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My dissertation consists of three chapters, each of which empirically examines 
impacts of U.S. health care policies on hospital care for a subgroup of disadvantaged 
populations. The first chapter studies the impacts of Medicaid coverage expansions for 
pregnant women on patient reallocation across hospitals. If patients from low-income 
zip codes, who are likely to gain coverage after expanded public insurance coverage, 
have limited hospital options due to a lack of payer source, they may be able to receive 
care at higher quality hospitals once they obtain coverage. Using Florida hospital data 
and the Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS) for 1988-1995, I find that low-income 
mothers who gained coverage following the expansions gave birth at higher quality 
hospitals—facilities with neonatal intensive care units and those with low postnatal 
complication rates. In the second chapter, I continue investigating the effects of 
expansion, but examine its impact on hospitals’ provision of indigent care, along with 
the impact of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, with its reductions in Medicare and 
Medicaid hospital payments, on hospitals’ supply of indigent care. The definition of 
hospital indigent care is, for the purpose of this dissertation, based on uncompensated 
care costs in dollars, volume of the uninsured, and amounts of unprofitable services 
provided. Using the Florida hospital data for 1990-2000, I find that these two health 
care policies reduced hospitals’ provision of indigent care, but to different extents, and 
that the policy impacts differed by hospital ownership type. The third chapter, a joint 
project with Kosali Simon, examines the impact of the Children’s Health Insurance 
 Program on hospital utilization for low-income children. The expansion of public 
insurance coverage results in two contrasting effects that could increase or decrease 
hospital care for low-income children. On the one hand, the gain of public insurance 
coverage will increase access to primary care, and this may prevent hospitalizations, 
particularly those with ambulatory care sensitive conditions, to some degree. On the 
other hand, the coverage gain means lower costs of care and thus may increase 
hospital care across the board. Using the NIS for 1996-2002, we find that 
hospitalization rates and intensity of care increased overall, but these increases 
originated from increased non-ambulatory care sensitive hospitalizations. 
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CHAPTER 1 
The Impact of Medicaid Expansion on Patient Reallocation Across Hospitals 
 
I. Introduction 
 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the U.S. government implemented two major 
health policies in order to improve health outcomes for low-income mothers. One was 
to provide more low-income pregnant women with public health insurance coverage, 
and the other was to provide medical care suppliers with higher payments for treating 
low-income mothers. A large body of prior research has shown that these policies 
succeeded in enhancing health outcomes for low-income patients, primarily through 
increasing the quantity of prenatal care: more visits to physicians and greater 
utilization of medical services during visits (Marquis and Long, 1999; Epstein and 
Newhouse, 1998; Currie and Gruber, 2001; Long et al, 2005). Despite extensive 
research on the achievements of the expansion policy, little is known about whether 
the expansion of public health insurance helps low-income mothers to receive care at 
higher quality hospitals. If those who obtain coverage also have better access to high-
quality hospitals, in addition to better access to prenatal care, this will contribute to 
enhancing their health outcomes. 
Previously, three studies examined how site of care for low-income pregnant 
women responded to Medicaid policy changes: Baker and Royalty (2000) for 
physician care; Duggan (2000) and Aizer et al (2005) for hospital care. Baker and 
Royalty (2000) studied impacts of Medicaid expansions and physician fee increases on 
reallocation of low-income mothers across physicians and showed patient reallocation 
between public and private physicians. Concerning hospital care, Duggan (2000) and 
Aizer et al (2005) found that increased Medicaid payments through the Medicaid 
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Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) program1 reallocated low-income mothers 
from public to private hospitals. With caution, both Baker and Royalty (2000) and 
Aizer et al (2005) suggested that this movement from public to private care providers 
enhanced quality of care, and thus should have improved health outcomes: Baker and 
Royalty (2000) believed that physician care in a private setting allows for more 
continuity of care, while Aizer et al (2005) assumed that private hospitals are likely to 
be higher quality because these are mainly used by privately insured patients, who 
have few constraints on hospital choice. Inspired by these three studies, I explore the 
impact of Medicaid coverage expansions on patient reallocation across hospitals, 
comparing several attributes of hospitals utilized by maternity patients before and after 
the policy change. Studying maternity patients has several advantages. First, virtually 
all babies are delivered in a hospital, unlike many diseases for which patients may or 
may not select hospital care. Therefore, we can get almost a full sample of childbirth 
patients and rule out selection problems. Second, pregnant women have enough time 
to research hospitals, compared to other patient groups that usually do not have such a 
long time to decide on their care providers. Third, a more practical reason to study 
birth is that pregnant women were major beneficiaries of nationwide Medicaid 
expansion policies in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Increased income thresholds for 
Medicaid eligibility during this period provided a larger number of low-income 
pregnant women with public health insurance coverage.  
Ideally, I would like to examine whether maternity patients who were 
previously uninsured but gained public insurance coverage were reallocated between 
hospitals, and, if they were, whether such changes were associated with improved 
quality of care, i.e., increased access to higher quality providers. However, the data 
                                                 
1
 Medicaid DSH payments are supplemental payments to hospitals that serve disproportionately large 
numbers of low-income patients. 
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sets available to me, Florida hospitals’ discharge data and the Nationwide Inpatient 
Sample (NIS), lack patient income information. Therefore, I use patients’ zip code 
median household income to classify patients into treatment and control groups, and 
study patient reallocation across zip code income categories. 
The objective of this paper is to empirically examine whether maternity 
patients from low-income zip codes are reallocated to different types of hospitals after 
Medicaid expansions, and if so, whether these hospitals are higher quality. Those from 
low-income zip codes are more likely to be uninsured and indigent, so have a higher 
probability of gaining coverage when the Medicaid program increases eligibility 
income thresholds. As a result, I expect that those from low-income zip codes are 
more likely to move to different hospitals after Medicaid expansions, particularly to 
those of higher quality if lack of coverage restricted their hospital options previously.  
Despite ongoing interest in quality of hospital care and a great deal of effort 
toward inventing a valid measure2, there is no consensus about which aspects of 
quality to measure (Jha et al, 2006). In this paper, I categorize hospitals based on 
hospital attributes and clinical outcomes—ownership type, teaching status, presence of 
NICU, obstetric volume, bed capacity, urban/rural status, and postpartum complication 
rates—and compare attributes of hospitals used by maternity patients from low-
income zip codes before and after Medicaid expansions. In particular, I focus on two 
hospital attributes that directly measure quality of hospital care—neonatal intensive 
care units (NICU) and postnatal complication rates—and examine whether utilization 
of hospitals with NICU or those with low complication rates increased among those 
from low-income zip codes after Medicaid expansions. Although hospitals may adjust 
their quality of care in response to policy implementations, this paper will not discuss 
                                                 
2
 Hospital Compare (the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services), Quality Check (the Joint 
Commission), US News and World Report, the Leapfrog Group Hospital Survey, HealthGrade, New 
York State Report Card, and so on. 
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those possible changes in hospital quality, but only discuss changes in sites of hospital 
care in settings in where hospital quality is not an endogenous variable. 
In order to examine the impact of coverage expansions on patient reallocation, 
I use discharges from all hospitals in Florida as well as 20 percent of community 
hospitals in the NIS, and select patients aged 15-44 who were hospitalized to give 
birth during 1988-1995. Without patient income information, I construct my treatment 
group and control groups based on patient zip code median household income: the 
treatment group is comprised of those whose zip code income levels were between 
100 and 185 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) (the income range that was 
above the eligibility income threshold prior to Medicaid expansions and below the 
income threshold after the expansions); the two control groups are: those whose zip 
code income levels were below 100 percent of the FPL and those whose zip code 
income levels were above 185 percent of the FPL.  
Conducting two sets of analysis, at the hospital level and at the patient level, I 
compare types of hospitals used by patients in the treatment group and those in the 
control groups. In the hospital level analysis, I examine whether the proportion of 
maternity patients in the treatment group increased at a certain type of hospital after 
Medicaid expansions. For example, if those in the treatment group obtained coverage 
and moved to hospitals with a NICU, the proportion of these mothers would increase 
at NICU hospitals. In the patient level analysis, I use conditional logit models to 
examine which of the hospital attributes determined patients’ choice of hospitals. In 
the national setting, however, lack of patient zip code information and a sampling 
nature in the NIS force me to use binary logit or linear probability models. Using each 
of the hospital attributes as a dependent variable, I separately estimate whether or not 
those from low-income zip codes chose hospitals with one attribute rather than 
hospitals without that attribute: for example, whether they chose FP hospitals over 
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NFP hospitals. Also, the availability of patient race information for some states allows 
me to investigate racial disparities in access to high-quality hospitals. Since non-
whites are over-represented among low-income patients, increased public insurance 
coverage is expected to reduce racial disparities in both quantity and quality of care. 
I find some evidence that Medicaid expansions helped those from low-income 
zip codes to give birth at higher quality hospitals. In Florida, the two eligibility 
expansions in 1989 and 1992 reallocated patients across hospitals to different extents. 
The 1989 expansion, which was the eligibility expansion alone, appeared to increase 
access to safety-net hospitals (teaching and public hospitals), hospitals with NICU, 
and those with good clinical outcomes. However, when the eligibility expansion was 
paired with a physician fee increase in 1992, maternity patients from low-income zip 
codes had further increased hospital choice sets, including hospitals of private 
ownership and hospitals with better clinical outcomes. The size of patient reallocation 
was larger after the 1989 expansion, which was targeted toward extremely indigent 
patients. In the national setting, my findings are consistent with those in Florida, 
particularly the results from the 1989 expansion. In other words, maternity patients 
from low-income zip codes were able to deliver at better safety-net hospitals and those 
with good clinical outcomes. I also demonstrate that maternity patients of color 
benefited the most, implying that racial disparities in access to high quality providers 
were somewhat reduced after coverage expansions. 
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section II describes the background of 
Medicaid policy changes, and Section III provides the conceptual framework. Section 
IV summarizes the findings of previous literature, and Section V explains empirical 
strategies and data sets. My results are discussed in Section VI, and Section VII 
provides further discussion and concludes the paper. 
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II. Background on the Medicaid Program 
 
Medicaid is an entitlement program under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, jointly 
funded by state and federal governments. Since its establishment in 1965, the 
Medicaid program has been a major source of health insurance for low-income 
individuals who otherwise would not be able to afford private health insurance. States 
have broad discretion to decide eligibility, scope of services and reimbursements. 
Before 1984, Medicaid eligibility was closely tied with the Aid for Families to 
Dependent Children (AFDC) program, so that only indigent, single mothers were 
eligible for Medicaid, and its income cutoffs were fairly low (Gruber, 1997).  
Between 1984 and 1987, however, the restriction on family structure had been 
lifted, and income cutoffs for Medicaid eligibility were raised significantly. By 1992, 
all states were required to provide Medicaid coverage to all children under age six and 
pregnant women with family income up to 133 percent of the federal poverty level 
(FPL), with the option of extending coverage up to 185 percent of the FPL. As a 
result, the fraction of women eligible for Medicaid greatly increased, from 20 percent 
in 1986 to about 45 percent in 1992 (Currie and Gruber, 1996). As in Currie and 
Gruber (2001), I take advantage of the variations in size and timing of the expansions 
across states in the study of the national sample. 
Before examining the policy impacts with the national sample, I extensively 
study hospitals and patients in the state of Florida3. Following the federal 
requirements, Florida extended Medicaid coverage three times in October 1987, July 
1989, and May 19924. Although the first event in 1987 was the largest increase in the 
eligible income limit from 47 to 100 percent of the FPL, I can only examine the last 
                                                 
3
 I choose the state of Florida because of many interesting features in its health care market, as well as 
the availability of the hospital universe and detailed data. Florida has the second highest uninsured rates 
in the nation—19.2 percent of the non-elderly population—and the fourth largest Medicaid population.  
4
 Table 1.1 summarizes the Medicaid policy changes related to obstetric care in Florida for 1987-1995. 
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two expansions (1989 and 1992) because data collection began only in 1988. In July 
1989, the income eligibility threshold was raised from 100 to 150 percent of the FPL, 
and then it was raised further, up to 185 percent of the FPL, in May 1992. Figure 1.1 
shows Medicaid enrollment growth and the trend of Medicaid deliveries in Florida. 
Although I cannot separate the enrollment of pregnant women from total enrollment, 
the growing Medicaid enrollment, along with increased number of Medicaid deliveries 
in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, confirms that the Medicaid expansion policy 
effectively helped low-income mothers to gain coverage and seek health care5.  
In addition to the increased income limits, Medicaid physician fee for obstetric 
care also increased in the nation (Currie et al, 1995): on average, the Medicaid to 
private fee ratio increased from 0.52 in 1989 to 0.80 in 1993. Also, the Florida 
government twice raised Medicaid physician fees for obstetric care. Firstly, in 1988, 
there was a large fee increase for global obstetric care6 from $315 to $800 ($1100 for 
high-risk patients)7. Secondly, in 1992, the global fee structure was switched to a 
separate fee system, under which physicians were paid $800 ($1100 for high-risk 
patients) for a delivery only, with an additional fee of $50 for a prenatal or postnatal 
care visit. For example, if a pregnant woman with Medicaid made 8.7 prenatal visits 
and one postnatal visit, i.e., the average number of prenatal and postnatal visits (Currie 
et al, 1995), the physician who treated her would receive $4858 in addition to $800, 
the fee for a non-high-risk delivery. Compared to the physician fee before 1992, the 
global obstetric fee increased 60 percent per patient (Norton, 1995): as a percentage of 
private payers’ average charges, Medicaid physician fees increased from 47 percent in 
1989 (Schwartz, 1991) to 66 percent9 in 1992. 
                                                 
5
 Since researchers did not find any increasing trend in births among Medicaid-eligible mothers 
(DeLeire et al, 2007), this increase in enrollment is not attributed to an increase in fertility. 
6
 Global obstetric care includes prenatal care, delivery, and postnatal care. 
7
 In Florida, the Medicaid physician fees for vaginal deliveries and c-sections were the same. 
8
 (8.7+1)×$50=$485. 
9
 I estimate this value based on the method discussed in Section VI.    
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[Table 1.1] Florida Medicaid Policies During 1987-1995 
Medicaid Eligibility Expansions Effective Date 
Income eligibility expanded from 47% to 100% of FPL October 1987 
Income eligibility expanded from 100% to 150% of FPL July 1989 
Income eligibility expanded from 150% to 185% of FPL May 1992 
Medicaid Obstetrical Fee Increases Effective Date 
Raising obstetrical global fees from $315 to $800 
Instituting a new global fee for $1100 for high-risk pregnant 
women 
1988 
Global obstetrical fees eliminated: new delivery-only fees of 
$800 and $1100 established for low- and high-risk deliveries, 
respectively. 
New per visit fee of $50 created for prenatal care, capped at 10 
visits per pregnancy for low-risk women and 14 visits for high-
risk women 
New per visit fee of $50 created for postpartum care, capped at 
two visits per pregnancy. 
New fee of $50 created for administration of Healthy Start risk 
assessment screen; $100 if completed in first trimester 
July 1992 
Source: Hill et al (1998) 
 
 
 
A. Medicaid Eligibility Income Threshold and Delivery 
 
[Figure 1.1] Florida Medicaid Eligibility, Delivery, and Enrollment  
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Medicaid Enrollment Growth in Florida
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B. Medicaid Enrollment 
[Figure 1.1] continued  
 
III. Conceptual Framework 
 
Hospital Care Decision 
Traditionally, low-income uninsured patients have limited hospital options to 
the extent that they have to depend primarily on safety-net hospitals, i.e., public or 
major teaching hospitals. These hospitals take care of the majority of low-income 
patients under an obligation to provide care for the indigent in return for receiving 
government funds. By contrast, non-safety-net hospitals, particularly high-quality 
institutions, may be reluctant to accept low-income uninsured patients due to 
uncertainty about receiving payment for providing care. 
The site of hospital care is determined by patients, physicians, and hospitals: 
patients demand hospital care, hospitals supply the care, and physicians link these two 
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sides. Once a patient chooses her physician, her hospital options are restricted to those 
which the physician has admitting privileges with. In that sense, patients’ hospital 
choices are influenced by their physicians to a great extent (Luft et al, 1990; Burns and 
Wholey, 1992). However, patients can play a major role in selecting hospitals by 
choosing treatment physician-hospital bundles (McGuirk and Porell, 1984; Tay, 
2003), and by actively expressing their preferences to physicians (Wolinsky and Kurz, 
1984). If physicians, as agents, take into account patients’ preference for hospitals, or 
if physicians’ hospital choice depends on many of the same factors that influence 
patients’ hospital choice, physicians’ choice of hospitals will reflect the outcomes as if 
patients maximize utility by independently choosing hospitals (Porell and Adam, 
1995). In this paper, whether patients themselves or their agents (physicians) choose 
hospitals is not an important issue. What matters is that whoever selects a hospital has 
relative preferences for one hospital attribute over the other (e.g. teaching hospital 
over non-teaching hospital) when all other attributes are constant, and these relative 
preferences should be systemically reflected in hospital admissions.     
I conjecture that Medicaid expansions provide incentives for both the supply 
side (hospitals) and the demand side (low-income patients) to change their behavior 
with regard to hospital admission and selection patterns, respectively. The rationale 
behind this conjecture is based on the following two assumptions: first, hospitals, 
maximizing profits or some combination of profits and other elements, prefer paying 
patients; second, all else being equal, patients will choose the highest quality hospitals 
among those available to them. 
On the supply side, hospitals can rank patients based on profitability: 
according to the Lewin Group (2005), hospitals’ payment-to-cost ratio is 1.22 for the 
privately insured (most profitable), 0.14 for indigent and uninsured patients who 
usually incur uncompensated care (the least profitable), and the profitability of 
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Medicaid patients is between these two (Medicaid hospital payments including DSH 
cover 92% of the costs). Due to hospitals’ preference for profitable patients, I 
conjecture that a level of access to different types of hospitals varies according to the 
profitability of their payer source, i.e., patients’ coverage types. In particular, 
opportunity costs of treating those without coverage may be greater for high-quality 
hospitals, which can attract a large number of privately insured patients. As a result, 
low-income uninsured patients are expected to have the most difficulty in accessing 
high-quality care, in addition to have the least access to care in overall. Despite low 
reimbursement, hospitals receive guaranteed payments for treating Medicaid patients. 
The certainty of Medicaid payments, as well as higher amounts than those received 
from average uninsured patients, suggests that Medicaid patients are more profitable 
than low-income uninsured patients, who mostly end up paying a significantly small 
amount (14% of the costs), or paying nothing at all (uncompensated care). Therefore, 
Medicaid expansions, by changing insurance status of nearly poor mothers from 
uninsured to Medicaid, create more profitable patients for hospitals and consequently 
increase the pool of patients with a reliable payer source. With the increased 
profitability of low-income mothers, I hypothesize that coverage expansions would 
increase hospitals’ willingness to provide care to low-income mothers, including high-
quality institutions. Obviously, the underlying assumption is that hospitals have extra 
capacity to admit additional patients, and marginal revenue from a low-income patient 
is greater than marginal cost of treating her. Considering low occupancy rates in the 
1990s—59 percent in Florida10 and no more than 65 percent in the nation (Bazzoli et 
                                                 
10
 I calculate this occupancy rate based on obstetric care only for Florida hospitals, which is total 
inpatient days divided by total available bed days corresponding obstetric care. 59 percent is the 
average of the occupancy rates for 1988-1995. 
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al, 2003)11—I conjecture that hospitals did have room for additional patients as long 
as the marginal revenue of care is larger than the marginal cost. 
On the demand side, patients’ hospital choice depends on various factors, such 
as preference, convenience, knowledge, experience, insurance coverage, quality of 
care, hospital reputation, and recommendations by friends and physicians. In this 
paper, I am only able to examine the relationship between changes in insurance 
coverage and hospital choice, assuming that all else is constant, or other effects are 
averaged out. Medicaid expansions provide indigent mothers with not only low-cost 
health insurance coverage, but also possibly more and better hospital options. As a 
result, those who gain coverage are expected to reoptimize their utility functions and 
thereby select the best hospital given a new, expanded choice set.  
Combining the effects on the demand and supply sides of hospital care, I 
hypothesize that the expansion of the Medicaid program would have reallocated low-
income mothers between hospitals, and that the hospitals used by low-income mothers 
who gained coverage would be of higher quality than those used by uninsured low-
income patients.  
My hypotheses above are based on several assumptions. On the supply side, 
the underlying assumption is that hospitals available to low-income uninsured patients 
are different from those available to paying patients, including Medicaid patients, and 
the latter may be of higher quality than the former. However, if hospitals do not view 
Medicaid and uninsured patients very differently due to low Medicaid payments, I will 
find little reallocation effects after the expansion. For the robustness check, I will use 
variations in Medicaid payments across states and examine whether states with lower 
Medicaid payments had smaller reallocation effects. On the demand side, the 
                                                 
11
 Although there are regional and seasonal variations in hospital occupancy rates (higher occupancy 
rates in regions with larger black populations and during the winter) (Chiswick, 1975), occupancy rates 
had been universally low across the nation until the mid 1990s. 
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underlying assumption is that patients who gain coverage, in order to move to 
different hospitals, should be able to access physicians who have admitting privileges 
at the hospitals to which they want to move. This implies that patients with Medicaid 
coverage may see a different set of physicians than they could without coverage, and 
these new physicians have admitting privileges with higher quality hospitals. 
Alternatively, the patients may see the same set of physicians, but the gain of 
Medicaid coverage can help them to be referred to their preferred hospitals in the 
following process: on the patient side, those who gained coverage may make more 
visits to physicians or increase interactions with physicians during a visit, which 
improve physicians’ understanding of patient health and preference, and thereby 
enhance matching processes between patients and hospitals; on the physician side, 
expected Medicaid payments may provide a greater incentive to increase interactions 
with patients and accommodate their preferences. If this intermediate process fails, we 
may see little effect on patient reallocation.  
On the demand side, there are at least four other factors that could potentially 
reduce policy impacts on patient reallocation: low take-up rates, crowding-out effects, 
low elasticity of demand for high-quality care, and residential segregation. First, not 
all of the Medicaid-eligible population takes up Medicaid: even if a larger number of 
low-income individuals become eligible for Medicaid, only those who actually enroll 
in the program can take advantage of its benefits. Considering that a high percentage 
of births (35-40%) have been financed by Medicaid, however, low take-up rates may 
be less of a problem. Second, the crowding-out group are those who previously had 
private or other forms of coverage but switched to Medicaid. Since private insurance 
payers provide more generous reimbursements (Currie and Gruber, 2001), the 
crowding out group are likely to receive lower quantity and quality of care if they 
switch to Medicaid. I will address concern about crowding-out effects in Section V. 
 14 
Third, low-income patients who face lower costs of care and better hospital options as 
a result of the coverage expansion may not be very responsive to the quality of 
hospital care: for those with low socioeconomic status, their marginal costs (in terms 
of time and money) of searching new (high-quality) hospitals may be extremely high 
compared to their marginal benefits. Fourth, they actually may be willing to move to 
higher quality hospitals but unable to do so if they reside in areas where high-quality 
hospitals are too far away (Currie and Thomas, 1995; Aizer et al, 2005). There is some 
evidence that hospital racial segregation is partly due to residential segregation (Smith, 
1998; Sarrazin et al, 2009). If the same logic is applied to disparities in access to high 
quality care between low-income and high-income patients, low-income patients may 
have more constraints on access to high-quality care because their residence is 
geographically isolated from high-quality hospitals.      
 
Hospital Quality 
Hospital quality is a complex, multi-dimensional concept, which can range 
from clinical outcomes to resource utilization, treatment intensity, patient safety, and 
satisfaction. Recently, a great deal of attention has been paid to hospital quality with 
regard to patients’ choice of hospitals (Luft et al, 1990; Burns and Wholey, 1992; 
Phibbs et al, 1993; Hodgkin, 1996; Chernew et al, 1998; Tay, 2003; Howard, 2005). 
Despite limited information in hospital administrative data, previous studies widely 
used clinical outcomes as a direct quality measure (mortality or complication rates), 
and considered hospital attributes such as hospital ownership, teaching status, high-
tech services, patient volume, medical staff level, or bed capacity as an indirect quality 
measure. Particularly for obstetric care, possible outcome quality measures are 
neonatal mortality rates (Phibbs et al, 1993), complication rates (Romano et al, 2005), 
adverse outcomes (Epstein et al, 2008), and other procedure and patient safety 
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indicators invented by the HCUP. In this paper, I use the risk-adjusted postpartum 
complication rates for the clinical outcome measure. 
Unlike the direct quality measure, how to interpret the indirect measures is 
debatable. Among those indirect quality measures, hospitals with NICU are 
unambiguously considered higher quality providers than hospitals without a NICU. 
For the rest of hospital attributes, however, it is not clear whether a hospital with one 
attribute is better than the one without it. In particular, the relationship between 
hospital ownership and quality of care is highly controversial (Eggleston et al, 2006). 
Some argue that FP hospitals provide higher quality care in order to attract profitable 
patients (Mukamel, 1999; Taylor et al, 1999; Sloan, 2003), while others claim the 
opposite: FP hospitals provide lower quality of care because profit maximizers only 
care about profits, but not the quality of care (Shen, 2002; McClellan and Staiger, 
1999; Norton, 1998). Another argument is that the quality of care does not differ by 
hospital ownership type (Sloan et al, 2001), or at least not between private FP and 
private NFP hospitals.  
Similarly, the relationship between teaching status and quality of care is 
uncertain. Generally, teaching hospitals are known to provide high-quality care for 
heart diseases and other surgical procedures (Kupersmith, 2004), but there is no such 
evidence for obstetric care (Finkelstein et al, 1998). In fact, Phibbs et al (1993) found 
that privately insured patients preferred non-teaching hospitals because they provide a 
more private environment during delivery. Larger and higher volume hospitals seem 
to offer more efficient and better-quality care, but again, there is no consensus about 
the relationship between hospital size (or volume) and the quality of care: the hospital 
size reflects a level of services available, and larger facilities can produce economies 
of scale, which improves resource allocation; some studies showed that a higher 
patient volume is positively correlated with lower infant mortality (Rogowski et al, 
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2004; Phibbs et al, 2007), and HealthGrades (2007) take obstetric volume into account 
when they determine hospital rankings.  
 
IV. Literature Review 
 
Prior research on Medicaid policy can be categorized into two groups: studies on 
coverage expansions and studies on payment increases. The coverage expansions 
directly provide health insurance coverage for a larger number of low-income, medical 
care consumers, whereas the payment increase creates financial incentives for medical 
service providers to offer more care to them.  
A substantial amount of research has been devoted to the costs and benefits of 
the Medicaid expansion policy. In particular, previous literature has highlighted the 
achievements of this policy for the demand side: increased access to care, and 
enhanced health status for low-income mothers and newborns (Marquis and Long, 
1999; Epstein and Newhouse, 1998; Curie and Fahr, 2001; Currie and Gruber, 1996 
and 2001; Kaestner et al, 1999; Long et al, 2005; Dafny and Gruber, 2005). However, 
the impact of this policy on the supply side has been overlooked, although Medicaid 
expansions can also alter suppliers’ motivation in relation to the provision of medical 
care for low-income patients. More specifically, Medicaid expansions increase 
hospitals’ expected payments for treating those who were previously uninsured but 
became eligible for Medicaid. The certainty of payments for treating these patients 
may motivate hospitals and physicians to accept more low-income patients. If higher 
quality providers become more available to the new Medicaid population, this 
increased access to higher quality of care will be another channel that leads to 
improved health outcomes for low-income patients. However, this mechanism has not 
been discussed as the impact of coverage expansions. 
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For policies concerning payment increases, the following three policies have 
been discussed at length: first, changes in Medicaid hospital reimbursements (Dranove 
and White, 1988; Dafny, 2005); second, the Medicaid DSH program (Aizer et al, 
2005; Baicker and Staiger, 2005; Coughlin, 1998, 2000, 2001 and 2005; Duggan, 
2000); and third, changes in Medicaid physician fees (Currie et al, 1995; Cohen and 
Cunningham, 1995; Baker and Royalty, 2000; Gray, 2001; Cunningham and Nicholas, 
2005; Decker, 2007). Except for Baker and Royalty (2000), Duggan (2000), and Aizer 
et al (2005), all of these studies focused on the increase in quantity and intensity of 
care in response to one of the three policy changes.  
Among the few exceptions, Baker and Royalty (2000) examined the impacts of 
Medicaid expansions and obstetric physician fee increases on reallocation of maternity 
patients in terms of physician care. Using the 1987 and 1991 Survey of Young 
Physicians, they found some intriguing results as follows: Medicaid expansions 
increased access to physicians who worked in public settings such as hospital clinics 
and emergency rooms, but not to those working in private offices; however, increased 
physician fees made those private physicians available to low-income patients. Since 
their study assumed that private physicians provided higher quality care, their findings 
suggest that low-income mothers received better physician care after the fee increase. 
If this increased access to higher quality physicians led them to give birth at higher 
quality hospitals, one can expect greater improvements in their health outcomes. 
However, they did not discuss the policy impacts on hospital care. 
As for hospital care, both Duggan (2000) and Aizer et al (2005), using 
California hospital data from the early 1990s, examined the impact of the Medicaid 
DSH program on patient reallocation and health outcomes. The findings of these two 
studies imply that low hospital payments might have put Medicaid patients at a 
disadvantage, with restricted hospital options, but the extra DSH payments enabled 
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them to receive treatment at hospitals of the same quality as those used by the 
privately insured. Duggan (2000) showed that Medicaid mothers, who became more 
profitable due to the DSH payments, were reallocated from public to private hospitals, 
but he did not find evidence for improvement in their health outcomes. However, 
Aizer et al (2005) found that the DSH program did improve health outcomes for 
Medicaid mothers by moving them to the same hospitals used by privately insured 
mothers. Although Duggan (2000) studied the impact of the DSH program on 
reallocation of Medicaid mothers in California for 1988-1995, when Medicaid 
coverage was greatly expanded as well, he did not take into account possible effects of 
the coverage expansions. Also, he examined the reallocation with regard to hospital 
ownership type alone, but not with regard to overall quality of hospitals. In this paper, 
I use several hospital characteristics to determine quality of hospitals, and examine the 
impact of Medicaid expansions on reallocation of low-income mothers. Unlike Aizer 
et al (2005), who implicitly assumed the reallocation of Medicaid mothers towards 
higher quality hospitals after the increase in Medicaid DSH payments and mainly 
discussed their improved health outcomes, I explicitly study the reallocation 
mechanism through which the expansion policy may lead to improved health 
outcomes, examining the switch to higher quality of hospitals among low-income 
mothers. 
Patients’ choice of hospital has been widely discussed in many different 
settings. To my knowledge, however, no study has related the Medicaid expansion 
policy to hospital choice behavior of low-income patients. Though not very recent, 
Porell and Adams et al (1996) produced an excellent review of hospital choice 
models. Based on their study, I find that previous studies have several features in 
common. Firstly, the majority of them have restricted their samples to Medicare 
patients hospitalized with heart disease, because they have identical hospital choice 
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sets and out-of-pocket costs of care. Phibbs et al (1993) and Gaskin et al (2001) are 
the only two studies that examined Medicaid mothers’ hospital choice. Phibbs et al 
(1993) used cross section data of California in 1985, so they were unable to examine 
changes in hospital admissions or selection patterns over time. Gaskin et al (2001) did 
examine the change in the type of hospitals used by low-income mothers in response 
to increased price competition, but they did not relate Medicaid policies to hospital 
choice. Moreover, their binary logit models can explain only one of many aspects of 
hospital quality, so they examined whether or not low-risk Medicaid mothers went to 
safety-net hospitals. As a result, they did not provide a comprehensive explanation for 
how other hospital attributes influenced patients’ hospital choice. Secondly, prior 
research has focused on the role of patient characteristics such as race, severity of 
illness, income, or insurance type in the hospital choice model (Nichols, 2005; Aizer 
et al, 2005). However, this paper focuses more on how hospital attributes, particularly 
quality of hospitals, influenced patients’ hospital selection decisions. 
Admittedly, patients’ hospital choices are influenced by their physicians to a 
certain degree. Like most previous research, except for Burns and Wholey (1992), lack 
of data is the reason that I cannot control for physician characteristics in my hospital 
choice model. As explained in Section III, However, I agree with Tay (2003) that 
patients do play a major role in selecting hospitals by choosing physicians who are 
more likely to have the same preferences as to hospitals or to accommodate their tastes 
(Dranove et al, 1992), and by letting their preferences be known to physicians. 
Ultimately, it is the patient who makes the final decision, based on the best 
information available from her physician and all other possible sources. 
Finally, literature in epidemiology and public health provides some 
explanations for how well aggregate level income variables such as zip code income 
predict individual income levels. Using zip code income as a proxy for individual 
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income could be problematic, and the magnitude of biases resulting from using this 
aggregate income level varies by the size of the zip code and the year in which the zip 
code was established12.  I expect a correlation between individual household income 
and zip code income for the 1990 Census to be between 0.3 and 0.5 because of the 
following reasons: Soobader et al (2001) presented the correlation between individual 
income and 1990 census tract/block income as 0.43-0.44, by merging the National 
Health Interview Survey (NHIS), which includes individuals’ family income 
information, with census tract/block income in the 1990 Census. Considering that zip 
code and census tract income levels are highly correlated (0.78-0.88), the correlation 
between zip code income in the 1990 Census and individual household income is 
expected to be lower than 0.44, but above 0.30. This is consistent with the correlation 
for the 1980 Census: Geronimus et al (1996) showed that the correlation between zip 
code income in the 1980 Census and personal income is about 0.4, linking two data 
sources, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) in 1985 and the National 
Maternal and Infant Health Survey (NMIHS) in 1988, to the 1980 Census data (the 
correlation was 0.39 for the PSID and 0.35 for the NMIHS). Since the correlation 
between zip code income and individual income level, 0.4, is quite modest, I study 
policy effects across zip code income groups, instead of using zip code income as a 
proxy for patient income. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 I consult with Nancy Krieger, who is an expert in the relationship between aggregate level and 
individual level socioeconomic variables. 
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V. Data and Empirical Strategy 
 
(1) Data 
 
To examine whether Medicaid expansions reallocated low-income mothers across 
hospitals, ideally, I would like to use longitudinal data sets for women who gave birth 
at least twice during my study period, the first time when they were uninsured and the 
second after they obtained coverage. Then I would be able to compare their site of 
care before and after the coverage change. Unfortunately, such data set does not exist.  
My main data sources are Florida hospital data and the Nationwide Inpatient Sample 
(NIS): both are pooled cross-section. The Florida data sets, provided by the Florida 
Agent for Health Care Administration (AHCA), consist of hospital discharge and 
financial data files, and include the universe of Florida hospitals. The discharge data 
sets contain patient information such as age, race13, sex, residential county and zip 
code14, payer source, DRG code, principle diagnosis and procedure code, type and 
source of admission, and total charges. The hospital financial data sets contain hospital 
information such as ownership type, teaching status, bed capacity (number of licensed 
beds), presence of neonatal intensive care units, obstetric volume (number of 
labor/delivery procedures), and hospital location (county and zip code). Using hospital 
identifiers, I merge these hospital variables with the discharge data sets. 
The NIS is the counterpart of the Florida inpatient discharge data sets in the 
national setting. Since 1988, the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) has 
annually released all inpatient discharges of a 20 percent sample of U.S. community 
                                                 
13
 Patients’ race information in Florida is available from 1992 onwards. 
14
 In my analysis, patient zip code information serves two purposes: first, I use patient zip code income 
as a proxy for patient household income, so that I identify my treatment and control groups based on the 
zip code income levels; second, distance to hospital from patient residence is the distance between 
patient zip code and hospital zip code. 
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hospitals15 from participating states. The NIS provides patient information similar to 
the Florida discharge data, but limited hospital information: hospital location (state, 
county, and zip code), ownership type, teaching status, bed capacity, and urban/rural 
status are included, but NICU variable is not available. The weakness of the NIS is 
lack of patients’ zip code information, but the NIS includes two indicator variables for 
the range of zip code income levels: ZIPINC4 breaks down zip codes into four income 
categories, while ZIPINC8 breaks down zip codes into eight categories. The advantage 
of using the NIS is that the availability of patient race information for several states16 
in some years enables me to examine racial disparities in the policy effects. 
 From the Census 1990 and 2000, I obtain zip code level data such as household 
median income, longitude, latitude, and historical poverty thresholds. 
 
(2) Sample Construction and Identification Strategy 
My sample is restricted to pregnant women aged 15-44 who were hospitalized 
for childbirth17 during 1988-1995 in the Florida discharge data sets, as well as those in 
the NIS (8 states for 1988 and 19 states for 1995). Patients admitted through 
emergency rooms are not included in the main analysis, but separately analyzed in a 
later section. Transferred patients from other hospitals/institutions are dropped along 
with those treated at hospitals where fewer than ten deliveries were performed in a 
year18. 
                                                 
15
 Community hospitals are defined as short-term, non-Federal, general and other hospitals, excluding 
hospital units of other institutions (e.g., prisons). They include OB-GYN, ENT, orthopedic, cancer, 
pediatric, public, and academic medical hospitals; however, long-term care, rehabilitation, psychiatric, 
and alcoholism and chemical dependency hospitals are excluded, unless these types of discharges are 
from community hospitals (HCUP, 2008). 
16
 Patients’ race information is available for California, Iowa, Massachusetts, and New Jersey (1988-
95); Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas, Maryland, New York, and South Carolina (1993-95); Florida and 
Wisconsin (1992-95). 
17
 Childbirth patients are identified by their DRG codes (370-375). 
18
 Ten and seven percent of the discharges in Florida and in the NIS report admissions through 
emergency room, respectively. 
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Now, I need to identify low-income patients who obtained coverage after the 
expansion policy. As mentioned above, with the ideal (longitudinal) data unavailable, 
the other method to identify new Medicaid-eligible patients is to use patients’ 
household income and examine whether their income levels were between 100 and 
185 percent of the FPL (the old and new income threshold for Medicaid). The 
challenging task is to identify this patient subgroup with patients’ income information 
unavailable: neither the Florida data nor the NIS do not provide patients’ household 
income information19.  
Here, I identify the treatment group and the control groups, using patients’ zip 
code household median income as a proxy for patients’ household income: the zip 
code income data from Census 1990 are linked to patients’ zip codes in the Florida 
discharge records. In Figure 1.2, I examine number of Medicaid births across zip code 
income percentiles, as well as proportion of Medicaid births within each of the zip 
code income categories. The figure shows that Medicaid births increased when the 
Medicaid expansions took place. The increase was larger in lower income zip code 
groups, and most of the increase occurred in the lower 50 percent of the zip code 
distribution. Figure 1.3 shows births by coverage type in Florida in the same period. 
The percentage of Medicaid births was below 20 percent in 1988, but increased to 30 
percent in 1990 and to 41 percent in 1993. 
 
 
 
                                                 
19
 If I had patients’ income information, I would construct a treatment group with those who were 
previously uninsured but became eligible for Medicaid due to the eligibility rule changes, and examine 
their choice of hospitals before and after the expansions. Then I would compare this treatment group 
with two control groups whose coverage type should not have been affected by the expansions such as 
an always Medicaid-eligible group (extremely indigent mothers, who should have gained Medicaid 
coverage before the expansions and continuously had it throughout my sample period) and a never 
Medicaid-eligible group (high-income patients probably with private coverage, who should never have 
been eligible for Medicaid during the sample period). 
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[Figure 1.2] Medicaid Birth across Zip Code Income Categories in Florida 
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[Figure 1.3] Birth by Coverage Type in Florida  
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Based on the zip code income levels, I define a treatment group for the 1989 
expansion as all patients who resided in zip codes whose income levels were in the 
lower 10 to 30 percent of the income distribution (corresponding to 100-150 percent of 
the FPL), while a treatment group for the 1992 expansion is defined as those who 
resided in zip codes whose income levels were in the lower 30 to 45 percent of the 
distribution20 (corresponding to 150-185 percent of the FPL). I separately look at 
maternity patients from extremely low-income zip codes (those residing in zip codes 
whose median income levels were in the bottom 10 percent of the zip code 
distribution), and maternity patients from high-income zip codes (those residing in zip 
codes where the income levels were in the upper 55 percent of the distribution). Graph 
(a) in Figure 1.4 presents proportions of Medicaid births across the patient subgroups: 
the proportions of Medicaid births significantly increase for maternity patients in the 
treatment group and those from the extremely poor zip codes21. 
For the NIS data, which do not contain patients’ zip codes, I use ZIPINC8 and 
ZIPINC4, the indicator variables for zip code income brackets. Figure 1.5 presents 
proportions of Medicaid births over time across the eight zip code income categories 
(ZIPINC8). The proportion increased to a great degree among the first three zip code 
income groups, which account for about 30 percent of the discharges. Therefore, I 
define the treatment group as patients from zip codes whose median household income 
levels were between $15,000 and $25,000, the income range that is above the old  
                                                 
20
 Based on poverty thresholds for a four-member family in the Census guideline, the zip code income 
cutoff for 100 percent of the FPL was $15,000 in 1989; the income cutoff for 185 percent of the FPL 
was $25,000; the income cutoff for 300 percent of the FPL was $40,000. 
21
 If individual income levels are homogeneous within zip codes, i.e., everyone within the same zip 
code has the same income level as the zip code median income level, proportion of Medicaid births 
across the patient subgroups for each expansion should look like those in Graph (b) in Figure 1.4: the 
proportion of Medicaid births in the treatment group jumps from zero to one when one of the 
expansions took place (red and blue solid lines). Since everyone from extremely low-income zip codes 
(zip code income less than 100 percent of the FPL) should have Medicaid, the proportion of Medicaid 
births in these zip codes should be constant at one (orange dotted line). On the contrary, no one from 
high-income zip codes (zip code income above 185 percent of the FPL) should have Medicaid, which 
means that the Medicaid proportion in the richest zip codes should stay at zero (black dotted line). 
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[Figure 1.4] Proportion of Medicaid Birth (Florida)  
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[Figure 1.5] Proportion of Medicaid Birth by Zip Code Income Category (NIS)  
 
eligibility income threshold but below the new threshold: these are corresponding to 
the lower second and third categories of ZIPINC8. I also separately examine maternity 
patients from extremely low-income zip codes and those from high-income zip codes: 
zip code income levels below $15,000 (the lowest income category in ZIPINC8) are 
defined as extremely poor zip codes, and zip code income levels above $25,000 (the 
upper five categories in ZIPINC8) are considered high-income zip codes. Then in 
Figure 1.6, I break down patients by coverage type: the figure shows that the 
proportion of Medicaid births increased by 13 percentage points from 1988 to 1995, 
from 24 to 37 percentages, which is a moderate increase compared to Florida. 
In addition to whether she has health insurance coverage and what kind of 
coverage she has, a patient’s risk level may play a role in her hospital choice decision, 
According to Phibbs et al (1993), high-risk patients are more sensitive to quality of  
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[Figure 1.6] Proportion of Birth by Coverage Type (NIS)  
 
care and thereby show different hospital selection patterns, and high-risk mothers with 
Medicaid are less able to deliver at high-quality hospitals (those with NICU) than 
those with private coverage. If Medicaid mothers are discriminated because of their 
payer source, which gives low reimbursement to hospitals than private payers, we can 
infer that high-risk, uninsured mothers would have even lower chances to receive care 
at high-quality hospitals. Therefore, the coverage gain may be more beneficial for 
high-risk patients among the indigent. However, there are several possibilities that 
may reduce the policy effects for high-risk patients: first, the barrier to high-quality 
providers for Medicaid mothers may be as high as that of uninsured patients; second, 
if most of newly eligible mothers are high-risk due to the lack of a regular source of 
care before pregnancy, they can be sorted into high-quality hospitals regardless of the 
coverage gain; third, the coverage gain may decrease the risk-level through increased 
care to prenatal care. 
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In order to check whether and how patients’ risk levels influence the choice of 
hospitals for maternity patients, I further break down the treatment and the control 
groups into high-risk and non-high-risk groups. High-risk pregnancies are determined 
by patients’ diagnosis codes: if a patient has at least one of the general comorbidities 
listed in Elixhauser et al (1998) or the specific obstetric complications listed in 
Gregory et al (2002), she is defined as high-risk. According to Elixhauser et al (1998), 
chronic heart disease, liver disease, diabetes, and renal failure are examples of high-
risk diagnoses, while Gregory et al (2002) defined advanced maternal age (over 35 
years old), preterm, malpresentation, and maternal soft tissue condition as high-risk 
obstetric conditions, which potentially require elective primary cesarean section. 
 
(3) Model Specification 
My main objective is to evaluate whether maternity patients from low-income 
zip codes, who are more likely to gain Medicaid coverage, move to different types of 
hospitals after Medicaid expansions, and if so, whether their new choice represents 
higher quality of care. In doing so, I conduct two sets of analyses at the hospital level 
and at the patient level, separately. At the hospital level, I examine proportion of 
maternity patients from low-income zip codes (treatment group), and it relation with 
each of hospital attributes: if the proportion increased at FP hospitals after the 
expansion, I interpret that those in the treatment group moved to FP hospitals. The 
advantage of conducting this hospital level analysis is that the availability of hospital 
identifiers allows me to construct hospital-level panel structure and examine changes 
in the proportion of low-income mothers within the same hospitals over time. 
Moreover, I can indirectly test crowding-out effects at the hospital level. However, the 
weakness of this hospital level analysis is that we cannot control for distance to 
hospital, which is considered one of the important determinants in hospital choice 
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decision. Therefore, I conduct a patient level analysis, controlling for zip code distance 
between patient and hospital. Here, I use a discrete choice model to study how each 
hospital attribute influences patients’ hospital choice. 
 
Hospital Level Analysis 
Taking advantage of the hospital panel structure, I estimate hospital fixed-
effect models, in which I can control for unobserved, time-invariant heterogeneity 
across hospitals. The baseline econometric models are as follows:  
 
[Model 1] htthhthtg YearHospXPOSTY εββ +++×⋅+= 8810   
[Model 2] htthhststhtg YearHospXELIGELIGY εβββ +++×⋅+⋅+= 88210   
 
Model 1 is applied to the Florida hospitals and Model 2 to the hospitals in the NIS. 
The dependent variable, Yhtg, is a proportion of patient subgroup g at hospital h in year 
t, where the patient subgroups consist of the treatment group (those from low-income 
zip codes), those from extremely poor zip codes, and those from high-income zip 
codes. The proportion of maternity patients from low-income zip codes is the number 
of patients in the treatment group divided by the total number of patients who came to 
hospital h in year t.  
88hX  is a vector of hospital dummy variables measured by the value of 1988, 
which will rule out endogeneity problems: private for-profit (FP), public, teaching, 
high-volume, large (in terms of number of licensed beds), presence of NICU22, low 
complication rates, and urban hospitals construct each dummy variable that takes the 
value of one, while hospitals without such attribute—private not-for-profit (NFP), 
non-teaching, low-volume, small, lack of NICU facilities, high complication rates, and 
                                                 
22
 The NICU variable is included only in the Florida analysis.  
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rural hospitals—take the value of zero, respectively. I will explain how I construct 
these hospital dummy variables in the next section. 
In the Florida analysis, I estimate Model 1 for the 1989 expansion (with 
POST89) and the 1992 expansion (with POST92), separately. POST89 takes a value of 
one for the years after the 1989 expansion (1990-1995), and zero for the pre-expansion 
period (1988-1989). POST92 takes a value of one for the post 1992 expansion period 
(1993-1995), and zero, otherwise. 88ht XPOST ×  is a vector of interaction terms 
between each of the hospital attributes in 88hX  and the policy indicator. The coefficient 
of the interaction term 1β  captures whether the proportion of those from low-income 
zip codes increased at hospitals with each attribute in X compared to those without it 
after the policy changes. For example, the coefficient of (POST89×NICU) indicates 
whether the proportion of those from low-income zip codes increased after 1989 at 
hospitals with NICU relative to those without a NICU. 
In the national analysis, I estimate Model 2, which is the same set-up as Model 
1, but replaces the binary policy indicator ( tPOST ) with a simulated fraction of 
women eligible for Medicaid in state s and year t ( stELIG ). Using the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) data of 1987-1996, I take a random sample of women aged 
15-44 in each year, and use this same sample across states to calculate the fraction of 
women who would have been eligible for Medicaid if they lived in the state during 
that year and became pregnant. This simulated fraction only captures the generosity of 
the Medicaid program across states, eliminating other confounding effects such as 
state-specific economic conditions and different demographic compositions. 
Another set of dependent variables is constructed based on patients’ health 
insurance coverage. Medicaid expansions should increase the proportion of Medicaid 
patients at the hospital level, particularly at hospitals which admit more low-income 
mothers after the expansions, while the proportion of the uninsured should decrease. 
 33 
The comparison between the proportion of maternity patients from low-income zip 
codes (treatment group) and the proportion of Medicaid patients enables me to 
indirectly test crowding-effects. Since the crowding out group should have had access 
to their preferred hospitals before switching to Medicaid, there should be little 
reallocation across hospitals for these patients. In the extreme case, if all new 
beneficiaries are the crowding-out group, they would have little incentive to move to 
different hospitals, which means no patient reallocation across hospitals. In this case, 
the proportion of Medicaid patients will increase at the hospital level because of the 
change in their insurance status, while the proportion of those from low-income zip 
codes will stay the same. As a result, an increase in the proportion of Medicaid 
patients without accompanying an increase in the proportion of patients from low-
income zip codes indicates crowding-out effects. 
 
Patient Level Analysis 
In the patient level analysis, I use McFadden’s conditional logit model in order 
to examine how each of hospital attributes influenced patients’ hospital choice. Unlike 
OLS regression or binary logit models, the conditional logit, one of discrete choice 
models, can deal with dependent variables that have unordered, choice-specific 
multiple categorical values. This conditional logit model focuses on explaining how 
attributes of the choice (e.g. hospital ownership type, teaching status, etc) influence 
choosers’ decision, as opposed to multinomial logit model, an alternative family of the 
discrete choice models, which examines how attributes of the chooser (e.g. patient’s 
age, sex, income, etc) influence the choice behavior. Using hospital attributes in the 
year of 1988 as the explanatory variables, I compare hospital choice behavior for the 
treatment and control groups before and after the expansions. Again, Model 1 is for 
the Florida data and Model 2 for the NIS data. 
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Model 1: ijtijijijg STPOXXV εγβα +×⋅+⋅+= 8888     
Model 2: ijstijijijg ELIGXXV εγβα +×⋅+⋅+= 8888        
 
ijgV  is the level of utility for patient i in a subgroup g choosing hospital  j among J 
alternatives. The chosen hospital must give the patient greater utility compared to 
other hospitals in her choice set. This utility is a linear function of hospital attributes 
as well as the interaction terms between each of the hospital attributes and the policy 
indicator: POST23 for the Florida data and ELIG for the NIS data. The β coefficients 
are the natural log of the odds ratio of a patient initially being treated at a hospital with 
the attribute in X to a hospital without that attribute. The coefficients of the interaction 
terms (γ ) capture the impact of Medicaid expansion on changes in patients’ hospital 
choice. The hospital attributes ( 88ijX ) include distance to hospital from a patient’s 
residence, as well as the explanatory variables used in the hospital-level analysis: 
ownership, teaching status, the presence of NICU, hospital capacity, obstetric volume, 
urban/rural status, and clinical outcomes at the 1988 level. The error terms are 
assumed to follow Type I extreme value distribution. 
 To estimate this conditional logit model, I construct a hospital choice set for 
each patient in the following way. First, I calculate distance to hospital from patient 
residence based on patient and hospital zip code centroids24. Then I drop those who 
delivered babies at hospitals located more than 30 miles away from home25. Finally, 
                                                 
23
 In the patient level analysis, I use both year and quarter to determine the policy variables: POST89=1 
for the discharges from the 3rd quarter of 1989, and POST92=1 for the discharges after the 2nd quarter of 
1992.   
24
 I use the Great Circle Distance Formula. 
25
 Since about 95 percent of the patients in my Florida sample chose hospitals within thirty miles from 
their residence, the extremely large distance values in the upper five percent were likely to be coding 
errors or represent those admitted to local hospitals while they were away from home.  
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each patient is assigned to her hospital choice set which contains all hospitals in her 
zip code as well as those chosen by other patients residing in the same zip code as hers 
(Nichols, 2005). 
The limitation of this conditional logit model is that it is not applicable to those 
with only one hospital option or when one cannot identify a full set of hospital 
options. Therefore, I cannot conduct the conditional logit analysis for Florida patients 
who had only one hospital option, as well as the patient sample in the NIS: since the 
NIS lacks patient zip code information and includes a subset of hospitals in each state 
(only 20 percent of the community hospitals), one’s hospital choice set, no matter how 
well constructed, does not include all of her possible hospital options. These data 
limitations prevent me from constructing a complete hospital choice set for patients, 
threatening viability of the conditional logit model. Therefore, for patients in the NIS 
as well as Florida patients with a single hospital option, I use linear probability models 
(LPM)26 as follows: 
 
Model 3: itsststistis STATEYEARELIGXY εγβα +++⋅+⋅+=88     
 
The dependent variables are binary indicators for each attribute of the hospitals 
chosen by patient i in state s. This binary dependent variable model can serve as a 
simplified version of a discrete choice model (Gaskin el al, 2001)27. The vector X 
controls for patient characteristics: age and high-risk status. For patients’ age, I 
include two indicator variables (Age_l25 and Age_g34): Age_l25 has a value of one 
for those aged below 25; and Age_g34 has a value of one for those aged above 34; 
those aged between 25 and 34 are the reference group. High-risk status is also 
                                                 
26
 I also use a binary logit model, but it produces qualitatively similar results as the LPM. 
27
 The caveat to this alternative approach is that I can examine only one dimension of hospital quality at 
a time. However, this approach, without a construction of hospital choice sets, can still provide some 
insight into hospital admission and selection patterns. 
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controlled for by a dummy variable. Including both year and state fixed-effects, I 
control for unobserved year-specific and state-specific factors. For the Florida sample, 
I estimate the same model, replacing ELIG with POST, and STATE with county 
fixed-effects. 
 
(4) Construction and Interpretation of Hospital Variables 
 
Construction of Hospital Quality Variables 
In the hospital and the patient level analysis, I include hospital attribute 
variables, which can be interpreted as indirect and direct quality measures: six 
observable characteristics (ownership, teaching status, presence of neonatal intensive 
care units, hospital capacity, obstetric volume, and urban/rural status) and one clinical 
outcome measure for maternity care (risk-adjusted complication rates). All the hospital 
variables in the main analysis are constructed as binary variables: FP=1 for private, 
for-profit hospitals; Public=1 for public hospitals; private, not-for-profit hospitals are 
the reference group; Teaching=1 for a hospital with a residency program to train 
obstetricians; NICU=1 if a hospital has a neonatal intensive care unit; Bed_Large = 1 
if a hospital has a large capacity, i.e., a number of licensed beds is above 200 for urban 
hospitals and 75 for rural hospitals; Vol_High=1 if a hospital has a higher obstetric 
volume, i.e., a number of labor/delivery procedures is greater than its median value in 
a given year; Urban=1 if a hospital is located in an urban area. 
The risk-adjusted complication rate, a ratio of actual to expected 
complications28, at the hospital level is generated based on patients’ adverse health 
outcomes after birth. The actual complications are the number of patients who suffered 
                                                 
28
 Post-obstetrical complications and adverse outcomes are defined by HealthGrade (Exhibit B in 
Hospital Report Cards Maternity Care and Women’s Health 2007-2008 Methodology White Paper) and 
the Delta Group (Table 1 in Forthman et al, 2005).  
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from adverse outcomes after birth at a given hospital. The expected complications are 
aggregated predicted probabilities of a patient having adverse outcomes to the hospital 
level. The predicted probability is estimated by binary logit models in which the 
dependent variable is the indicator for whether a patient had postpartum complications 
(clustered by hospital units). The explanatory variables in the models are patient 
characteristics such as age, presence of chronic illness29, a number of comorbidities30, 
emergency room admissions, and DRG dummy variables. The higher value of 
RATIO, i.e., the actual complications greater than the expected complications, means 
poorer clinical outcomes. I assign a binary indicator for lower complication rates at the 
hospital level: RAT_LOW=1 if RATIO is less than the value of one, i.e., the number 
of actual complications is less than the number of expected complications. For some 
analysis, I divide RATIO into four tiers at its quartiles and use those four indicator 
variables: Rat_q1 has a value of one for hospitals whose RATIO is in the first quartile 
(the group of hospitals with the best clinical outcomes), whereas Rat_q4 has a value of 
one for hospitals whose value of RATIO is in the highest quartile (the group of 
hospitals with the worst clinical outcomes)31. 
In order to avoid endogeneity concerns, all of the hospital variables are 
constructed as time-invariant, fixed values at the initial year of 198832. If hospitals 
adjust their quality in response to policy changes in order to attract a certain type of 
patients, seeing more patients from low-income zip codes receiving care at higher 
                                                 
29
 I use chronic condition indicators, provided by the HCUP.   
30
 I use the number of secondary diagnosis codes for the number of comorbidities. 
31
 Alternatively, as in Epstein et al (2008), I use linear probability model with hospital fixed-effect 
estimates included. With patient characteristics as well as their risk factor controlled in this model, the 
remaining effects on patient health outcomes, captured by the hospital fixed-effect estimates, imply 
overall hospital quality. Since the correlation between these fixed-effect estimates and the complication 
ratio (RATIO) is significantly high (above 0.8), the results reported in this paper are based on the 
RATIO. 
32
 Ideally, I would like to use hospital variables before 1988. However, since the earliest year of data 
available is 1988 in both Florida and the national sample, all hospital variables including the clinical 
outcome measure are based on the hospital samples in 1988. For hospitals that entered after 1988, I use 
the first available year in the calculation. 
 38 
quality hospitals may be attributed to hospitals’ change in characteristics, not the 
patient reallocation to higher quality hospitals. 
 
Interpretation of Hospital Variables 
Now, I would like to associate the above hospital attributes with the quality of 
hospitals. As explained in Section II, without a consensus on the relationship between 
hospital attributes and quality of care, I examine the association between my clinical 
outcome measure and other hospital characteristics. Regressing RATIO on the other 
hospital attributes (FP, Public, teaching, NICU, high-volume, large bed, and urban 
status), however, I do not find any statistically significant association between the 
clinical outcome measure and the rest of the hospital attributes. Therefore, except for 
NICU and the clinical outcome measure, I do not attach the level of quality to the 
hospital variables. Instead, I interpret them as hospital attributes or types that each 
patient subgroup may or may not prefer. For example, I expect those from low-income 
zip codes to be reallocated toward FP hospitals if a lack of coverage before the 
expansion was the constraint for them to choose FP hospitals. 
 
VI. Results 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1.2 presents descriptive statistics of the Florida and NIS data: the second 
to fourth columns for the Florida data, and the last three columns for the NIS data. The 
Florida hospital sample consists of 872 observations during 1988-1995: thirty-one 
percent private, for-profit hospitals; fifty-three percent private, not-for-profit hospitals; 
and fifteen percent public hospitals. Eight percent were teaching hospitals, which had  
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[Table 1.2] Summary Statistics (1988-1995) 
 
A. Patient and Hospital Variables  
 
B. Construction of Treatment and Control Group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Patients 
Characteristics Florida NIS 
Variable Mean Std. Obs. Mean Std. Obs. 
Age (years) 26.9 5.81 1,029,801 27.1 5.82 4,568,817 
Zip Code Distance 
(miles) 7.47 6.07 1,029,801 - - - 
Length of Stay 2.47 2.11 1,029,801 2.49 2.36 4,568,817 
High-risk 0.41 0.49 1,029,801 0.28 0.45 4,568,817 
c-section 0.26 0.44 1,029,801 0.23 0.42 4,568,817 
Household Median 
Income  $30746 11624 1,029,801 30924 9951 
4,568,817 
Medicaid 0.31 0.46 1,029,801 0.32 0.46 4,568,817 
Private coverage 0.55 0.50 1,029,801 0.59 0.49 4,568,817 
Other (Self-
pay+Other) 0.12 0.33 1,029,801 0.04 0.20 
4,568,817 
       
Hospital Attributes Florida NIS 
Private, for-profit 0.31 0.46 872 0.09 0.29 5216 
Private, not-for-profit 0.53 0.50 872 0.70 0.46 5216 
Public  0.15 0.36 872 0.21 0.41 5216 
Teaching 0.08 0.27 872 0.15 0.35 5216 
Bed_large  0.69 0.46 872 0.35 0.48 5216 
NICU 0.39 0.49 872 - - - 
Rat_low (RATIO<1) 0.61 0.49 872 0.60 0.49 5216 
Vol_high 0.50 0.50 872    
Annual number of 
delivery procedure 3381.5 9636.7 872 1077.10 1392.49 5216 
Urban 0.93 0.26 872 0.61 0.49 5216 
Zip Code Income Group Florida NIS 
100 ≤ zip code income ≤ 185% of the FPL 42% 23% 
   100 ≤ zip code income ≤ 150% 28% - 
   150 ≤ zip code income ≤ 185%  14% - 
zip code income<100% of the FPL 9% 2% 
zip code income > 185% of the FPL 50% 75% 
185 ≤ zip code income ≤ 300% of the FPL - 47% 
300% of the FPL < zip code income - 28% 
Number of Observations 1,029,801 4,568,817 
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[Table 1.2] Continued 
 
C. Breakdown of Zip Code Income in the NIS Data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D. Breakdown of Patients by Race in the NIS Data 
 
 
 
 
 
residency programs in obstetrics and gynecology, and thirty-nine percent hospitals had 
NICU. Sixty-one percent of the hospitals had RATIO whose value is less than one, 
and sixty-nine percent were grouped into large hospitals based on the number of 
licensed beds. A half of the hospital sample were high-volume hospitals, while ninety-
three percent were located in urban areas. The occupancy rates during the sample 
period were between 53% (for 1994) and 61% (for 1988). 
The size of patient sample, pregnant women aged 15-44 who were admitted to 
hospitals for childbirth, except for the emergency room admissions, is 1,029,801. 
Based on the zip code income classification, the treatment for the 1989 expansion 
(those whose zip code income levels were between 100 and 150 percent of the FPL) 
NIS Data (1988-1995) 
Income range ZIPINC8 Freq. % ZIPINC4 
$0-15000 1 89,856 1.96 
$15000-20000 2 332,615 7.29 
$20000-25000 3 734,380 16.01 
1 
$25000-30000 4 841,222 18.34 2 
$30000-35000 5 954,487 16.45 3 
$35000-40000 6 550,312 12.00 
$40000-45000 7 392,368 8.55 
$45000+ 8 590,892 12.88 
4 
Missing . 300,685 6.56  
Total  4,586,817 100  
Race Freq. % 
White 1,804,673 65.1 
Black 318,717 11.5 
Hispanic 462,718 16.7 
Other race 185,054 6.7 
Total 2,771,162 100 
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was 28 percent, while the treatment group for the 1992 expansion (those whose zip 
code income levels were between 150 and 185 percent of the FPL) was 14 percent. 
Fifty percent of the patient sample resided in zip codes whose median income levels 
were above 185 percent of the FPL, while nine percent of the total discharges belong 
to the zip codes whose median income levels were below 100 percent of the FPL. The 
breakdown of the patients by health insurance coverage is as follows: 31 percent had 
Medicaid, 55 percent had private insurance, and 12 percent were either self-pay or had 
other coverage. 
The NIS started with eight states33 in 1988, but eleven states entered between 
1989 and 199534. The NIS hospital sample consists of a total of 5216 hospitals35 for 
1988-1995: 70 percent are NFP hospitals, 21 percent public hospitals, and only 9 
percent FP hospitals. Fifteen percent of the hospitals were teaching hospitals, and 
sixty-one percent were located in urban areas. The patient sample in the NIS consists 
of more than 4.5 million discharges36, but observations with race information shrink to 
2.8 millions (about 60% of the total discharges). The treatment group accounts for 23 
percent of the patient sample, while those whose zip code income was less than 100 
percent of the FPL consist of only 2 percent of the sample. The remaining 75 percent 
of the patient sample resided in high income zip codes: 47 percent of them came from 
zip codes whose income ranged between 185 and 300 percent of the FPL, while 28 
percent came from zip codes whose income levels were above 300 percent of the FPL. 
The breakdown of the patient sample across insurance coverage shows a pattern 
similar to that in the Florida data. The breakdown of the patient sample by race is as 
                                                 
33
 California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Washington 
34
 In 1989, three states (Arizona, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin) entered the NIS, six states (Connecticut, 
Kansas, Maryland, New York, Oregon and South Carolina) were added in 1993, and two more states 
(Missouri and Tennessee) were included in 1995. 
35
 Five states—California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa and Wisconsin—take up more than sixty percent of the 
hospital sample. 
36
 California and Florida are the two largest states which make up forty-three percent of the patient 
sample. 
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follows: 65 percent Whites, 12 percent Blacks, 17 percent Hispanics, and 7 percent 
other race. 
 
Results from the Florida Data 
 Table 1.3 and Table 1.4 report the results of the hospital level analysis in 
Florida: Table 1.3 for the 1989 expansion and Table 1.4 for the 1992 expansion. The 
first two columns show the results for the treatment group (the first column for the 
simple OLS regression model and the second column for the hospital fixed-effect 
model), while the last two columns report the same results for the Medicaid patient 
group. Since time-invariant hospital variables are dropped out in the fixed-effect 
model setting, I start with a simple OLS regression model with year and county (for 
Florida) or state (NIS) dummy variables included. 
The OLS regression results show attributes of the hospital used by maternity 
patients from low-income zip codes (the treatment group) before and after the 
expansions. In the pre-expansion period, the proportion of those in the treatment group 
was 7 percentage point lower at hospitals with NICU than those without it, while this 
proportion was 33 percentage point lower at urban hospitals. Teaching hospitals had a 
6 percentage point higher proportion of these mothers than non-teaching hospitals, 
albeit not statistically significantly from zero at the 10 percent level. The proportion of 
maternity patients from low-income zip codes was smaller by 6 and 4 percentage 
points at FP and public hospitals, respectively, than NFP hospitals. After the 1989 
expansion, this proportion increased at public hospitals by 4 percentage points. The 
hospital fixed-effect model produces qualitatively similar results to the OLS 
regressions, with the increase in the proportion at urban hospitals and clinically better 
performing hospitals statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  
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[Table 1.3] Hospital Level Analysis for the 1989 Expansion in Florida 
Treatment 89 
(100≤ZIPINC≤150%) Medicaid Y=Proportion of 
Patient Subgroup OLS Fixed-Effect OLS 
Fixed-
Effect 
FP -0.06   -0.18***   
  (0.04)   (0.05)   
Public -0.04   0.04   
  (0.04)   (0.07)   
Teaching 0.06   0.22***   
  (0.04)   (0.07)   
Large_bed -0.02   -0.04   
  (0.04)   (0.06)   
NICU -0.07*   -0.01   
  (0.04)   (0.05)   
Rat_low 0.02   0.09**   
  (0.03)   (0.04)   
High_Vol 0.02   0.02   
  (0.05)   (0.06)   
Urban -0.33***   -0.07   
  (0.12)   (0.10)   
FP×POST89 0.02 0.01 0.09** 0.04 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Public×POST89 0.04* 0.04* 0.03 0.01 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
Teaching×POST89 0.02 0.01 -0.07** -0.08*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
largebed×POST89 0.01 0.01 0 -0.02 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) 
NICU×POST89 -0.02 -0.01 0 0.02 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
Rat_low×POST89 0.03 0.04** 0 0.02 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
High_Vol×POST89 0.01 0 0.03 0 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) 
Urban×POST89 0.04 0.07** -0.15** -0.11** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) 
constant 0.71*** 0.26*** 0.24 0.19*** 
  (0.13) (0.01) (0.18) (0.01) 
Year F.E. YES YES YES YES 
County F.E. YES - YES - 
Hospital F.E. - YES - YES 
Observations 872 872 872 872 
R-square 0.85 0.06 0.54 0.51 
F test 468491.2 1.7 57.56 27.12 
p value 0 0.06 0 0 
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Now, I compare the proportion of those in the treatment group with the 
proportion of Medicaid patients. Before the coverage expansion, the proportion of 
Medicaid mothers was 18 percentage points smaller at FP hospitals than NFP 
hospitals, but 22 percentage points larger at teaching hospitals than non-teaching 
hospitals. Also, hospitals with good clinical outcomes had a 9 percentage point larger 
proportion of Medicaid mothers than those with poor clinical outcomes. After the 
expansion, the proportion of Medicaid mothers increased at FP hospitals by 9 
percentage points, while it decreased by 7 percentage points at teaching hospitals. As 
explained above, the change in the Medicaid proportion without a change in the 
proportion of those from low-income zip codes can be interpreted as crowding-out 
effects. For example, the increase in the Medicaid proportion at FP hospitals was not 
paired with an increase in the proportion of those in the treatment group: the latter was 
smaller (0.02) and not statistically significant at the 10 percent level. This could imply 
that FP hospitals provided care to the same zip code income group of patients, who 
only changed their insurance status to Medicaid. However, I am cautious about 
interpreting my results for the crowding out effects, because I am using zip code 
income levels instead of individual income levels.  
Table 1.4 continues to report the results of the hospital level analysis for the 
1992 expansion. Based on the OLS regressions, I do not find any particular pattern for 
the type of hospitals chosen by my treatment group in the pre-expansion period. After 
the 1992 expansion, the proportion of those from low-income zip codes increased 2 
percentage points at public hospitals and 1 percentage point at large hospitals, but 
none of the coefficients is statistically significant. Again, the proportion of Medicaid 
mothers increased at FP hospitals by 11 percentage points, while it decreased by 21 
percentage points at urban hospitals. 
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[Table 1.4] Hospital Level Analysis for the 1992 Expansion in Florida 
Treatment 92 
(150≤ZIPINC≤185%) Medicaid Y=Proportion of 
Patient Subgroup OLS Fixed-Effect OLS 
Fixed-
Effect 
FP 0   -0.15***   
  (0.02)   (0.05)   
Public 0.03   0.07   
  (0.03)   (0.06)   
Teaching -0.02   0.18**   
  (0.03)   (0.07)   
Large_bed -0.02   -0.06   
  (0.02)   (0.05)   
NICU 0   -0.01   
  (0.03)   (0.05)   
Rat_low 0   0.09**   
  (0.02)   (0.04)   
High_Vol 0.01   0.04   
  (0.03)   (0.06)   
Urban 0.04   -0.1   
  (0.03)   (0.10)   
FP×POST92 0 0 0.11*** 0.06** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
Public×POST92 0.02 0 -0.03 -0.04 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
Teaching×POST92 0.01 0 -0.05 -0.06** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
largebed×POST92 0.01 0.01 0.02 0 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
NICU×POST92 0 0.01 0.03 0.03 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) 
Rat_low×POST92 -0.01 0.01 0 0.01 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
High_Vol×POST92 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) 
Urban×POST92 -0.04 -0.02 -0.21*** -0.17*** 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06) 
constant 0.08* 0.15*** 0.24 0.19*** 
  (0.04) (0.01) (0.18) (0.01) 
Year F.E. YES YES YES YES 
County F.E. YES - YES - 
Hospital F.E. - YES - YES 
Observations 872 872 872 872 
R-square 0.66 0.04 0.55 0.53 
F test 352749.3 2.04 42.54 24.21 
p value 0 0.02 0 0 
 
 46 
In summary, the hospital level analyses show that the treatment group for the 
1989 expansion was reallocated to public hospitals, but no statistically significant 
reallocation effect after the 1992 expansion. These findings provide weak evidence 
that maternity patients from low-income zip codes switched to different types of 
hospitals, but I find no evidence to support that the movement is related to better 
quality of care. However, this aggregate level analysis does not control for distance 
between hospital and patient, which is one of the important factors in patients’ choice 
of hospitals. Next, I present the results of the individual level analysis, which control 
for the distance variable. 
Table 1.5 and Table 1.6 report the estimated odds ratio of the conditional logit 
model for the Florida patient sample—Table 1.5 for the 1989 expansion and Table 1.6 
for the 1992 expansion. Each of the patient subgroups is further broken down by 
severity of illness, and the results show that there was not much difference in hospital 
selection patterns between high-risk and non-high-risk patients, particularly within the 
control groups. Therefore, I will focus on the discussion of the comparison between 
the treatment and control groups overall, rather than a comparison between high-risk 
and non-high-risk patients within each patient subgroup. 
For the 1989 expansion, the treatment group consists of those whose zip code 
income levels were between 100 and 150 percent of the FPL. According to Table 1.5, 
prior to the 1989 expansion, all patients in the treatment and control groups were less 
likely to choose distant hospitals (16-18 percent less likely to go to distant hospitals). 
Maternity patients from low-income zip codes were 6.67 times more likely to deliver 
at high-volume hospitals than low-volume hospitals, but 15 percent less likely to give 
birth at public hospitals than hospitals of NFP ownership. Surprisingly, these mothers 
were 1.12 and 1.73 times more likely to choose hospitals with lower complication 
rates and NICU hospitals than those with higher complication rates and those without  
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[Table 1.5] Conditional Logit Model for 1989 Expansion 
 100≤ZIPINC≤150% of the FPL 
(Treatment Group for 1989) 
ZIPINC≤100% 
of the FPL 
ZIPINC≥185% 
of the FPL 
 
all high-
risk 
non- 
high-risk All all 
Zipdist 0.84*** 0.83*** 0.84*** 0.84*** 0.82*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
FP 1.07*** 1.21*** 1.01 0.70*** 0.71*** 
  (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) 
Public 0.85*** 1.14*** 0.72*** 0.44*** 0.56*** 
  (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) 
Teaching 0.83*** 0.88*** 0.80*** 0.96 0.75*** 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) 
Large_bed 0.58*** 0.60*** 0.57*** 0.51*** 0.65*** 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) 
NICU 1.73*** 1.73*** 1.73*** 1.68*** 2.36*** 
  (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.03) 
Rat_low 1.12*** 1.01 1.18*** 0.68*** 0.71*** 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
High_Vol 6.67*** 7.75*** 6.26*** 4.09*** 2.83*** 
  (0.22) (0.45) (0.26) (0.26) (0.05) 
Urban 0.45*** 0.64*** 0.37*** 3.36*** 0.28*** 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.83) (0.01) 
Zipdist×POST89 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.01*** 1.00*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
FP×POST89 0.99 0.81*** 1.12*** 1.33*** 0.93*** 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.01) 
Public×POST89 1.82*** 1.35*** 2.13*** 1.41*** 1.37*** 
  (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.03) 
Teaching×POST89 1.35*** 1.45*** 1.25*** 1.15*** 1.39*** 
  (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) 
largebed×POST89 1.89*** 1.94*** 1.86*** 3.73*** 1.42*** 
  (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) (0.26) (0.03) 
NICU×POST89 0.79*** 0.78*** 0.80*** 1.40*** 0.81*** 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.01) 
Rat_low×POST89 1.10*** 1.15*** 1.09*** 1.63*** 1.32*** 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.01) 
High_Vol×POST89 0.40*** 0.37*** 0.40*** 0.26*** 0.57*** 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Urban×POST89 2.22*** 1.82*** 2.41*** 1 2.46*** 
  (0.09) (0.13) (0.13) (0.26) (0.06) 
Observations 1192937 494446 698491 492996 4596160 
LR-chi2 188879.41 78360.7 111590.98 56971.27 566720.42 
Prob>chi2 0 0 0 0 0 
Psuedo R2 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.22 0.26 
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NICU, respectively. Compared to the control groups, however, the size of the 
coefficient of NICU is smaller or about the same. Also, these patients were more 
likely to receive care at rural rather than urban hospitals, non-teaching than teaching 
hospitals, small-sized than large-sized hospitals. The only difference between high-
risk and non-high-risk patients was the use of FP and public hospitals: high-risk 
mothers before gaining coverage were more likely to choose FP or public hospitals 
than NFP hospitals. 
After the 1989 expansion, the noticeable change for the treatment group, 
compared to the pre-expansion period, was to have increased access to large, public 
hospitals. The odd ratio for the distance traveled to hospitals increased up to 1.02, and 
those in the treatment group were more likely to deliver at public and teaching 
hospitals relative to NFP and non-teaching hospitals, by 82 and 35 percent 
respectively. The switch to public hospitals was larger among non-high-risk patients, 
who also had a higher chance of giving birth at FP hospitals than NFP hospitals by 12 
percent. Dependence on high-volume hospitals was significantly reduced, and, in fact, 
those in the treatment group were 60 percent less likely to choose high-volume 
hospitals. They also seemed more likely to choose large, urban hospitals than before, 
1.89 and 2.22 times, respectively. Although the importance of NICU in the hospital 
choice decision decreased, it decreased across the other patient subgroups as well. The 
coefficient of LOW_RAT stayed almost the same, at 1.10, but still larger than one. My 
findings show that maternity patients from low-income zip codes had increased access 
to clinically high-performing hospitals as well as safety-net hospitals. Within the 
treatment group, the reallocation effect was larger for non-high-risk patients. This 
implies that high-risk patients, even with the coverage gain, may have more 
constraints on hospital choice, and therefore their health outcomes might not have 
been improved as much. 
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Table 1.6 presents the results of the conditional logit model for the 1992 
expansion, where the treatment group consists of those whose income ranged between 
150 and 185 percent of the FPL. Before obtaining coverage, patients in this income 
category were more likely to use hospitals with the following attributes: large size, 
high volume, NICU, high complication rates, teaching, NFP, and urban hospitals. 
However, after obtaining coverage, they were more likely to give birth at FP and 
clinically better performing hospitals than NFP and clinically poorly performing 
hospitals, by 22 and 26 percent, respectively. Again, the switch to FP hospitals 
occurred more with non-high-risk mothers than high-risk patients. As expected, the 
changes among the control groups, particularly those from higher income zip codes, 
were very small: all coefficients have values close to one, while the changes in the 
always eligible show patterns similar to those for the newly eligible. My results 
suggest that the 1992 expansion provided those from low-income zip codes with 
increased access to FP hospitals, hospitals in more private environments, as well as 
those with better clinical outcomes. 
As mentioned in Section V, these conditional logit analyses drop patients who 
have only one hospital option. Since these patients would have found it difficult to 
switch between hospitals even if they wanted to, I examine their hospital choice 
behavior, using binary dependent variable models (Model 3). The number of patients 
with only one hospital option is 35,475 out of 1,131,395, only 3.14 percent of total 
discharges: 40 percent are privately insured, 39 percent have Medicaid, and 21 percent 
are uninsured. They were more likely to be uninsured compared to the average 
population, and traveled farther to receive hospital care: the average distance to the 
hospital was 9.15 miles. I do not find statistical evidence about the policy impacts on 
patient reallocation at the 10 percent level. This implies that the patient reallocation  
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[Table 1.6] Conditional Logit Model for 1992 Expansion 
 
150≤ZIPINC≤185% of the FPL 
(Treatment Group for 1992) 
ZIPINC≤150% 
of the FPL 
ZIPINC≥185
% of the FPL 
 all high-
risk 
non-
high-risk all all 
Zipdist 0.82*** 0.83*** 0.82*** 0.86*** 0.82*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
FP 0.86*** 0.89*** 0.84*** 0.65*** 0.71*** 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) 
Public 0.82*** 0.98 0.73*** 0.91*** 0.71*** 
  (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Teaching 1.05*** 1.28*** 0.93*** 0.92*** 1 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Large_bed 1.07*** 1.11*** 1.05** 1.05* 0.80*** 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) 
NICU 2.21*** 2.12*** 2.27*** 2.38*** 2.08*** 
  (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) 
Rat_low 0.93*** 0.94*** 0.92*** 0.82*** 0.85*** 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
High_Vol 1.49*** 1.49*** 1.50*** 1.41*** 1.91*** 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) 
Urban 1.14*** 1.58*** 0.93* 4.84*** 0.40*** 
  (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.55) (0.01) 
Zipdist×POST92 1.00** 1.01*** 1 0.99*** 1 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
FP×POST92 1.22*** 1.13*** 1.29*** 1.78*** 0.91*** 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.01) 
Public×POST92 0.90*** 0.76*** 1.01 0.43*** 1.10*** 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
Teaching×POST92 0.93*** 0.91** 0.90*** 1.36*** 0.98** 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) 
largebed×POST92 1.33*** 1.46*** 1.24*** 2.18*** 1.23*** 
  (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.01) 
NICU×POST92 1.02 1.05 1 0.91*** 0.90*** 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) 
Rat_low×POST92 1.26*** 1.26*** 1.27*** 1.52*** 1.10*** 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) 
High_Vol×POST92 0.79*** 0.75*** 0.82*** 0.84*** 0.81*** 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) 
Urban×POST92 1.12** 0.91 1.27*** 0.48*** 2.28*** 
  (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.04) 
Observations 946825 385300 561525 492996 4596160 
LR-chi2 134695.65 51652.7 
83690.6
8 57530.18 566217.18 
Prob>chi2 0 0 0 0 0 
Psuedo R2 0.28 0.27 0.3 0.22 0.26 
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was not occurring with this patient subgroup: those with only one hospital option, 
without or with coverage, still had constraints on hospital selection37. 
 
Results from the NIS Data 
Now, I extend both hospital and patient level analysis to the national setting. 
Here, the estimation method for the hospital analysis is the same as the Florida’s OLS 
and hospital fixed-effect model, except for the NICU variable unavailable. For the 
patient level analysis, I estimate linear probability models instead of the conditional 
logit model due to lack of patient zip code information. With patients’ race 
information available in the NIS, the national analyses focus on racial disparities in 
access to different types of hospitals. In doing so, I first categorize patients into four 
racial subgroups—White, Black, Hispanic, and other race38—and then break down 
each racial group by patients’ zip code income levels as in the Florida hospital 
analysis. 
Table 1.7 presents the results of the hospital level analysis. The dependent 
variable is the proportion of patients whose zip code income ranged between 100 and 
185 percent of the FPL. Here, the policy variable (ELIG) is the simulated fraction of 
the Medicaid eligible population among women of child bearing age had they become 
pregnant. Since this fraction, on average, increased by 0.24 over the years (0.17 in 
1988 and 0.41 in 1995), the actual size of the policy impact can be obtained by 
multiplying 0.24 to the estimates of each covariate. 
In response to the increased fraction of the Medicaid eligible population, the 
proportion of patients in the treatment group, increased at large-size, low-volume, 
clinically well-performing, teaching, public, rural, FP hospitals relative to the ones 
                                                 
37
 They might have chosen different hospitals after obtaining coverage, but those hospitals would have 
been more than 30 miles away from home. 
38
 Asian or Pacific Islander, Native American, and other 
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without each of these attributes, respectively. Although the F-test statistic is large 
enough to reject the null hypothesis such that all of the coefficients are zero, none of 
the coefficients are statistically significantly different from zero at the 10 percent 
level, and the actual magnitude of the policy impact is also very small. However, when 
I break down patients by race and examine the proportion of patients from low-income 
zip codes within each racial category, there are different patterns in patient 
reallocation across race. First, this proportion among Whites increased at hospitals by 
8 percentage points, except for urban hospitals. For Hispanics and Blacks, these 
proportions increased by 11 and 9 percentage points respectively, but only at FP 
hospitals. For other race, the proportion increased at clinically better performing 
hospitals by 3 percentage points. 
 
[Table 1.7] Hospital Fixed-Effect Model across Race with the NIS data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All White Black Hispanic Other race Proportion of 
Patient Subgroup 100 ≤ ZIPINC ≤185% of the FPL 
ELIG -0.02 0.34*** -0.30* -0.12 -0.13 
  (0.07) (0.12) (0.17) (0.14) (0.12) 
ELIG×Public 0.08 -0.13 0.11 0.02 0.08 
  (0.08) (0.11) (0.16) (0.13) (0.12) 
ELIG×FP 0.17 0.23 0.74*** 0.37* 0.23 
  (0.12) (0.19) (0.25) (0.21) (0.17) 
ELIG×Teaching 0.05 -0.05 0.03 0.07 -0.03 
  (0.07) (0.08) (0.13) (0.11) (0.09) 
ELIG×Vol_high -0.02 -0.07 0.07 0.06 0.09 
  (0.05) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) 
ELIG×Bed_Large 0.01 -0.03 0.30** 0.07 0.1 
  (0.07) (0.10) (0.13) (0.11) (0.10) 
ELIG×Urban 0.01 -0.44*** 0.05 -0.09 -0.07 
  (0.07) (0.13) (0.17) (0.15) (0.11) 
ELIG×Rat_Low 0.05 0.06 -0.04 0.11 0.14* 
  (0.05) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.08) 
Constant 0.26*** 0.07*** 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Observations 4181 4181 4181 4181 4181 
# of Hospitals 1092 1092 1092 1092 1092 
R-square 0.02 0.16 0.13 0.09 0.07 
F-stat 2.31 12.44 9.42 7.36 7.17 
p-value 0 0 0 0 0 
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[Table 1.7] continued 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Next, I compare the proportion of those in the treatment group with that of 
Medicaid patients within each racial category. As expected, these two proportions 
move in the same direction, but the size is larger for the Medicaid proportions. The 
proportion of Medicaid patients in total increased at public and FP hospitals (about 6 
percentage points), as well as those with low complication rates (3 percentage points). 
Except for other race, the proportion of Medicaid mothers among Whites, Blacks, and 
Hispanics increased at FP hospitals at least by 9 percentage points, with the increase 
the largest for Hispanics (12 percentage points). While the proportion of Hispanic 
Medicaid mothers also increased at public hospitals (7.5 percentage points), the 
proportion of Black Medicaid mothers declined at public and NFP hospitals (11 and 
3.5 percentage points). Medicaid mothers of other race moved to higher volume 
All White Black Hispanic Other race Proportion of 
Patient Subgroup Medicaid Coverage 
ELIG -0.01 -0.07 -0.44** -0.14 -0.19 
  (0.09) (0.10) (0.19) (0.14) (0.14) 
ELIG×Public 0.23** 0.09 0.30* 0.30** 0.13 
  (0.10) (0.12) (0.18) (0.13) (0.13) 
ELIG×FP 0.25** 0.35** 0.80*** 0.49*** 0.09 
  (0.11) (0.16) (0.25) (0.18) (0.14) 
ELIG×Teaching -0.07 -0.09 -0.04 -0.02 -0.08 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.15) (0.13) (0.11) 
ELIG×Vol_high -0.13 0.01 0.09 -0.01 0.19* 
  (0.08) (0.09) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) 
ELIG×Bed_Large 0.09 -0.03 0.42*** 0.11 0.1 
  (0.07) (0.09) (0.13) (0.10) (0.11) 
ELIG×Urban 0.07 0 0.22 0.17 0.13 
  (0.08) (0.11) (0.17) (0.13) (0.13) 
ELIG×Rat_Low 0.12* 0.11 -0.07 0.09 0.15* 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) 
Constant 0.17*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.02* 0.05*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Observations 4181 4181 4181 4181 4181 
# of Hospitals 1092 1092 1092 1092 1092 
R-square 0.29 0.25 0.19 0.2 0.13 
F-stat 36.33 25.71 16.53 23.03 18.12 
p-value 0 0 0 0 0 
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hospitals and clinically better performing ones. My findings suggest that among those 
from low-income zip codes, patients of color benefited the most from the expansions 
by switching to FP hospitals and hospitals with lower complication rates. These results 
imply that the increased coverage might have somewhat reduced racial disparities in 
access to higher quality of care. 
Table 1.8 and Table 1.9 present the results of the patient level analysis in the 
national setting: Table 1.8 for the four patient subgroups by zip code income levels 
and Table 1.9 for the three subgroups by coverage type. In the linear probability 
models, I separately regress each of the binary indicators for hospital attributes (FP, 
teaching, low complication rate, etc) on the fraction of the Medicaid eligible 
population (ELIG), as well as patient age and high-risk status. In this way, I test 
whether a higher fraction of the Medicaid eligible population increased a probability 
of patients’ receiving care at hospitals with one attribute over those without it: e.g. 
whether those from low-income zip codes are more likely to choose FP hospitals over 
NFP or public hospitals, or hospitals with low complication rates over those with high 
complication rates, etc. Additionally, I use four tiers of the clinical outcome measure 
(Rat_q1, Rat_q2, Rat_q3, and Rat_q4) as the dependent variables. 
Table 1.8 reports the coefficients of ELIG for the patient subgroups across zip 
code income levels in the linear probability model: the first row presents the 
coefficients for patients of all races, and the following four rows report the coefficients 
when the LPM is separately estimated across the four racial subgroups. The results of 
these patient level analyses are consistent with the ones in the hospital level analysis. 
Medicaid expansions enabled those in the treatment group to deliver at teaching and 
NFP hospitals, as well as hospitals with better clinical performance. In particular, 
Black mothers among those from low-income zip codes showed the largest 
reallocation towards such types of hospitals: the coefficient of Rat_low is the largest  
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[Table 1.8] Linear Probability Model across Income Levels (NIS Data) 
Patient Subgroup by X=ZIPINC 
All White Black Hispanic 100≤X≤185 
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
FP -0.02*** (0.00) 0.11*** (0.01) 0.07*** (0.01) -0.06*** (0.01) 
Public -0.01* (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) -0.09*** (0.02) 0.43*** (0.02) 
Teaching 0.21*** (0.01) -0.25*** (0.03) 0.06* (0.03) -0.33*** (0.04) 
Bed_Large -0.05*** (0.01) -0.34*** (0.03) -0.24*** (0.04) 0.34*** (0.03) 
Urban -0.07*** (0.01) -0.21*** (0.02) -0.05*** (0.01) -0.47*** (0.02) 
RatQ1 -0.18*** (0.01) 0.05** (0.02) -0.01 (0.03) -0.07** (0.03) 
RatQ2 -0.02** (0.01) 0.13*** (0.02) -0.15*** (0.03) 0.43*** (0.03) 
RatQ3 0.21*** (0.01) -0.27*** (0.02) 0.59*** (0.03) -0.04 (0.03) 
RatQ4 -0.02* (0.01) 0.09*** (0.02) -0.43*** (0.03) -0.32*** (0.02) 
Rat_Low 0.16*** (0.01) 0.27*** (0.03) 0.50*** (0.04) 0.30*** (0.04) 
Vol_high -0.11*** (0.01) -0.36*** (0.03) -0.07*** (0.03) -0.07** (0.03) 
X<100 
FP 0.03*** (0.01) 0.13*** (0.04) -0.03 (0.02) 0.01 (0.01) 
Public -0.08*** (0.03) 0.04 (0.08) -0.67*** (0.06) 0.28*** (0.07) 
Teaching -0.24*** (0.04) -0.76*** (0.16) -0.21** (0.09) -0.77*** (0.12) 
Bed_Large -0.15*** (0.04) -0.79*** (0.16) 0.31*** (0.10) -0.47*** (0.12) 
Urban -0.06*** (0.02) -0.31*** (0.08) 0 (0.00) -0.33*** (0.05) 
RatQ1 0.30*** (0.03) 0.29** (0.14) 0.1 (0.08) 0.40*** (0.09) 
RatQ2 -0.66*** (0.03) 0.01 (0.13) -1.71*** (0.07) -0.21** (0.09) 
RatQ3 0.46*** (0.03) 0.14 (0.16) 0.70*** (0.08) 0.29*** (0.10) 
RatQ4 -0.11*** (0.04) -0.44** (0.18) 0.91*** (0.09) -0.48*** (0.08) 
Rat_Low 0.85*** (0.03) 0.73*** (0.15) 1.28*** (0.09) 0.65*** (0.12) 
Vol_high -0.10*** (0.02) -0.16 (0.11) -0.19** (0.07) -0.23** (0.09) 
185<X≤300 
FP 0.03*** (0.00) 0.03*** (0.00) 0.10*** (0.01) -0.12*** (0.01) 
Public 0.06*** (0.00) 0.08*** (0.01) -0.01 (0.02) 0.34*** (0.01) 
Teaching -0.24*** (0.01) -0.35*** (0.01) -0.16*** (0.03) -0.15*** (0.03) 
Bed_Large 0.08*** (0.01) -0.07*** (0.01) -0.11*** (0.03) 0.54*** (0.03) 
Urban -0.06*** (0.00) -0.04*** (0.01) -0.04*** (0.01) -0.07*** (0.01) 
RatQ1 -0.03*** (0.00) -0.02* (0.01) -0.09*** (0.02) -0.13*** (0.02) 
RatQ2 0.09*** (0.01) 0.07*** (0.01) -0.24*** (0.02) 0.23*** (0.02) 
RatQ3 0.23*** (0.01) 0.32*** (0.01) 0.50*** (0.03) 0.20*** (0.03) 
RatQ4 -0.29*** (0.01) -0.38*** (0.01) -0.17*** (0.02) -0.30*** (0.02) 
Rat_Low 0.36*** (0.01) 0.40*** (0.01) 0.28*** (0.03) 0.42*** (0.03) 
Vol_high -0.20*** (0.01) -0.22*** (0.01) -0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.03) 
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[Table 1.8] continued 
All White Black Hispanic X>300 
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
FP 0.07*** (0.00) -0.03*** (0.00) 0.03* (0.02) 0.01 (0.01) 
Public 0.07*** (0.00) 0.07*** (0.00) -0.01 (0.03) 0.06*** (0.02) 
Teaching -0.34*** (0.01) -0.22*** (0.01) -0.05 (0.04) -0.28*** (0.05) 
Bed_Large 0.51*** (0.01) 0.48*** (0.01) 0.56*** (0.04) 0.46*** (0.04) 
Urban -0.04*** (0.00) -0.05*** (0.00) 0.01 (0.02) 0.05*** (0.01) 
RatQ1 0.01** (0.00) 0.02** (0.01) -0.14*** (0.03) 0.03 (0.04) 
RatQ2 0.11*** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01) -0.31*** (0.03) 0.32*** (0.03) 
RatQ3 -0.39*** (0.01) -0.08*** (0.01) -0.36*** (0.04) 0.19*** (0.05) 
RatQ4 0.27*** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01) 0.82*** (0.04) -0.54*** (0.04) 
Rat_Low 0.26*** (0.01) 0.24*** (0.01) 0.56*** (0.03) 0.90*** (0.05) 
Vol_high -0.06*** (0.01) -0.02*** (0.01) 0.26*** (0.03) 0.05 (0.04) 
 
(0.50), and they moved from the bottom tier to the third tier hospitals in terms of 
clinical performance. Unlike White or Black patients in the treatment group, Hispanic 
and other race women in the treatment group were heavily reallocated towards public 
hospitals. Patients of color from low-income zip codes were able to avoid the 
clinically worst performing hospitals (Rat_q4), with Blacks benefiting the most, while 
Whites move up to the top or second tier hospitals (Rat_q1 and Rat_q2). These 
findings imply that disparities in access to higher quality hospitals between low-
income and high-income patients might have lowered when low-income patients 
obtained Medicaid coverage, but Medicaid patients still had some constraints on 
access to high-quality hospitals compared to the privately insured. 
Table 1.9 reports the coefficients of ELIG for patient subgroups across 
coverage types in each racial subgroup. Similar to the results in Table 1.8, Black and 
White Medicaid mothers were more likely to choose FP hospitals, while Hispanic or 
other race women were more likely to select public hospitals. Medicaid patients of all 
races were able to avoid the clinically worst performing hospitals, Rat_q4. Hispanic 
Medicaid patients were more likely to deliver at large, teaching, public hospitals, as 
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[Table 1.9] Linear Probability Model across Insurance Coverage (NIS Data) 
 
Patient Subgroup by Insurance Coverage 
All White Black Hispanic Medicaid 
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
FP -0.02*** (0.00) 0.01** (0.01) 0.05*** (0.01) -0.14*** (0.01) 
Public 0.12*** (0.01) 0.06*** (0.01) -0.10*** (0.02) 0.51*** (0.01) 
Teaching 0 (0.01) -0.30*** (0.02) -0.26*** (0.03) 0.06** (0.03) 
Bed_Large 0.11*** (0.01) -0.03* (0.02) 0 (0.03) 0.52*** (0.03) 
Urban -0.02*** (0.01) -0.05*** (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01) -0.20*** (0.01) 
RatQ1 -0.11*** (0.01) -0.07*** (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.19*** (0.03) 
RatQ2 -0.15*** (0.01) 0.03* (0.02) -0.27*** (0.02) 0.07*** (0.02) 
RatQ3 0.27*** (0.01) 0.07*** (0.02) 0.39*** (0.03) 0.34*** (0.03) 
RatQ4 -0.01 (0.01) -0.03** (0.02) -0.11*** (0.02) -0.22*** (0.02) 
Rat_Low 0.31*** (0.01) 0.38*** (0.02) 0.75*** (0.02) 0.15*** (0.03) 
Vol_high -0.13*** (0.01) -0.25*** (0.02) -0.13*** (0.02) 0.03 (0.03) 
Private Insurance 
FP 0.05*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.08*** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01) 
Public 0.05*** (0.00) 0.06*** (0.00) -0.06*** (0.01) 0.10*** (0.01) 
Teaching -0.26*** (0.01) -0.27*** (0.01) 0.04 (0.03) -0.68*** (0.03) 
Bed_Large 0.22*** (0.01) 0.23*** (0.01) 0.05* (0.03) 0.24*** (0.03) 
Urban -0.08*** (0.00) -0.07*** (0.00) -0.02*** (0.01) -0.13*** (0.01) 
RatQ1 -0.02*** (0.00) 0.01 (0.01) -0.34*** (0.02) -0.06* (0.03) 
RatQ2 0.16*** (0.00) 0.11*** (0.01) -0.24*** (0.02) 0.63*** (0.02) 
RatQ3 -0.11*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.28*** (0.03) -0.04 (0.03) 
RatQ4 -0.02*** (0.01) -0.15*** (0.01) 0.29*** (0.03) -0.54*** (0.02) 
Rat_Low 0.29*** (0.01) 0.30*** (0.01) 0.17*** (0.03) 0.76*** (0.03) 
Vol_high -0.12*** (0.00) -0.11*** (0.01) 0.20*** (0.02) -0.01 (0.03) 
Self-pay 
FP -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 0.06** (0.03) -0.16*** (0.02) 
Public -0.08*** (0.01) 0.16*** (0.02) 0.07 (0.06) -0.06** (0.03) 
Teaching -0.49*** (0.02) -0.46*** (0.03) -0.05 (0.08) -0.47*** (0.06) 
Bed_Large 0.03 (0.02) -0.04 (0.03) -0.31*** (0.09) 0.39*** (0.06) 
Urban -0.09*** (0.01) -0.12*** (0.02) -0.03 (0.03) -0.07*** (0.02) 
RatQ1 -0.05*** (0.02) -0.04 (0.03) 0.19*** (0.07) 0.04 (0.06) 
RatQ2 0.14*** (0.02) 0.25*** (0.03) -0.28*** (0.07) 0.26*** (0.04) 
RatQ3 0.12*** (0.02) 0 (0.04) 0.09 (0.09) 0.08 (0.06) 
RatQ4 -0.21*** (0.02) -0.22*** (0.03) 0 (0.07) -0.39*** (0.04) 
Rat_Low 0.53*** (0.02) 0.54*** (0.03) 0.31*** (0.08) 0.94*** (0.06) 
Vol_high -0.22*** (0.02) -0.19*** (0.03) -0.19*** (0.07) -0.27*** (0.06) 
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well as facilities with better clinical outcomes, while other race Medicaid patients 
moved to lower volume, public, and urban hospitals. The heterogeneous policy effects 
by patient race suggest that Medicaid expansion might have reduced racial disparities 
in access to higher quality of care. 
 
VII. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
In the main analysis, I showed that Medicaid expansions reallocated maternity patients 
from low-income zip codes across hospitals, mostly towards higher quality 
institutions. However, there may be other factors that might have led Medicaid 
mothers to switch to higher quality hospitals. In this section, I address potential 
confounding factors, especially payment changes that could have provided incentives 
for hospitals to admit more low-income mothers. Then I discuss other issues and 
conclude this paper. 
 
Medicaid DSH  
As shown in Aizer et al (2004) and Duggan (2000), the Medicaid DSH 
program, making extra payments to hospitals which serve a large number of low-
income patients, is likely to provide a strong incentive for some hospitals to accept 
more low-income patients. In order to examine whether the DSH payment is the main 
reason for those from low-income zip codes being admitted to higher quality hospitals, 
ideally I would like to control for the amount of DSH payments at the hospital level. 
With such data unavailable, however, I conduct a counterfactual analysis, comparing 
maternity patients from low-income zip codes, who were more likely to be influenced 
by both coverage expansion and the DSH program, with a control group who were 
influenced by only one of these two policies. The assumption behind this analysis is 
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that if high quality hospitals admitted more maternity patients from low-income zip 
codes in order to receive Medicaid DSH payments, these hospitals would also increase 
admissions for patients with other diseases from those poor zip codes.  
As for the control group, I study pneumonia patients39 aged between 20 and 64. 
Pneumonia was one of the top five causes of hospitalization among the uninsured, 
along with childbirth, heart disease, mental illness, and alcohol abuse (HCUP, 2006). 
Therefore, hospitals’ potential uncompensated care burden would have reduced if low-
income pneumonia patients had come with a reliable payer source. Without a change 
in the eligibility rules for non-pregnant adults, however, profitability for low-income 
pneumonia patients would have changed only if Medicaid DSH payments changed. 
Table 1.10 presents the results of the hospital fixed-effect model for 
pneumonia patients in the NIS. Here, the hospital sample and hospital variables are the 
same as those in the maternity patient analysis. If the proportion of pneumonia patients 
from low-income zip codes increases at higher quality hospitals, I can infer that the 
DSH program was part of the reason for maternity patients from low-income zip codes 
moving to higher quality hospitals. However, I do not find such pattern for pneumonia 
patients. Nor do I find any statistically significant impact on reallocation of Medicaid 
pneumonia patients, while the proportion of selfpay patients with pneumonia increased 
at FP and public hospitals.  
In Florida, the Medicaid DSH program was established on July 1, 1988, and 
the DSH formula did not change during my study period, although the distribution of  
                                                 
39
 I choose pneumonia patients for the following reasons: a) there is a large enough sample of 
pneumonia patients at each hospital; b) most states have run a separate DSH program for mental 
institutions; c) heart disease patients usually require immediate medical attention so that their choice of 
hospitals would be mainly determined by distance to hospital, rather than other hospital attributes; and 
d) pneumonia patients are considered to have discretion over the hospital choice because a delay of as 
much as one hour would not directly affect the patient’s prognosis (Gowrisankaran and Town, 2003). 
The principle diagnosis code (ICD-9 code: 480-486) determines pneumonia patients. Those with 
childbirth DRG codes (370-375), as well as children and the elderly, i.e., those who could have had 
coverage other than Medicaid, are dropped. 
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[Table 1.10] Hospital Fixed-Effect Model for Pneumonia Patients (NIS Data) 
 
Fixed effects 
(X=ZIPINC) 
100≤X 
≤185 X<100 
185<X 
≤300 X>300 Medicaid 
Privately 
Insured 
Self-
pay 
ELIG 0.13 -0.01 -0.20* 0.1 0.08 0.22 -0.13** 
  (0.09) (0.02) (0.11) (0.08) (0.10) (0.16) (0.06) 
ELIG×Public -0.06 0.01 0.14 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 0.21*** 
  (0.10) (0.02) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.14) (0.07) 
ELIG×FP 0.11 -0.03 0.09 -0.17 0.02 0.03 0.16** 
  (0.13) (0.02) (0.12) (0.15) (0.09) (0.19) (0.06) 
ELIG×Teaching 0.03 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.01 
  (0.08) (0.02) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.13) (0.05) 
ELIG×Vol_high -0.04 0 0 0.01 -0.07 0.08 0 
  (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.04) 
ELIG×Bed_Large 0 -0.02 -0.05 0.08 -0.05 0.1 0.04 
  (0.08) (0.02) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.10) (0.04) 
ELIG×Urban -0.12 0.02 0.16* -0.07 -0.11 -0.1 0.05 
  (0.09) (0.02) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.14) (0.05) 
ELIG×Rat_Low -0.09 0 0.13* -0.04 0.05 -0.12 0.04 
  (0.06) (0.01) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.04) 
Constant 0.29*** 0.02*** 0.39*** 0.25*** 0.10*** 0.61*** 0.04*** 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Observations 4097 
 # of Hospitals 1084 
F-stat 0.64 0.8 1.33 1.08 3.92 4.03 3.22 
p-value 0.85 0.67 0.18 0.37 0 0 0 
 
DSH payments across hospitals or hospitals’ response to the DSH program might have 
changed over time. Without detailed data for hospital DSH payments, I also conduct 
the same counterfactual analysis on pneumonia patients. Again, I do not find any 
reallocation effect among pneumonia patients from low-income zip codes at the 
statistically significant level. 
 
Physician Fee Increases 
The other possible factor which could affect patient reallocation is physician 
fee changes. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) in 1989 encouraged 
states to raise Medicaid physician fees for pregnant women and children. Higher 
physician fees for Medicaid mothers may have influenced hospital admissions for low-
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income mothers through two channels: better access to physicians and a change in the 
available physician pool through Medicaid. First, the increase in physician care for 
low-income mothers can prevent development of high-risk pregnancies, and more 
interactions with physicians may improve physicians’ understanding about patients’ 
health and preferences, which can lead them to better and preferred hospitals. 
Moreover, the increased fees may have motivated physicians to join the Medicaid 
program. If those new physicians had different referral patterns or admitting privileges 
with higher quality hospitals, Medicaid mothers could have been reallocated, even 
without a coverage expansion. 
In order to control for the effect of the physician fee increase on hospital 
admission patterns, I add the ratio of Medicaid to private payer physician fees for 
obstetric care40, as well as the interaction terms between this fee ratio41 and each of the 
hospital attributes, to the original fixed-effect model (Baker and Royalty, 2000). The 
results in Table 1.11 show that the increased physician fees did have some effects on 
Medicaid patients in total, but the reallocation effect on maternity patients from low-
income zip codes was still dominated by the eligibility expansion policy. For example, 
the proportions of White and Black mothers from low-income zip codes increased by 
23 and 20 percentage points42 at FP hospitals, all of which were due to the eligibility 
expansions. For Hispanic and other race mothers from low-income zip codes, 
however, the reallocation towards FP hospitals was attributed to the physician fee 
increases rather than the coverage expansions. Finally, the expansion of Medicaid  
                                                 
40
 The data for the Medicaid physician fees from 1987 to 1993 come from various sources (see Currie et 
al, 1994). As in Currie et al (1995), I estimate private physician fees based on the 1989 data in 
Schwartz (1991) and state-specific, hospital cost inflation (hospital expenses per inpatient days) from 
Hospital Statistics (AHA, 1987-1995).  
41
 According to Schwartz (1991), this ratio in 1989 was as low as 0.18 in New Jersey, and as high as 1 
in South Carolina. On average, the ratio increased by 10 percentage points during the sample period, 
from 0.41 in 1988 to 0.51 in 1991.  
42
 On average, the fraction of eligible population increased by 0.25, while the ratio of Medicaid to 
private payer physician fees increased by 0.1. Therefore, the change in the proportion of low-income 
White mothers at FP hospitals is calculated by (0.94)/4+(-0.45+0.40)/10. 
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[Table 1.11] Hospital Fixed-Effect Model with Physician Fees (NIS Data) 
 
100 ≤ ZIPINC ≤ 185% of the FPL Proportion of 
Patient Subgroup All White Black Hispanic Other Race 
ELIG -0.07 0.94*** -0.34 -0.19 0 
  (0.06) (0.23) (0.25) (0.22) (0.26) 
ELIG×Public -0.02 -0.36** -0.09 0.06 0.2 
  (0.06) (0.16) (0.20) (0.14) (0.18) 
ELIG×FP 0.1 0.03 0.80** 0.01 -0.2 
  (0.07) (0.18) (0.35) (0.12) (0.12) 
ELIG×Teaching 0.01 -0.24*** 0.01 -0.07 -0.14* 
  (0.03) (0.07) (0.11) (0.09) (0.08) 
ELIG×Vol_high 0 0.14 0.08 0.18* 0.31*** 
  (0.04) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) 
ELIG×Bed_Large 0.03 -0.26*** 0.1 -0.07 -0.11 
  (0.04) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) 
ELIG×Urban 0.04 -1.02*** 0.07 -0.08 -0.29 
  (0.06) (0.22) (0.23) (0.19) (0.20) 
ELIG×Rat_Low 0.01 0.1 -0.07 0.08 0.22** 
  (0.03) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) 
FEE 0.06 -0.45*** 0.04 0.06 -0.12 
  (0.05) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) 
FEE×Public 0.18** 0.27*** 0.37*** 0.16 0.08 
  (0.08) (0.10) (0.13) (0.10) (0.11) 
FEE×FP 0.17 0.40** 0.29 0.44*** 0.53*** 
  (0.13) (0.16) (0.20) (0.15) (0.15) 
FEE×Teaching 0.03 0.09 -0.12 0.02 0.06 
  (0.06) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) 
FEE×Vol_high -0.07 -0.07 -0.01 -0.03 -0.09 
  (0.05) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) 
FEE×Bed_Large 0.04 0.17** 0.15 0.07 0.18** 
  (0.05) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) 
FEE×Urban -0.05 0.43*** 0.15 0.05 0.21* 
  (0.06) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11) 
FEE×Rat_Low 0.01 0.01 0.05 -0.03 -0.07 
  (0.04) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
Constant 0.25*** 0.07*** -0.02 0.04** 0.04** 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Observations 3466 
 # of Hospitals 943 
R-square 0.03 0.19 0.17 0.1 0.09 
F-stat 1.38 7.77 7.95 5.04 5.89 
p-value 0.11 0 0 0 0 
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[Table 1.11] continued 
 
Medicaid Proportion of 
Patient Subgroup All White Black Hispanic Other race 
ELIG 0.14 0.22* -0.48* -0.13 -0.07 
  (0.10) (0.12) (0.29) (0.20) (0.26) 
ELIG×Public 0.09 -0.11 -0.03 0.39** 0.29 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.23) (0.19) (0.19) 
ELIG×FP 0.01 0.04 0.59* 0.13 -0.22 
  (0.15) (0.17) (0.35) (0.21) (0.15) 
ELIG×Teaching -0.11 -0.24*** -0.03 -0.11 -0.23* 
  (0.09) (0.08) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) 
ELIG×Vol_high -0.11 0.13 0.09 0.06 0.26* 
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) 
ELIG×Bed_Large -0.01 -0.20** 0.2 -0.11 0.01 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.12) (0.15) 
ELIG×Urban 0 -0.26** 0.23 0.14 0.03 
  (0.12) (0.13) (0.25) (0.19) (0.23) 
ELIG×Rat_Low 0.11 0.1 -0.06 0.15 0.18 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13) 
FEE -0.04 -0.31*** -0.21* -0.24** -0.24* 
  (0.06) (0.08) (0.13) (0.10) (0.12) 
FEE×Public 0.23*** 0.38*** 0.62*** 0.15 0.16 
  (0.08) (0.09) (0.14) (0.11) (0.11) 
FEE×FP 0.15 0.50*** 0.52*** 0.38** 0.52*** 
  (0.10) (0.14) (0.20) (0.15) (0.13) 
FEE×Teaching -0.06 0.11 0.05 0.09 0.11 
  (0.07) (0.09) (0.14) (0.11) (0.10) 
FEE×Vol_high -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.04 
  (0.07) (0.08) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) 
FEE×Bed_Large 0.06 0.12* 0.19* 0.16* 0.04 
  (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) 
FEE×Urban 0 0.23*** 0.29** 0.09 0.1 
  (0.07) (0.09) (0.15) (0.12) (0.12) 
FEE×Rat_Low -0.02 0.05 0.02 -0.07 -0.08 
  (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) 
Constant 0.16*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.09*** 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Observations 3466 3466 3466 3466 3466 
 # of Hospitals 943 943 943 943 943 
R-square 0.32 0.28 0.21 0.2 0.15 
F-stat 24.71 15.58 13.96 13.84 12.33 
p-value 0 0 0 0 0 
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coverage helped other race mothers from low-income zip codes to receive care at 
clinically better performing hospitals; the proportion increased by 5 percentage points 
at hospitals with low complication rates. My findings suggest that the increased 
physician fees seemed to reinforce the reallocation effects towards FP hospitals for 
Medicaid patients. These results are consistent with those in Baker and Royalty 
(2000), which showed that increased physician fees reallocated low-income mothers to 
private physicians. 
 
Payment Differentials 
Lastly, I examine whether the impact of Medicaid expansion varied with 
hospital reimbursement generosity across states. As Currie and Gruber (2001) noted, 
the lower the Medicaid hospital payments are relative to private payer 
reimbursements, the smaller increase in expected payments for hospitals for treating 
low-income mothers who obtained Medicaid coverage. Therefore, the impact of 
Medicaid expansions on patient reallocation may be small in states where Medicaid 
hospital payments are significantly lower than private payer reimbursements, as 
opposed to states where Medicaid hospital payments are close to the private payers’. 
Due to the lack of hospital payment data, however, I use physician fee 
differentials as a proxy, assuming that states with higher physician fees would also 
provide higher payments to hospitals. The payment differential is defined as the ratio 
of private to Medicaid global physician fees for vaginal delivery, the inverse of the fee 
ratio used in the previous section. To capture the role of the relative payment 
generosity across hospitals, I add the interaction terms between the differentials and 
the hospital covariates (FEE and FEE×X) to the original fixed-effect models.  
Table 1.12 presents the results of this hospital fixed-effect model with the NIS 
data, and supports my hypothesis that the impact of Medicaid expansion was smaller  
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[Table 1.12] Hospital Fixed-Effect Model with Payment Differentials (NIS Data) 
 
100 ≤ ZIPINC ≤ 185% of the FPL Proportion of Patient 
Subgroup All White Black Hispanic Other 
race 
ELIG 0.06 0.80*** 0.2 0.31* 0.12 
  (0.10) (0.15) (0.19) (0.18) (0.15) 
ELIG×Public 0.16 -0.26* 0.12 0.02 0.05 
  (0.10) (0.15) (0.18) (0.17) (0.16) 
ELIG×FP 0.23 0.21 0.73*** 0.45* 0.28 
  (0.17) (0.23) (0.28) (0.24) (0.21) 
ELIG×Teaching 0.1 -0.06 0.06 0.14 0.01 
  (0.10) (0.14) (0.17) (0.16) (0.15) 
ELIG×Vol_high -0.08 -0.2 0.01 0.06 0.06 
  (0.08) (0.15) (0.19) (0.17) (0.16) 
ELIG×Bed_Large 0.02 -0.08 0.29* 0.03 0.1 
  (0.09) (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.14) 
ELIG×Urban -0.07 -0.49*** 0.11 -0.2 -0.04 
  (0.12) (0.18) (0.22) (0.19) (0.17) 
ELIG×Rat_Low 0.04 0.13 0.02 0.09 0.20* 
  (0.06) (0.12) (0.15) (0.14) (0.11) 
ELIG×DIFF -0.07* -0.17*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.09* 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) 
ELIG×DIFF×Public -0.07 -0.01 -0.12** -0.05 -0.04 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
ELIG×DIFF×FP -0.06 -0.08* -0.11 -0.11** -0.10** 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) 
ELIG×DIFF×Teaching -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.01 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
ELIG×DIFF×Vol_high 0.01 0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
ELIG×DIFF×Bed_Large 0 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
ELIG×DIFF×Urban 0.07* 0.08 0.09 0.14** 0.04 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) 
ELIG×DIFF×Rat_Low -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant 0.28*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Observations 4086 
 # of Hospitals 1068 
R-square 0.04 0.2 0.2 0.13 0.09 
F-stat 1.55 10.29 10.19 6.95 6.37 
p-value 0.05 0 0 0 0 
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[Table 1.12] continued 
 
Medicaid Proportion of Patient 
Subgroup All White Black Hispanic Other 
race 
ELIG 0.08 0.12 -0.15 -0.07 -0.21 
  (0.11) (0.13) (0.18) (0.18) (0.16) 
ELIG×Public 0.27** 0.17 0.49*** 0.36** 0.34** 
  (0.11) (0.13) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
ELIG×FP 0.2 0.46*** 0.89*** 0.60*** 0.35** 
  (0.13) (0.16) (0.23) (0.19) (0.15) 
ELIG×Teaching -0.15 -0.01 0.1 0.1 -0.03 
  (0.10) (0.16) (0.20) (0.17) (0.18) 
ELIG×Vol_high -0.19* 0.01 0.17 0.04 0.37*** 
  (0.10) (0.12) (0.16) (0.15) (0.14) 
ELIG×Bed_Large 0.06 0 0.50*** 0.2 0.02 
  (0.08) (0.11) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) 
ELIG×Urban 0.11 0.01 0.37** 0.32* 0.1 
  (0.10) (0.14) (0.19) (0.18) (0.16) 
ELIG×Rat_Low 0.11 0.22** -0.04 0.01 0.08 
  (0.08) (0.10) (0.14) (0.13) (0.11) 
ELIG×DIFF -0.03 -0.04 -0.09 0 0 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) 
ELIG×DIFF×Public -0.08* -0.12*** -0.21*** -0.05 -0.10** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
ELIG×DIFF×FP 0.02 -0.12** -0.14* -0.04 -0.11** 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) 
ELIG×DIFF×Teaching 0.02 0 0.04 -0.01 0 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
ELIG×DIFF×Vol_high 0 -0.02 -0.10*** -0.05 -0.07** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
ELIG×DIFF×Bed_Large 0.01 -0.01 0 -0.02 0.03 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
ELIG×DIFF×Urban 0 0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.01 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) 
ELIG×DIFF×Rat_Low 0 -0.04* -0.05 0.01 0.01 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant 0.17*** 0.10*** 0.14*** 0.03** 0.07*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Observations 4086 
 # of Hospitals 1068 
R-square 0.29 0.29 0.24 0.21 0.14 
F-stat 24.05 20.78 21.65 17.62 12.96 
p-value 0 0 0 0 0 
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in states where Medicaid hospital payments were less generous than private payers’. 
For example, the proportion of Hispanic mothers from low-income zip codes would 
have increased at FP hospitals by 11 percentage points ((0.31+0.45-0.21-0.11)/4) if 
there were no payment differentials between private payers and Medicaid. However, if 
state governments paid hospitals less than private payer reimbursements, the increase 
in the proportion would be smaller. 
 
Patients Admitted through Emergency Room 
In the main analysis, I did not include patients who were admitted through 
emergency rooms. In the Florida discharge data sets, about 10 percent of childbirth 
patients (6-16 percent in each year) were admitted through emergency rooms, while in 
the NIS, 7 percent of the discharges were recorded as emergency room admissions. 
Not surprisingly, emergency room admissions in Florida had 8 percentage point lower 
c-section rates and 6 percentage point higher weekend admissions than non-
emergency admissions. They were younger, residing in lower income zip codes, 
staying longer, and making shorter trips to hospitals than routine admissions. The most 
striking difference lies in the distribution of payer sources. Emergency rooms are 
heavily used by not only uninsured patients but also Medicaid patients, with these two 
groups accounting for about 80 percent of ER admissions. It is surprising to see such a 
large number of Medicaid patients admitted through emergency rooms, even after they 
obtain a guaranteed payer source. The increase in ER admissions for Medicaid patients 
after 1989 and 1992 implies that some of new Medicaid-eligible mothers might not 
have been aware of their eligibility until their admissions to hospitals to deliver babies.  
 Table 1.13 reports the results of the conditional logit model for the Florida 
data. Prior to the expansions, maternity patients from low-income zip codes were 
heavily dependent on emergency departments at public, teaching, and urban hospitals.  
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[Table 1.13] Conditional Logit Model for Emergency Room Admissions (Florida) 
 
 
X=ZIPINC as % 
of the FPL 
100≤X 
≤150 X≤100 X>300 
150≤X 
≤185 X≤150 X>300 
Zipdist 0.77*** 0.66*** 0.81*** 0.78*** 0.60*** 0.87 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
FP 0.56*** 0.10*** 0.35*** 0.28*** 0.73*** 0.64 
  (0.05) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) 
Public 22.21*** 6.11*** 4.86*** 3.13*** 2.08*** 7.87 
  (1.27) (0.59) (0.29) (0.13) (0.18) 0.17 
Teaching 5.46*** 90.93*** 0.56*** 3.00*** 2.81*** 1.46 
  (0.47) (17.41) (0.04) (0.15) (0.25) 4 
Large_bed 1.55*** 2.12*** 1.21 1.69*** 4.71*** 2.66 
  (0.17) (0.27) (0.18) (0.12) (0.57) 0.12 
NICU 0.54*** 0.28*** 1.54*** 1.75*** 11.88*** 1.2 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.14) (0.11) (1.69) 0.04 
Rat_low 0.97 1.26*** 1.47*** 1.24*** 0.88* 0.82 
  (0.05) (0.11) (0.09) (0.04) (0.06) 0.01 
High_Vol 11.99*** 1.64*** 8.00*** 1.38*** 0.28*** 7.41 
  (0.90) (0.22) (0.83) (0.09) (0.04) 0.21 
Urban 21.63*** 27.00*** 35.69*** 66.95*** 3.75** 49.8 
  (2.58) (6.45) (7.53) (12.06) (2.40) 5.09 
Zipdist×POST 1.13*** 1.04*** 1.01* 1.05*** 0.97** 0.99 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 0 
FP×POST 1.67*** 3.25*** 1.32*** 2.42*** 3.45*** 1.44 
  (0.15) (0.52) (0.12) (0.22) (0.64) 0.07 
Public×POST 0.32*** 0.80** 0.38*** 1.28*** 1.49*** 0.84 
  (0.02) (0.08) (0.03) (0.09) (0.23) 0.03 
Teaching×POST 0.45*** 0.26*** 4.39*** 1.48*** 1.41** 1.46 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.36) (0.13) (0.23) 0.07 
largebed×POST 1.61*** 0.64*** 0.94 1.39*** 0.04*** 0.68 
  (0.18) (0.09) (0.15) (0.14) (0.01) 0.04 
NICU×POST 2.09*** 2.59*** 0.83* 0.76*** 0.21*** 0.9 
  (0.22) (0.50) (0.08) (0.07) (0.04) 0.05 
Rat_low×POST 0.71*** 0.96 0.84*** 0.81*** 0.82* 0.95 
  (0.04) (0.09) (0.06) (0.05) (0.09) 0.03 
High_Vol×POST 0.29*** 1.29* 0.37*** 0.94 7.26*** 0.43 
  (0.02) (0.19) (0.04) (0.10) (1.69) 0.02 
Urban×POST 0.96 0.74 0.36*** 0.17*** 1.06 0.35 
  (0.15) (0.19) (0.09) (0.04) (1.28) 0.05 
Observations 252390 222580 128782 113298 108934 356995 
LR-chi2 49868.53 78411.78 23733.43 23585.8 39459.96 63873.58 
Prob>chi2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Psuedo R2 0.38 0.64 0.37 0.43 0.63 0.35 
 
After the coverage expansions, their access to FP hospitals was greatly improved, 
while dependence on safety-net hospitals decreased. This indicates that the policy 
effect on patient reallocation is different between maternity patients admitted through 
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an emergency room and those admitted with a referral: the finding that ER admissions 
are more likely to give birth at FP hospitals, which referred low-income mothers still 
had difficulty in accessing, implies that FP hospitals had no choice but to provide care 
for those who showed up at their emergency rooms.  
 
Other Discussions 
The conditional logit model, focusing on the effect of hospital attributes on 
patient choice, is based on the strong assumption such that the probability ratio of 
patients choosing between two hospitals does not depend on the availability or 
attributes of other hospital options, i.e., the error terms are independent across 
alternatives. This restrictive assumption, called independence from irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA), raises some concerns because the violation of the IIA could produce 
inconsistent estimates (Tai, 2004). There are alternative discrete choice models, such 
as nested logit, multinomial probit and mixed logit models, that partially or fully relax 
the IIA assumption43. However, the task of relaxing the IIA assumption accompanies 
significant time and computational costs, while the results of the conditional logit 
model and other models with the relaxed IIA assumption produced qualitatively 
similar results (Christiadi and Cushing, 2007). Since my goal was to examine patients’ 
average preference on hospital attributes, not to predict the substitution patterns 
among hospital options, the conditional logit model would suffice to address my 
questions44. 
 
 
                                                 
43
 Borah (2006) and Pope (2007) used the mixed-logit model to investigate hospital choice decisions in 
India and for American Medicare patients, respectively. 
44
 Moreover, I applied the conditional logit model to the various patient subgroups as an attempt to take 
into account taste variations among patients, which mixed logit or multinomial probit models aim to 
capture. This further breakdown of my sample across patient characteristics (income, coverage type, 
and risk-level) would minimize the potential bias (Train, 2003).  
 70 
Conclusion 
The original goal of the Medicaid program was to provide low-income people 
with health insurance coverage so that they would not be at a disadvantage in 
receiving necessary medical services due to inability to pay. Past studies have 
provided ample evidence that the expansion of the Medicaid program increased 
utilization of medical services and thereby improved health outcomes for low-income 
individuals. However, this paper shows that these improved health outcomes could 
actually have been the product of not only increased access to care but also 
accessibility to higher quality providers. If increased access to high-quality care is as 
important a factor in improved health outcomes as increased quantity of care received, 
without considering this quality channel, previous studies may not have fully 
understood the mechanisms for improved health outcomes as a result of the Medicaid 
expansion policy. 
In this paper, I show that types of hospitals utilized by maternity patients differ 
by zip code income level, coverage type, and severity of illness. Traditionally, 
uninsured low-income patients have relied on safety-net hospitals such as major 
teaching or public hospitals. However, increased public insurance coverage makes 
those who were previously uninsured but obtained Medicaid coverage more profitable 
and thereby can steer them toward higher quality hospitals. Without patient income 
information, I study how Medicaid expansions reallocated maternity patients from 
low-income zip codes across hospitals. Overall, my findings confirm that those from 
low-income zip codes, who were more likely to obtain Medicaid coverage after the 
expansion policy, had a higher probability of being guided to better hospitals after the 
expansions. In Florida, the two eligibility expansions in 1989 and 1992 increased 
access to higher quality hospitals to different extents. While the 1989 expansion 
reallocated those from low-income zip codes to safety-net hospitals, hospitals with 
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NICU, and those with low complication rates, the 1992 expansion sent them to non-
safety-net hospitals, i.e., private FP or NFP hospitals, and those with better clinical 
outcomes. The physician fee increase in 1992 seemed to solidify the reallocation 
effects, but was not entirely responsible for this change in site of hospital care. Nor did 
the high-risk status among maternity patients from low-income zip codes lead them to 
higher quality hospitals. At the national level, the impacts of Medicaid expansion on 
patient reallocation were similar to those of the 1989 expansion in Florida, but 
somewhat smaller than the effects found in the Florida analysis. However, my findings 
from the NIS consistently support my hypothesis that those from low-income zip 
codes were more likely to receive care at higher quality hospitals such as institutions 
with low postnatal complication rates. I also find that the increased public insurance 
coverage somewhat reduced racial disparities in access to higher quality hospitals.  
 This paper suggests two future research directions. First, there has been an 
ongoing discussion concerning the measurement of hospital quality, dissemination of 
quality information, and incentives for hospital quality improvement. More research 
should be done with regard to how this increasing attention to quality improvement 
can benefit the vulnerable, low-income population. Second, in order to have a better 
understanding of hospital admission and selection processes, more studies concerning 
the role of physicians in patients’ choice of hospitals, as well as the dynamics between 
hospitals and physicians, are necessary.  
Nonetheless, my findings provide two important implications for policy 
makers. First, this paper shows that expansion of the public insurance program results 
not only in increased access to care but also in access to better care, which may lead to 
improved health outcomes. Therefore, policy makers should pay attention to the 
quality of providers accessible to low-income individuals, in addition to the increase in 
public insurance coverage. Second, my findings suggest that higher payments to 
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providers reinforce the reallocation effect toward better care. Therefore, increased 
coverage combined with direct financial support to providers such as increases in 
hospital payments or physician fees may be more effective in providing a better health 
care safety net for low-income people.
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CHAPTER 2 
 
The Impact of Health Policy and Market Structure on Hospital Indigent Care 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Nearly 46 million Americans, or 18 percent of the population under age 65, do not 
have health insurance, among whom 64 percent have incomes below 200 percent of 
the federal poverty line (CPS, 2007). Although physicians provide some indigent care, 
hospitals have been a primary source of care for this uninsured low-income 
population45 (Hadley and Holahan, 2004). According to the most recent national study 
(HCUP, 2009), uninsured hospitalizations have increased by 34 percent, from 1.7 
million in 1997 to 2.2 million in 200646, and account for 4.8 and 5.7 percent, 
respectively, of total hospitalizations. This increasing trend in uninsured 
hospitalizations implies that hospital indigent care has been in high demand.  
At the same time, hospitals have experienced considerable financial strain 
since the 1990s due to low payments from both private and government payers (Figure 
2.1). In the private sector, growth of managed care organizations has increased price 
competition, making it difficult for hospitals to cross-subsidize the uninsured and the 
underinsured (Thorpe et al, 2001; Weissman, 2003; McKay and Meng, 2007). 
Meanwhile, low government reimbursements have been a perennial problem for 
safety-net hospitals, i.e., those whose payer mix consists mainly of Medicaid and self-
pay. Hospitals’ financial distress deepened in 1997 when the Balanced Budget Act  
 
                                                 
45
 Sixty three percent of indigent care is provided by hospitals, whereas physicians and clinics/direct 
care programs provide about 20 percent of indigent care.  
46
 Over those ten years, privately insured hospitalizations did not change; the increase in Medicare 
hospitalizations was much smaller, 17%, while Medicaid hospitalizations increased the most, by 36%. 
 82 
(a) Percentage of Hospitals with Negative Total Margins 1980-2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Hospital Margins: 1990 – 2001 
 
 
Source: AHA Trend Watch Chartbook, 2003: p. 45 
 
[Figure 2.1] Hospital Financial Distress: 1980-2001  
 
further reduced Medicare and Medicaid hospital payments (Zuckerman et al, 2001; 
Bazzoli et al, 2004). 
Concern about increased demand for indigent care, along with hospitals’ 
decreased ability to finance it, triggered implementation of several health policies that 
aimed to ease the financial burden for both hospitals and indigent patients. For 
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example, the federal and state governments have run financial support programs—the 
Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) program, Indirect Medical Education (IME), 
and uncompensated care pool—for indigent care providers, directly injecting extra 
funds into hospitals that disproportionately serve the poor. At the same time, 
expansions of public insurance coverage through Medicaid and other state-run 
insurance programs are designed to lower the financial burden of indigent patients, 
which will ultimately reduce disparities in access to care and in health outcomes. 
Indirectly, however, this increased coverage may also benefit hospitals by decreasing 
demand for indigent care, as well as offering some payments to them for treating low-
income patients. 
The objective of this study is to examine hospitals’ provision of indigent care 
in response to two U.S. health policies: expansions of the Medicaid program for 
pregnant women and infants in 1992 and the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) in 1997. 
The BBA, reducing government payments, increased financial pressure on hospitals, 
thereby giving them a greater incentive to reduce the supply of indigent care. The 
impact of the Medicaid expansion is rather ambiguous because coverage expansions 
affect both the demand and supply sides of indigent care. On the demand side, 
expanded coverage for pregnant women and infants (the target group) is expected to 
lower demand for indigent care, considering that childbirth has been the most common 
reason for hospitalization for the uninsured (HCUP, 2009). The equilibrium level of 
indigent care, however, may fall because of potential effects on demand for and supply 
of indigent care. On the demand side, if there is large excess demand for indigent care, 
increased coverage will reduce that excess demand to some degree, but may not 
completely eliminate it (only a small reduction in unmet indigent care). The other 
possibility is that if non-maternity and non-infant patients (non-target group) increase 
demand for indigent care, the total demand will not decrease. On the supply side, 
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despite low Medicaid hospital payments, revenues generated from a larger number of 
Medicaid mothers and infants may motivate hospitals to provide more indigent care to 
other low-income uninsured patients (income effects). If hospitals supplement the 
decreased indigent care for the target group with increased indigent care for those in 
the non-target group, the expansion policy will not necessarily reduce the observed 
equilibrium amount of indigent care. Therefore, whether the expansion of Medicaid 
coverage reduces the equilibrium level of hospital indigent care is an empirical 
question. 
In order to examine the impacts of these two policies on hospitals’ provision of 
indigent care, I study a sample of 1739 hospital-year observations for 1990-2000 from 
168 different hospitals in Florida hospitals’ financial and discharge data sets47. As 
shown in Table 2.1, I define hospital indigent care in the following three ways: 
uncompensated care costs in dollars, volume of indigent patients, and amounts of 
unprofitable services provided. First, uncompensated care (UC) is the sum of charity 
care and bad debt: both are unpaid care, but charity care is care for which hospitals 
never expect to be reimbursed, while bad debt arises when hospitals cannot obtain 
reimbursement for care provided, as opposed to their initial expectation of payment 
(AHA, 2008). I examine charity care and UC as a percent of operating costs, as well as 
their log values. Second, I examine number and proportion of indigent admissions. 
Due to the data limitation, I define indigent patients based on payer source, and 
examine admissions for uninsured (selfpay) patients. Since not all uninsured patients 
are indigent, I am aware of the possible biases resulting from studying total uninsured  
 
                                                 
47
 I choose to study the state of Florida due to not only the availability of the detailed data sets but also 
interesting features in its health care market. Florida ranks third in the nation in uninsured persons, 
20.2% of the state population (Census, 2005); demographically, racial and ethnic minorities are over-
represented among the uninsured: Hispanics make up 31.6% of the uninsured, Blacks 19.5%; the 
Florida hospital market includes a large number of for-profit hospitals (47%) compared to the average 
hospital market in the nation (10%).  
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[Table 2.1] Definition of Hospital Indigent Care 
 
Hospital Indigent 
Care 
Definition 
Charity 
Care 
Unbilled care that hospitals initially do not expect to be 
reimbursed for. Hospitals report full charges on their 
financial statements, but not true costs of providing the care. 
Active willingness to provide indigent care or hospitals’ 
intention of providing indigent care. Ex-ante concept. 
Uncomp
ensated 
Care 
Bad Debt 
Billed but unpaid care that hospitals initially expect to be 
reimbursed for, but fail to collect payments due to patients’ 
unwillingness or inability to pay. No intention of providing 
indigent care in the first place. Ex-post concept.  
Admissions for 
Indigent patients 
I use indigent, uninsured, and selfpay patients, 
interchangeably.  
Provision of 
Unprofitable 
Services 
See Table 2.3. 
 
patients instead of just the indigent segment of uninsured patients. I will discuss this 
issue in Section V. Admissions for uninsured patients are broken down into non-
emergency vs. emergency patients, and for the analysis of the Medicaid expansion, 
into the target group (maternity and infant patients) vs. the non-target group. Last, I 
classify hospital services as profitable and unprofitable services based on Horwitz 
(2005) and consider provision of unprofitable services (such as emergency room and 
clinic services) as indigent care.  
While studying the policy impacts on hospital indigent care, I particularly 
focus on two factors that could generate heterogeneous policy impacts: hospital 
ownership type and level of concentration of indigent care burden among hospitals 
within markets. First, I divide hospitals into three groups by ownership status: private 
for-profit (FP), private not-for-profit (NFP), and public. The general consensus is that 
FP hospitals, as profit maximizers, have the least incentive to provide indigent care, 
while public or NFP hospitals are major indigent care providers by mission, or due to 
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the requirement to provide community benefits in exchange for tax exemptions48. 
Since hospitals’ objective functions and constraints differ by ownership type, demand 
or supply shocks such as Medicaid expansions or the BBA are expected to have a 
heterogeneous impact on provision of indigent care across hospitals with different 
ownership types. For example, FP hospitals, concerned with profits, may be more 
responsive to financial incentive changes than NFP or public hospitals. On the other 
hand, FP hospitals may not need to be as responsive because these types of policies 
are likely to have a larger impact on hospitals with high indigent care burdens in the 
first place, which would not be the case for FP hospitals.  
In addition to ownership types, the extent to which hospitals are able to adjust 
their provision of indigent care may vary across markets, or more precisely, according 
to markets’ levels of concentration of indigent care burden across hospitals. Therefore, 
I compare hospitals’ supply of indigent care across three types of markets: markets 
with a single hospital; markets with multiple hospitals of which very few 
disproportionately serve the indigent; markets with multiple hospitals among which 
the indigent care burden is equally spread out. For markets with multiple hospitals, I 
measure the concentration level based on distribution of hospitals and indigent 
patients. If a large public hospital serves a great number of indigent patients because it 
is located in an area in which indigent patients are largely populated (e.g. Jackson 
Memorial Hospital in Miami-Dade County), I do not consider this market highly 
concentrated. However, if indigent patients have to make a long trip to a public 
hospital because nearby hospitals do not welcome them, this public hospital 
disproportionately serves the poor, and its market is considered highly concentrated. 
 
                                                 
48
 As an exception to this, Norton and Staiger (1994) showed that there is no difference in the provision 
of charity care across hospital ownership types after controlling endogeneity of ownership type and 
services provided.  
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Hospital payment cuts such as the BBA are major supply shocks that would 
give hospitals a greater incentive to reduce indigent care, but probably to different 
extents across markets. If hospitals are operating as sole providers in markets, it may 
be difficult for them to reduce indigent care to a large extent, because there is no 
alternative institution that could provide indigent care in their markets. If there are 
alternative providers in markets, hospitals may make larger adjustments to indigent 
care, hoping that other hospitals will meet the indigent care needs of their 
communities. In particular, hospitals operating in markets where every hospital shares 
indigent care burden may be able to reduce indigent care to greater extents than those 
operating in markets where only a few hospitals disproportionately serve the poor. 
Because indigent care has a public good property (Nicholson et al, 2000; Sloan, 2002), 
I conjecture that hospitals will minimize the provision of indigent care if they can, and 
prefer to free-ride instead of acting as major indigent care providers. Whether and to 
what extent hospitals can free-ride depends on other hospitals’ supply of indigent care. 
Here, I use the level of concentration of indigent care burden among hospitals as a 
measure for how easily hospitals can make adjustments to indigent care or free-ride in 
terms of indigent care contributions to communities. I compare the supply of indigent 
care after the policy changes, not only across hospital ownership types but also 
between markets in which distribution of indigent care burden is different. 
Estimating difference-in-difference and triple difference type regression 
models, I find that policy impacts did differ across ownership status, but do not find a 
consistent pattern for the relationship between the market conditions and hospitals’ 
provision of indigent care. For the Medicaid expansion, increased coverage lowered 
provision of charity care, regardless of ownership type or market structure, with the 
decrease larger at public and NFP hospitals. The policy impact on overall volume of 
uninsured patients was small and statistically insignificant. However, the composition 
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of uninsured admissions between the target and non-target groups appeared to change: 
public and NFP hospitals seemed to supplement their decreased indigent care for 
maternity and infant patients with increased care for non-maternity indigent patients 
who did not have emergency conditions; however, FP hospitals decreased their 
uninsured admissions after the expansion unless they were sole providers within 
markets. I also find that the coverage expansion reallocated provision of maternity and 
infant care services across hospitals: public and NFP hospitals acting as sole providers 
or operating in markets with low concentrations of indigent care burden increased 
NICU days after the expansion; in contrast, in markets with high concentrations of 
indigent care burden, FP hospitals increased services associated with maternity and 
pediatric patients, the target groups of the expansion.  
For the BBA, hospitals reduced indigent care by admitting fewer uninsured 
and Medicaid admissions, while amounts of uncompensated care did not change. 
Policy impacts were large at safety-net hospitals, such as public and NFP hospitals, 
which were hit hard by the BBA. Although FP hospitals with the least detrimental 
effects after the BBA made little adjustment to indigent care, they increased provision 
of profitable services and decreased provision of unprofitable services. After both 
policy changes, public hospitals remained major indigent care providers. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section II summarizes the background 
of the BBA and the Medicaid expansion. Section III provides the conceptual 
framework: the supply side of indigent care, the demand side of indigent care, three 
measures for hospital indigent care, and the measure for market level concentration of 
indigent care burden. I introduce data and empirical strategies in Section V, discuss 
the empirical results in Section VI, and conduct robustness checks in Section VII. 
Section VIII concludes this paper. 
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II. Background of Health Policy 
 
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 
The BBA was widely considered a broad, fundamental change in the whole 
reimbursement system of health care providers. The BBA reduced hospital 
reimbursements for Medicare patients, set Medicaid DSH spending limits, refined the 
physician payment system to more accurately reflect practice expenses, and expanded 
the Prospective Payment System to outpatient care, home health agencies, 
rehabilitation hospitals, as well as skilled nursing facilities. Through the reductions of 
annual inflation updates, Medicare DSH payments, and direct/indirect graduate 
medical educational payments, Medicare hospital revenues were expected to decrease 
by $72 billion for 1998-2002 and $119 billion for 1998-2004 (AHA, 2001). With the 
BBA effective on the first day of 1998, however, larger than anticipated reductions in 
hospital Medicare revenues convinced the U.S. Congress to enact the Balanced Budget 
Refinement Act (BBRA) in 1999 and Benefits Improvement and Protection Act 
(BIPA) in 2000. These two provisions relaxed or delayed some of the original 
reductions ($8.4 billion under the BBRA and $11.5 billion under the BIPA), 
lengthened the transition period for reductions in IME adjustments, and limited DSH 
reductions (AHA, 2001). However, the BBRA and BIPA were considered to be small, 
temporary relief from the BBA.  
The size of the financial shock was measured with a BBA-simulator (Volpp et 
al, 2005; Seshamani et al, 2006; Tamara et al, 2005) or Financial Pressure Index 
(Bazzoli et al, 2004; Lindrooth et al, 2006). The BBA-simulator, constructed by the 
American Hospital Association (AHA) based on hospital data from Medicare Cost 
Reports, estimated Medicare revenues under inflation for post-BBA periods, had the 
BBA not been implemented. The difference between these estimated and actual 
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revenues indicates the magnitude of the policy impact on hospitals. Table 2.2 presents 
the simulated results (Seshamani et al, 2006): the BBRA and BIPA, the two follow-up 
policies after the BBA, did not change the size of the financial impact at all, except in 
2001, while the magnitude of net impact stayed the same after 2000. This indicates 
that the BBA was the main driving force that increased hospitals’ financial distress in 
the late 1990s, and that most of the policy impact was absorbed in the short run (1998-
2000), during the first three years after the enactment of the BBA. Although this AHA 
simulator would conveniently extract exogenous policy impacts, without access to the 
AHA resources, I turn to an alternative measure, the Financial Pressure Index (FPI). 
The FPI also aims to capture potential losses attributed to the BBA, using hospitals’ 
pre- and post-BBA financial information. The Medicare FPI for hospital h is 
constructed in the following way: 
 
McareFPIh,98 = [(per_McareCost h,97 – per_McarePrev h,98)×Mcare_AdjAdm h,97]/TE h,97 
 
where per_McareCost is hospital h’s Medicare costs per adjusted admission in 1997; 
per_McareRev is total Medicare revenues per adjusted Medicare admission in 1998; 
Mcare_AdjAdm is an estimate of Medicare adjusted admissions in 1997; TE is total 
hospital expenses in 1997. The adjusted admissions account for both inpatient and 
outpatient care. The numerator means potential losses attributed to the BBA under the 
assumption that the trend for cost and revenue structure would have continued had the 
BBA not been implemented. Similarly, I construct Medicaid FPI, replacing Medicare 
costs, revenues, and admissions with respective values for Medicaid. These FPI 
measures are assigned to each hospital, and the values do not vary over time within 
hospitals.  
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[Table 2.2] Relative Changes in DRG Payments for Sole-Community Hospitals 
under BBA, BBRA, and BIPA Using a Baseline of FY 1997 
 
 FY 1997 FY 1998 FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001 
Inflation Alone 1.000 1.027 1.052 1.083 1.114 
BBA 1.000 0.999 0.995 1.007 1.024 
BBA+BBRA 1.000 0.999 0.995 1.007 1.036 
BBA+BBRA+BIPA 1.000 0.999 0.995 1.007 1.038 
Net Impact 
(BBA+BBRA+BIPA-
inflation) 
0 -0.028 -0.057 -0.076 -0.076 
Source: Table 1 in Seshamani et al (2006) 
Note: DRG, diagnosis-related groups; BBA, Balanced Budget Act; BBRA, Balanced Budget 
Refinement Act; BIPA, Benefits and Improvement Protection Act. 
 
Medicaid Expansions in 1992 
Medicaid is an entitlement program under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 
jointly funded by the state and federal governments. Since its establishment in 1965, 
the Medicaid program has been a major source of health insurance for low-income 
individuals who otherwise would not be able to afford private health insurance. States 
have broad discretion to decide eligibility, scope of services and provider 
reimbursements. Before 1984, Medicaid eligibility was closely tied to the Aid for 
Families to Dependent Children (AFDC) program, so that only indigent, single 
mothers were eligible for Medicaid, and its income cutoffs were fairly low (Currie and 
Gruber, 1997). After states were allowed to delink Medicaid eligibility from the cash 
welfare assistance program in 1986, Congress required all states to cover pregnant 
women and children under age six with incomes at or below 133% of the federal 
poverty line (FPL) by 1990, with the option to cover up to 185% of the FPL. In 
Florida, there were several eligibility expansions for pregnant women and children 
from the late 1980s to the early 1990s. In this paper, I study the 1992 expansion, in 
which the income threshold increased from 150 to 185 percent of the FPL for low-
income expectant mothers as well as infants under age 1. Figure 2.2 shows the trend of  
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Medicaid Enrollment Growth in Florida
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Source: Social Services Estimating Conference, various years.  
Downloaded at the following website: http://collinsinstitute.fsu.edu/research/table/71 
 
[Figure 2.2] Medicaid Enrollment Growth in Florida (1984-2008) 
 
Medicaid enrollment growth in Florida over time: with a sharp increase in enrollment 
between 1991 and 1993. 
 
III. Conceptual Framework  
 
A. Supply of Hospital Indigent Care 
 
Motives for Provision of Indigent Care 
Provision of indigent care is an unprofitable business in which hospitals 
generate very little revenues or even incur losses. However, hospitals provide indigent 
care for several reasons. First of all, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active 
Labor Act (EMTALA) of 1986 prohibited hospitals from dumping patients with 
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emergency medical conditions (GAO, 2001). This law virtually calls upon every 
hospital to provide some amount of indigent care. Besides this emergency care offered 
to indigent patients, some hospitals have obligations to provide more indigent care, 
while other hospitals voluntarily provide it, but out of different motivations. The three 
ownership types define hospitals’ objective functions and constraints differently 
(Frank and Salkever, 1991; Norton and Staiger, 1994; Banks et al, 1997; Gaskin, 
1997; Weissman et al, 2003; Rosko, 2004; GAO, 2005), and thus create different 
incentives to supply indigent care. Public hospitals, which receive government 
funding, are obliged to provide indigent care by mission, while NFP hospitals are 
required to provide community benefits in exchange for tax benefits. Although 
community benefits49 include indigent care, their magnitude and categories are not 
clearly specified. Therefore, there is room for NFP hospitals to fulfill their obligations 
by taking on other, possibly less costly, activities, such as educational and outreach 
programs, instead of providing indigent care. 
Duggan (2000) presents three theoretical models for hospital organization, 
from which we can infer hospital behavior in response to changes in financial 
incentives. His first model is based on the assumption that all hospitals, regardless of 
ownership type, prefer maximizing profits, but different constraints in appropriating 
profits make them behave differently. For example, for-profit and not-for-profit 
entities face a different level of easiness of distributing profits to owners: FP hospitals 
can distribute their profits to owners, while NFP and public hospitals cannot. With the 
value of profits larger for FP hospitals, FP hospitals are expected to be more 
responsive to incentive changes, while NFP hospitals may want to increase 
perquisites. Duggan’s second model assumes that non-profit entities have different 
                                                 
49
 Community benefits can range from uncompensated care, Medicaid and Medicare losses, health 
clinics, as well as other community activities such as health fairs, screening events, educational and 
outreach programs (health professional education, residency program, support group, and children’s 
literacy promotion), and so on.  
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preferences—they are more altruistic. Therefore, in response to any incentive changes, 
NFP and public hospitals are more likely to be concerned about the well-being of 
indigent patients than FP hospitals. The third model is based on the soft budget 
constraints of the public entities. Since public hospitals can smooth out financial 
fluctuations through government subsidies, positive or negative financial shocks may 
not have a large impact on them50. 
Duggan’s three models offer concrete explanations of the motivation for 
providing indigent care by NFP and public hospitals (altruism and soft budget 
constraint). However, his models do not explain what motivates FP hospitals to supply 
indigent care. Hirth (1997) and Banks et al (1997) provided theoretical frameworks 
that may explain FP hospitals’ provision of indigent care. Hirth (1997) pointed out that 
FP and NFP hospitals compete in terms of quality, including charity care, and this 
rivalry can lead FP hospitals to provide indigent care. Banks et al (1997) suggested 
that FP hospitals view supply of indigent care as part of business costs in the future 
profit maximizing process, and provide some amount of community benefits in order 
to avoid the penalty of losing business in the future. In the same context, one can 
apply the conception of NFP hospitals’ strategic behavior in Frank and Salkever 
(1991) to FP hospitals’ supply of indigent care. In other words, FP hospitals provide 
indigent care to communities in order to build good reputations as caring neighbors, 
which they hope will increase their future profit opportunities. As for NFP hospitals, 
which make up of the majority of the U.S. hospital market, there are more theoretical 
and empirical studies that have tried to provide further explanations of what they 
maximize and why they provide indigent care (Sloan, 2000): Chang and Jacobson 
(2008) showed that NFP hospitals behave as a perquisite maximizer, while Duggan 
                                                 
50
 Business cycles, through government budgets, can affect subsidies for public entities. Here, I assume 
that there is sufficient government funding that could subsidize public hospitals.  
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(2002) and Horwitz (2007) suggested that NFP hospitals act like FP hopsitals if they 
operate in markets where FP hospitals’ penetration is high. 
 
Rationing of Indigent Care 
So far, I have discussed the way in which hospitals’ ownership status creates 
different objective functions (mission) and thus generates different behaviors toward 
indigent care. Since the scope of a hospital’s mission is limited by availability of 
resources, I now discuss how hospitals’ constraints affect provision of indigent care. 
Here, I conjecture that hospitals with budget or resource constraints ration care based 
on the following criteria: need for urgent medical intervention, patients’ ability to pay, 
and types of services demanded. First, as discussed in the previous section, the 
EMTALA rules ensured that care for those in need of urgent medical interventions has 
priority over any other care. Second, hospitals are likely to prioritize care to those with 
reliable payer sources, preferably more profitable ones, although the degree of this 
rationing could vary greatly across ownership types. Lastly, hospitals may prioritize 
care based on types of services demanded. This rationing could be more significant 
among indigent patients if hospitals set aside a limited amount of resources for 
indigent care other than emergency care rendered to the indigent. The idea of 
prioritizing services has not been formally addressed, although some states seemed to 
have practiced it (Sasse, 1990; Hadorn, 1991; Rosner et al, 1996): Sasse (1990) 
discussed an effort in Alameda County in California to prioritize its health care 
system, while Hadorn (1991) and Rosner et al (1996) studied Oregon’s Medicaid 
rationing plans. In 1993, the state of Oregon dropped very costly procedures, such as 
bone marrow and organ transplants, from its Medicaid benefit packages in order to 
expand Medicaid coverage to more low-income persons. In doing so, the state ranked 
17 categories of services in order of importance: criteria for setting the priority are 
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based on cost of treatment, probable improvement in patient’s quality of life, and 
expected duration of that improvement (Rosner et al, 1996). According to Hadorn 
(1991), maternity and pediatric care were among the top five services deemed 
important: acute care (e.g., appendectomy or repair of open wound on neck) topped 
the list, but maternity and pediatric care, including disorders of newborns and 
preventive care for children (e.g., immunization and screening for vision or hearing 
problems), came in second and fourth, respectively.  
The Medicaid expansion moved some low-income pregnant women and 
infants from the uninsured to Medicaid group. If hospital indigent care had focused on 
maternity and infant patients prior to the expansion, the increased coverage would 
have lowered hospitals’ indigent care burden for this group of patients. As a result, 
hospitals after the expansion may have turned to indigent patients who demanded less 
priority care, such as those with chronic conditions. In the analysis of the Medicaid 
expansion, I will offer a formal test of whether hospitals did replace their maternity 
and infant indigent patients with non-maternity care patients above age one. 
 
B. Demand for Hospital Indigent Care 
In this section, I discuss the demand side of hospital indigent care, i.e., primary 
causes of hospitalization among the uninsured. It is important to understand this 
demand side for the following three reasons: first, expansions of public insurance 
coverage for pregnant women will be a major force that causes a shift in demand for 
indigent care, because childbirth has been a primary cause of hospitalization among 
uninsured patients; second, types of hospital services demanded by the indigent may 
differ from those demanded by the general population; third, demand for indigent care 
may be more inelastic than its supply, which means that the demand side is likely to 
determine the overall amount of indigent care. 
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According to Saywell et al (1989), pregnancy and childbirth accounted for the 
largest proportion of uncompensated hospital care in Indiana as of 1987, in terms of 
both cases (19.1%) and expenditure (17.4%). Based on the most recent years of the 
Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS), researchers at HCUP (2009) also found that 
maternity care still is the first reason for hospital stay among the uninsured (11.2%) at 
the national level. Using Florida hospital discharge data (1990-2000), I examine 
numbers of uninsured patients (selfpay and no charge) in each DRG code: Figure 2.3 
presents the top ten causes of hospitalizations among uninsured patients in Florida for 
1990 and 2000. I can confirm that throughout the 1990s, childbirth has been the 
primary cause of hospitalization among the uninsured51, although the share of 
childbirth patients among uninsured hospitalizations decreased from 17 percent in 
1988 to below 10 percent in 2000 (Figure 2.4). This implies that the expansion of 
Medicaid coverage for pregnant women in the early 1990s would have alleviated a 
considerable amount of hospitals’ indigent care burdens. Although the large part of the 
financial burden for indigent care is associated with maternity indigent patients, it 
remains unambiguous whether coverage expansions reduce the total demand for 
hospital indigent care: for example, there may be always excess demand for indigent 
care among the target group, so that even though some of these uninsured patients gain 
coverage and move to the Medicaid group, there may be still a significant number of 
maternity and pediatric patients who would demand indigent care.  
 
 
                                                 
51
 Other leading causes of hospitalization among the uninsured include digestive disorders (esophagitis, 
gastroenteritis, gastro-intestinal hemorrhage), psychoses, poisoning, alcohol/drug abuse, cardiac 
problems (chest pain, heart failure, heart shock), pneumonia, and back problems. 
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[Figure 2.3] Percent of DRG Codes among the Uninsured in Florida as of 1990 
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[Figure 2.4] Percent of Childbirth DRG Codes among the Uninsured 
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C. Measure for Hospital Indigent Care 
Now, I discuss the concept and measure of hospital indigent care, exploring the 
following three aspects of hospital indigent care: uncompensated care costs in dollars, 
volume of the indigent, and quantifies of unprofitable services provided. 
 
Hospital Uncompensated Care 
Uncompensated care is the sum of charity care and bad debt, widely used in 
existing literature (Bazolli et al, 2006; Davidoff et al, 2000; Lo Sasso et al, 2007; 
Thorpe et al, 2001). Charity care is ex-ante indigent care that hospitals offer with no 
intention or expectation of payment from the beginning, while bad debt is ex-post 
indigent care for which hospitals initially anticipated receiving payments but end up 
unpaid, due to patients’ unwillingness or inability to pay52. Ideally, I would like to 
isolate unpaid care offered to low-income uninsured patients from uncompensated 
care. Charity care, by definition, is such care, but bad debt can include any unpaid 
care, irrespective of its payer source. Moreover, hospitals have broad discretion to 
independently develop their own eligibility policies for charity care53 and determine 
bad debt. This generates inconsistency in classification of these two items across 
hospitals, but using the sum of charity care and bad debt alleviates these concerns. 
Despite the popularity of the UC measure, this measure can be misleading54: 
for instance, hospitals can report a large amount of uncompensated care, while treating 
only a few, high-cost indigent patients. Moreover, changes in UC do not provide much 
insight on how hospitals have altered the supply of indigent care. 
                                                 
52
 For example, an unpaid portion of deductibles or co-payments from the insured is bad debt, whereas 
discounts to private payers or underpayments from Medicaid/Medicare are not. 
53
 Based on the conversation with a staff from the American Hospital Association, some hospitals 
classify a patient who could be a charity care case as bad debt if the patient is unconscious when 
admitted. 
54
 Each hospital has a different charging method so that different mark-up rates make it difficult for 
researchers to compare true costs of care between hospitals. In fact, Gruber and Rodriguez (2007) 
showed that physician UC significantly decreased if differently measured. 
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Volume of the Indigent 
Possibly, hospitals can manipulate the volume of indigent patients in order to 
change amounts of indigent care. Here, indigent patients are defined as uninsured 
patients, those who were recorded as “selfpay” in payer source. Ideally, I would like to 
examine volume of uninsured low-income patients who cannot pay medical bills (the 
low-income segment of the uninsured who actually demand hospital indigent care), 
rather than volume of all uninsured patients. With patients’ income information 
unavailable in hospital discharge data, however, I use uninsured patients as a proxy for 
the indigent, and thus overestimate the actual volume of indigent patients.  
Although I acknowledge possible biases resulting from using the whole 
uninsured population instead of its low-income subgroup, this will be an attenuation 
bias. Moreover, there is some evidence that the magnitude of the bias may not be 
large. One way to directly measure the size of this bias is to examine hospitals’ 
collections of medical bills for the uninsured. If all uninsured patients are 
homogeneously indigent and thus cannot afford medical care, hospitals will collect 
nothing from the uninsured. Based on a case study conducted by University of Central 
Florida in 2000, collection from self-pay patients among those admitted to emergency 
departments at Florida Hospital Orlando and East Orlando was only 11.3 cents on the 
dollar55. Lewin Group (2005) also provided evidence that hospitals recover only 14% 
of uncompensated care costs. 
The other way to indirectly prove that this bias is not too large is to show that 
the majority of uninsured patients who use hospital care actually belong to low-
income households, and thus cannot afford medical care. Using CPS March data of 
2004, Lynk and Alcain (2008) studied distribution of family income among non-
                                                 
55
 The uninsured were frequent visitors to the emergency department for non-emergency conditions, for 
which 79% did not pay. On average, only $49 was collected among $1,431 charges from selfpay 
patients: downloaded at http://flhosp.net/govpubaffairs/pubs/healthissues/healthbrf_edstudy.htm  
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elderly uninsured individuals (18-64 year old adults) in 2003. Their findings provide 
evidence that the majority of uninsured persons did come from low-income 
households: the uninsured population, on average, earned only half as much as the 
annual income of the general population ($39,250 vs. $79,209 for a household of 
three), and that their income distribution was extremely right-skewed compared to that 
of the insured (see Panel A in Figure 2.5). A limitation of this study is that it looked at 
the income distribution of the nation’s uninsured population as a whole, not restricting 
its scope to uninsured patients who actually used hospital care. Therefore, its results 
may have over- or under- estimated the true income distribution of uninsured patients 
who received care at hospitals. 
Using the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) of 2003, I am able to 
examine the income distribution of only those who were uninsured and used hospital 
care (inpatient, outpatient, or emergency room)56. Panel B in Figure 2.5 shows the 
income distribution of uninsured and insured patients who used hospital care to be 
similar to that in Panel A. Those who actually used hospital care in the MEPS 
appeared to be poorer than the general population in the CPS, but the pattern of 
income distribution among those who used hospital care looks similar to that for the 
whole uninsured population in the CPS. Based on the MEPS, I find that a very high 
proportion of the uninsured population with hospital costs (66.9%) reported income of 
less than 200% of the FPL, the income range that is generally considered to be eligible 
for charity care, and 90% reported income of less than 400% of the FPL. However, 
only 37.8% of the insured reported to earn income less than 200% of the FPL, and 
67% earned income less than 400% of the FPL. However, this also means that a third 
(31.1%) of the uninsured earned income more than twice the poverty level and would  
                                                 
56
 To be consistent with Lynk and Alcain (2008), I restrict the sample to the non-elderly adult 
population in the MEPS who received care at hospitals in 2003 and distribution of income greater than 
$250,000 is not shown. 
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A. The Non-Elderly Adult Population (18-64 year old) in the CPS: Lynk and Alcain 
(2008), Figure 1, p. 58. 
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B. The Non-Elderly Adult Population that Use Hospital Care in the MEPS (2003) 
 
[Figure 2.5] The Distribution of the Uninsured and Insured Population in 2003 
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not have qualified for charity care. With this possible bias in mind, I separate 
uninsured admissions into emergency and non-emergency patients because hospitals, 
abiding by the EMTALA regulations, have discretion over admissions for only those 
with non-emergency conditions. 
  In order to distinguish non-emergency conditions from emergency conditions, 
I use two approaches: first, I use admission type information (emergency, urgent, and 
elective); second, I use principle diagnosis codes of privately insured patients, 
combined with admission source (physician referral, HMO referral, emergency room, 
etc). Admission type is determined based on how urgently patients need to be 
accommodated and receive medical interventions57. Here, I group patients by their 
DRG codes and calculate, for each DRG code, a percentage of patients who are 
categorized as “emergency” by admission type. If this percentage is greater than 0.50 
for 90% of the time during 1990-2000, I define that DRG code as an emergency 
condition. The rest of the DRG codes are defined as non-emergency conditions. 
Among the 503 DRG codes, 146 codes (29%) are defined as emergency conditions. 
Examples of emergency conditions are heart attack, stroke, pneumonia, acute 
appendicitis, poisoning, burn care, head or neck injuries, and transplants, while 
examples of non-emergency conditions are child delivery, diabetes, benign tumors, 
various types of cancer, mental disease, and metabolic and immunity disorders.  
  The second approach follows the novel method in Nakamura (2007), which 
restricted the sample to privately insured patients under age 65 and examined the first 
three digits (DX3) of their principle diagnosis codes (ICD-9 code) along with 
admission source information. In the Florida discharge records of 1990-2000, I look at 
                                                 
57
 The admission type is recorded as “emergency” if they require immediate medical intervention 
because of severe, life-threatening, or potentially disabling medical conditions, “urgent” if patients’ 
conditions are not life-threatening but need reasonably urgent medical intervention, and “elective” if the 
patient’s condition permits adequate time to schedule the availability of a suitable accommodation. 
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how many of the privately insured58 in each DX3 were admitted through emergency 
rooms in each year. I define a DX3 as an emergency condition if more than 50 percent 
of privately insured patients with that DX3 are admitted to emergency rooms in all 
years from 1990 to 2000; otherwise, DX3’s are defined as non-emergency conditions. 
Note that I do not regard all emergency room admissions as emergency conditions, 
and use the principle diagnosis code information, which denotes the condition that is 
chiefly responsible for the admission. Due to a lack of a regular source of care, the 
uninsured are more likely to be admitted through emergency departments, no matter 
how urgent their actual need for medical attention; as such, studying diagnosis codes 
of privately insured patients, combined with whether they were admitted through the 
emergency room, gives a better idea of severity of illness for each disease type. 
  By this second approach, I categorize 150 DX3 (28%) as emergency 
conditions and 383 (72%) as non-emergency conditions. The assignment of principle 
diagnosis codes may differ across hospitals or vary over time. However, the first three 
digits define a general category of the disease, so are unlikely to vary across hospitals 
or over time. Moreover, DX3 categorization is not sensitive to upcoding practices 
because hospitals’ manipulation, if any, occurred in changing the fourth and fifth 
digits of the ICD-9 codes (Silverman and Skinner, 2004), or by adding secondary 
diagnoses (Dafny, 2005). 
  Finally, I compare these two approaches. For more than 90% of patients, the 
classification into emergency vs. non-emergency conditions by the first approach is 
matched with that by the second approach. In this paper, I choose the first approach to 
distinguish between emergency and non-emergency conditions. 
 
                                                 
58
 Transferred patients and those with unknown admission sources are dropped. The DX3’s assigned to 
less than ten patients in a year, as well as the DX3’s that were dropped or newly introduced during 
1990-2000, are excluded. 
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Provision of Profitable vs. Unprofitable Services 
In the longer term, hospitals can change types of services provided as a means 
of manipulating indigent caseload. They may cut back or eliminate unprofitable 
services, while increasing or opening profitable services. I identify unprofitable and 
profitable services based on the classification in Horwitz (2005). Horwitz59 (2005) 
categorized hospital services into three groups: relatively profitable, relatively 
unprofitable, and variably profitable services. Among the total of 17 profitable and 10 
unprofitable services60 listed in Horwitz (2005), the Florida hospital data sets include 
information for 10 profitable and 5 unprofitable services. Adding (free-standing) clinic 
visits to the list of unprofitable services, I am able to examine the provision of 10 
profitable services and 6 unprofitable services for my Florida hospital sample. Table 
2.3 presents the classifications in Horwitz (2005), the list of services available in the 
Florida data sets, and units of services measured. Profitable services include cardiac 
care (angioplasty, cardiac catheterization, and open-heart surgery), orthopedic 
services, Extracorporeal Shock-Wave (ESW) Lithotripter, diagnostic tests (Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (MRI), Computed Tomography scanner (CT), and radioisotope 
facility), and some intensive care (neonatal and pediatric intensive care). Unprofitable 
services include burn care, emergency room visits, free standing clinic services, 
psychiatric care, substance abuse (alcohol and drugs) treatment, and labor/delivery 
procedures. These are total amounts of services rendered to patients regardless of their 
payer source.  
                                                 
59
 Their classifications were based on various sources from academic literature (peer-reviewed medical, 
business, finance, statistics, sociology, and public policy literatures) to policy reports (Medicare 
Payment Advisory Commission and Prospective Payment Assessment Commission reports to 
Congress), press articles (trade publications, business magazines, and newspaper reports), and 
interviews with relevant experts (hospital administrators and doctors). Although she did not take a 
systematic approach, Horwitz (2005) noted that these various methods of characterizing services 
yielded remarkably consistent results, and provided a detailed research note59.   
60
 Horwitz (2005) listed 14 unprofitable services in Exhibit 1 (p. 792), out of which two are outpatient 
services (AIDS and Alcohol/drugs). With the remaining 12 unprofitable inpatient services, I combine 
AIDS unit and AIDS services into one service, and obstetric (beds) and obstetric (birth) into another. 
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[Table 2.3] Profitable vs. Non-Profitable Services 
 
Services Relatively profitable 
Availability 
in FL data Notes (Units) 
AIDS services/units NO -  
Alcohol beds NO Available Substance Abuse Acute Care (Inpatient Days) 
Angioplasty YES Available Coronary Care Unit (Days) 
Birthing room YES -  
Burn Treatment NO Available Burn Intensive Care Unit (Days) 
Cardiac Catheterization Lab YES Available Cardiac Catheterization Lab (Procedure) 
Computed tomography (CT) 
Scanner YES Available CT (Procedure) 
Child Psychiatric Services NO -  
Diagnostic Radioisotope Facility YES Available Radiology/Diagnostic (Procedure) 
Emergency Room NO Available 
Emergency Services: 24-
hour/Inhouse M.D.+ 24-hour/M.D. 
on-call (Visits) 
Clinic Services (incl. Free Standing 
Clinic) NO Available 
Clinic Services + Free Standing 
Clinic Services (Visits) 
Extracorporeal Shock-Wave (ESW) 
Lithotripter YES Available ESW (Procedures) 
Fitness center YES -  
HIV test NO -  
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) YES Available MRI (Procedures) 
Neonatal Intensive Care YES Available Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (Days) 
Obstetrics (beds or births) NO Available Labor and Delivery Services (Procedures) 
Open Heart Surgery YES Available Open Heart Surgery (minutes) 
Orthopedic Surgery YES Available Number of Staff (Persons) 
Pediatric Intensive Care Unit YES Available Pediatric Intensive Care (Inpatient Days) 
Positron Emission Tomography YES -  
Psychiatric NO Available Psychiatric Acute Care (Days) 
Psychiatric Emergency Services NO -  
Single Photon Emission CT YES -  
Sports Medicine YES -  
Trauma Center NO -  
Ultrasound YES -  
Women's center YES -  
Number of Profitable Services/Total 17/29 10/16  
Source: Horwitz (2005) 
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D. Concentration of Indigent Care Burden among Hospitals across Markets 
 
Market Concentration 
 
A large volume of health care literature has studied market concentration or 
competition, particularly related to the introduction and growth of managed care 
organizations in the 1990s (Shen et al, 2008; Dranove et al, 2008). This increased 
market competition put pressure on hospitals to reduce prices and costs, as well as 
make adjustments in types of services provided, intensity or quality of care, and 
supply of indigent care. In extreme cases, higher market competition forced some 
hospitals to convert, merge or close, which consequently changed the landscape of the 
whole hospital market. 
In order to test my hypothesis regarding the level of market concentration of 
indigent care burden, I need to isolate market concentration for indigent patients and 
determine, for each market, whether or not the indigent care burden is highly 
concentrated across hospitals. In doing so, I categorize hospital markets into three 
groups according to number of hospitals, as well as the degree of indigent care 
concentration across hospitals if the market consists of multiple hospitals. The three 
types of hospital markets are as follows: markets with a single hospital, markets with 
multiple hospitals among which the indigent care burden is equally spread out (low 
concentration of indigent care burden), and markets with multiple hospitals among 
which only a few hospitals disproportionately serve the indigent (high concentration of 
indigent care burden). For markets with multiple hospitals, to what extent the indigent 
care burden is highly concentrated is determined by the median value of Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) for indigent patients. 
 
 108 
The HHI is the most commonly used index for market concentration in the 
economics literature. In general, the HHI61 is calculated by the sum of squared shares 
of beds, admissions, or discharges in the market. Although hospitals compete for 
patients, my conjecture is that they would compete only for paying patients, not for 
uninsured, indigent patients. Therefore, I decompose the traditional market 
concentration measure (HHI) into two parts: concentration of paying patients and 
concentration of indigent care burden. The former is calculated by summing the 
squared market shares of hospital admissions for paying patients—privately insured, 
Medicare, Medicaid, and other payer sponsored patients—while the latter, the variable 
of my interest, is measured as explained below.  
 
Measure for Concentration of Indigent Care Burden across Hospitals 
In order to measure market concentration of indigent care burden, I first define 
hospital market based on counties62, measure individual hospitals’ indigent care 
burden, and create a market level index for the level of concentration of indigent care 
burden. The simplest method to measure market concentration is to construct a 
traditional HHI associated with uninsured patients, i.e., the sum of hospitals’ squared 
shares of uninsured admissions in a given county. Here, I consider patients’ types of 
illness and dispersion of the indigent within counties. A patient’s choice of hospital, 
regardless of her payer source, depends on whether the hospital provides services that 
she need, and whether the hospital is close to her residence. For example, the indigent 
with cardiac problems may choose hospital B over A because hospital A does not 
provide cardiac care, or simply because hospital B is closer than A if both provide 
cardiac care. 
                                                 
61
 The HHI can have a value from 1/n (n=the number of hospitals in the market) to 1. Higher HHI 
values mean higher market concentration, i.e., lower market competition. 
62
 “The Florida state statute delegates responsibility for caring for the uninsured to the counties, and 
consequently it is flexible regarding how counties provide this care.” (Jackson and Beatty, 2003) 
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In order to take into account these two factors, I break down uninsured patients 
by DRG group and zip code, using Florida discharge data sets. Patients are grouped 
into one of the eleven DRG groups: pediatrics, maternity, transplant, tumor (benign 
and malign), cardiac care, burn and trauma, orthopedics, psychiatrics, HIV, other 
medical care, and other surgical care. For hospital h in county c, I calculate a share of 
uninsured patients in disease group d from zip code z for all disease groups and all zip 
codes that the hospital serves within the county. Once a hospital-level concentration 
measure is created by summing the squared shares over the disease groups and zip 
codes, I add this hospital-level measure for all hospitals in county c, which creates the 
concentration measure at the market level. 
For example, let’s suppose that Hospital A served 20 and 10 uninsured patients 
who were hospitalized for cardiac care and resided in zip code 32008 and 32009, 
respectively. If zip code 32008 had a total of 50 uninsured patients with cardiac 
diseases and zip code 32009 had 100 uninsured, cardiac patients, Hospital A’s share of 
indigent patients with cardiac disease is 20/50=0.4 for zip code 32008 and 10/100=0.1 
for zip code 32009. Their squared values are 0.16 and 0.01, respectively, which sum 
up to 0.17 for the hospital’s HHI for indigent patients with cardiac diseases. I repeat 
the same exercise for all other disease groups and aggregate the obtained HHI values 
in each disease group to create the hospital level HHI for indigent patients. If the 
county in which this hospital is located contains two other hospitals whose HHI values 
are 0.13 and 0.20, respectively, the market level HHI is the sum of these three 
hospitals’ HHI values: 0.17+0.13+0.20=0.50.  
For this HHI measure, there may be endogeneity concerns. Since the market 
level HHI is a function of hospitals’ actual admissions, this concentration measure and 
individual hospitals’ provision of indigent care are simultaneously determined. 
Moreover, some unobserved factors such as hospital quality may affect both the 
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market concentration level and hospitals’ supply of indigent care. For example, 
hospitals of certain types which attract a large number of privately insured patients 
(such as high-quality hospitals or FP hospitals) may be less able or willing to supply 
indigent care, given limited bed capacities (their opportunity costs of treating the 
indigent are much higher than those of low-quality or non-FP hospitals). In such cases, 
other hospitals without those attributes would have to serve a disproportionately large 
number of indigent patients, which would result in inequitable distribution of indigent 
care burdens across hospitals. In other words, quality or ownership mix within markets 
may be correlated with a hospital’s provision of indigent care and the distribution of 
the indigent care burden within markets. 
There are two approaches to address this endogeneity problem. The first is to 
construct the HHI based on years prior to any policy changes and use this baseline 
level for the entire hospital sample. The second approach is to instrument actual 
admissions with expected patient flow (Kessler and McClellan, 2000; Gorinsakaran 
and Town, 2003; Dranove et al, 2008) and construct the HHI based on predicted 
numbers of indigent admissions. Here, I select the second approach in which I 
estimate hospital choice models for the uninsured in each year and in each disease 
group (11 years×11 disease groups). All patients in the same disease group are 
expected to have the same set of hospital options if they reside in the same zip codes. 
Hospitals are dropped if they are more than 75 miles away from patients’ home. I use 
zip code level grouped logit models in which distance to hospital, an indicator for 
whether a hospital is within 10 miles, and patients’ zip code median income levels (in 
log form) are included. Then I obtain the predicted number of uninsured admissions 
for each hospital: this number is calculated by aggregating the predicted probabilities 
of an uninsured patient being admitted to the hospital. Finally, I use these expected 
numbers of uninsured admissions to calculate the concentration level for the indigent. 
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IV. Literature Review 
 
In this section, I review empirical literature related to hospital indigent care. I 
categorize previous literature into three groups, depending on which health policy or 
market structure they studied: expansions of public insurance coverage, changes in 
government hospital payments, and changes in other market conditions. Davidoff et al 
(2000) and Lo Sasso and Seamster (2007) are two studies that comprehensively 
analyzed the impact of the federal and state policies on hospital indigent care. 
Davidoff et al (2000) examined hospital UC during 1990-1995 in response to the 
following changes: Medicaid coverage expansions, increased generosity of Medicaid 
payments, and increased Medicaid HMOs. Their findings suggest that FP and public 
hospitals lowered UC after Medicaid expansions, while NFP hospitals reduced UC in 
response to higher Medicaid HMO rates. Most recently, Lo Sasso and Seamster (2007) 
extended the study of Davidoff et al (2000) by including additional years of data 
(1996-2000) and more policy variables: SCHIP expansion, the Medicaid DSH 
program, and government subsidies through tax appropriations. They found a large 
positive relationship between government subsidies and hospital UC, but little or no 
impact of other Medicaid related policies. Although their findings indicated that 
hospitals are most responsive to financial incentive changes than any other Medicaid 
policies, they did not consider the BBA policy, the financial pressure that should have 
influenced hospitals’ indigent care decision in the late 1990s. Nor did they take into 
account the effect of other hospitals’ provision of indigent care.  
The findings in these two studies are useful but not very informative, because 
changes in overall UC do not explain through which mechanisms hospitals changed 
their provision of indigent care. For example, increases in UC may not reflect 
hospitals willingness to increase indigent care, but rather capture reduced efforts in 
 112 
collecting bad debts. Here, in addition to UC, I examine admission patterns as well as 
type of services provided in order to explore how hospitals changed their provision of 
indigent care in the 1990s. Below, I summarize the findings of past studies about 
hospital indigent care related to coverage expansions, financial incentive changes, as 
well as market conditions. 
 
(1) Expansion of public health insurance coverage for low-income patients 
Apart from Davidoff et al. (2000) and Lo Sasso and Seamster (2007), Dubay et 
al. (1995) is the only peer-reviewed, national study that examined the impact of 
Medicaid expansions on hospital UC63. Their findings showed that the Medicaid 
expansions for pregnant women and infants in 1987 decreased the growth of UC by 5 
percent. Blewett et al (2003), studying a state-subsidized health insurance program for 
the working poor (MinnesotaCare), also found a negative relation between expanded 
government coverage and hospital uncompensated care64. The major limitation of 
these studies is that they used aggregated measures for UC, at the county or state level, 
which cannot explain individual hospitals’ behavior.  
 
(2) Government hospital payments 
There have been several policies that have changed hospital payment systems 
or amounts of hospital payment: the Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS), 
Uncompensated Care Pool, the Medicare/Medicaid DSH program, and the BBA. 
Bazzoli et al (2006) is one of the major studies that examined the BBA impact on the 
provision of hospital UC. Instead of controlling for hospital ownership type, they 
                                                 
63
 As a working paper, McConnell et al (2005) measured the effect of the Oregon’s Medicaid program 
(OMP) on hospital uncompensated care, and showed that disenrollment of one adult from the OMP 
leads to an increase of approximately $852 in hospital uncompensated care. 
64
 APS healthcare (2006) is a working paper that studied Wisconsin’s BadgerCare–state funded health 
insurance program for low-income working families with children–and showed that the expansion of 
this program accounted for a 6-year cumulative savings of $283.08 million in hospital UC spending. 
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focused on the safety-net status and the size of the financial pressure. They found that 
the adjustment to UC after the BBA was proportional to the degree of the financial 
pressure for each hospital: the largest decline in UC occurred at core safety-net 
hospitals, while the policy impact was minimal for non-safety-net hospitals. Campbell 
et al (1993) and Mann et al (1995), examining Medicaid payment cuts and the 
Medicare PPS respectively, showed that the decreased hospital payments reduced 
provision of hospital UC. 
Spencer (1998) is the only study that examined distribution of indigent care 
burden across hospitals. In particular, she analyzed whether the establishment of an 
uncompensated care pool successfully redistributed indigent care burden across 
hospitals and increased the total amount of UC. Using New York hospital data in 
1993, she found the redistribution effects only for routine care. Nakamura (2007) 
examined hospitalization of indigent patients without emergency conditions after the 
deregulation of the hospital rate-setting system, along with reduced state subsidies for 
charity care, in New Jersey in 1993. Defining indigent admissions without emergency 
conditions as voluntary indigent care, she found that lower government subsidies 
decreased indigent care, but only the voluntary portion. 
 
(3) Other Factors (managed care, conversion, merger, and peer pressure) 
There has been a great deal of research about the relationship between changes 
in market conditions and hospital indigent care. Gruber (1994) is a seminal paper that 
studied the effect of market competition on hospital charity care, using California 
hospital data during 1984-1988. He found that increased price competition decreased 
revenues from private payers, which consequently constrained the cost-shifting ability 
of hospitals and thereby led to decreases in hospital UC. Except for Currie and Fahr 
(2004), which found little evidence that higher HMO penetration reduced charity care, 
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previous studies have shown evidence that increased price competition reduces 
hospitals’ provision of indigent care (Thorpe et al, 2001; McKay and Meng, 2007). 
Another intriguing factor that could affect hospitals’ provision of indigent care 
is peer pressure, i.e., the provision of indigent care from other hospitals within 
markets. Banks et al (1997) and Clement et al (2002) found that the presence of public 
or major safety-net hospitals in the market create incentives for other hospitals to 
reduce indigent care. By contrast, Frank and Salkever (1991), Gaskin (1997), Clement 
et al (2002), and Rosko (2004) found that hospitals increased the provision of UC if 
other hospitals in the market provide UC, as part of non-price competition (rivalry on 
the supply of indigent care). Although these studies considered potential or actual 
provision of other hospitals’ indigent care, they did not examine dynamics of the 
distribution of indigent care burden between hospitals. 
 
V. Data and Empirical Strategy 
 
Data 
My primary source of data is Florida hospital discharge data sets along with 
the hospitals’ financial data, obtained from the Agency of Health Care Administration. 
The hospital financial data sets provide information about charity care (Hill-Burton 
plus other), bad debt, ownership status, teaching status, number of licensed beds, 
revenues, admissions, county and zip code information. The revenues and admissions 
can be broken down by payer sources. The discharge data sets provide detailed patient 
information such as payer source, DRG code, diagnosis and procedure code, 
admission source, admission type, sex, age, residential county, and zip code. 
Other variables are obtained from Area Resource Files (ARF), the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS), Current Population Survey (CPS), and Florida Agency for 
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Health Care Administration (AHCA). The ARF files provide hospital market 
information at the county level: number of active non-federal physicians, number of 
emergency care visits, number of births, population, population under 65, non-white 
population, population under poverty, per capita income, and unemployment rates. 
The BLS provides the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for medical care65, while the CPS 
data is used to generate ELIG, the Medicaid policy variable, as well as trends of the 
uninsured population. From the Florida AHCA, I obtain Medicaid caseload data (for 
1990-2000) and HMO penetration rates (only for 1996-2000) at the county level. 
 
Estimation Model 
Before examining the policy impact on individual hospitals’ provision of 
indigent care, I test effects on the total amounts of indigent care at the county level. If 
most hospitals reduce provision of indigent care after coverage expansions or the 
BBA, the aggregated indigent care at the county level should decrease; however, if the 
county level indigent care does not change, this will imply that these policies merely 
redistributed contributions for indigent care among hospitals. The following is the 
estimation model for indigent care at the county level:  
 
Model 0: Indigent Carect  = a0 + a1 POSTt  + a2 POSTt×MKT ht +  a3 Mct + county +  ect  
 
Where POST=POST92 for Medicaid expansions, POST97 for the BBA 
MKT = [solehosp=1, HighHHI=1]  
 
 
                                                 
65
 The Producer Price Index (PPI) for hospital services seems to be a more appropriate index to deflate 
hospital uncompensated care. However, I use the CPI due to the data availability: CPI data for medical 
care is available from 1987 on, whereas PPI data for hospital services is available only after 1992.  
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The dependent variable is the sum of hospitals’ indigent care in a given county, 
while hospital indigent care is quantified by three sets of measures: amount of 
uncompensated care in dollars, volume of uninsured patients, and quantity of 
unprofitable services provided. I examine aggregate amounts of indigent care provided 
within the same counties over time and compare the aggregated indigent care across 
three market types. For each policy, I separately estimate the model: impact of the 
Medicaid expansion is estimated with the hospital sample for 1990-1995, and the BBA 
impact with that for 1996-2000. POST is a policy variable: POST92=1 for the post 
Medicaid expansion period (1993-1995), and POST97=1 for the post BBA years 
(1998-2000). MKT consists of two indicator variables that control for the 
concentration level of indigent care burden at the market level: HighHHI and 
solehosp. If a market (county) consists of at least two hospitals, and its HHI is higher 
than the median value of all counties’ HHI’s, HighHHI takes a value of one, 
representing a market with high concentration of indigent care burden. If a market 
contains only one hospital, solehosp takes a value of one. Markets with low 
concentration of indigent care burden (LowHHI) are the reference group.  
M is a vector of market conditions that could affect demand for, and supply of 
indigent care, the variables obtained from the ARF. On the demand side, I control for 
per capita emergency visits, number of births (log form), per capita income level (log 
form), unemployment rates, percentage of non-white population, percentage of 
population aged over 65, percentage of population below the poverty line, and 
Medicaid caseload (log form). On the supply side, I control for market concentration 
for paying patients, per capita active non-federal MD’s (log form), presence of public 
hospitals in the market, as well as private HMO and Medicaid HMO penetration (only 
for the BBA). 
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 Now, I introduce my main econometric models (Model 1 and Model 2) that 
examine individual hospitals’ provision of indigent care in response to the policy 
changes.  These are difference-in-difference and triple difference type regressions at 
the hospital level. 
 
Model 1: Hospital Indigent Careht  = a0 + a1 POSTt  + a2 OWNSH ht + a3  
POSTt×OWNSH ht + a4 Hht +a5 Mct + county + eht  
 
Model 2: Hospital Indigent Careht  = b0 + b1 POSTt + b2 OWNSH ht + b3 MKT ct + b4 
OWNSH
 h × MKT ct + b5  POSTt ×OWNSH ht+ b6  POSTt × MKT ct  + b7 POSTt 
×OWNSH
 ht × MKTct + Hht + Mct  + eht  
 
Where OWNSH = [FP=1, Public=1]                   
 
My dependent variables are the three sets of measures that capture individual 
hospitals’ supply of indigent care: UC, uninsured admissions, and unprofitable service 
provision. I will explain how to construct these dependent variables in the next 
section. Again, I separately estimate these models for the Medicaid expansion (with 
the sample of 1990-1995) and the BBA (with the sample of 1996-2000). In Model 1, I 
compare hospitals’ supply of indigent care across three different ownership types—
NFP, FP, and public hospitals—in a given market before and after the policy change. 
OWHSH consists of two binary variables: one for for-profit ownership (FP=1) and the 
other for public ownership (Public=1); NFP hospitals are the reference group. The 
policy indicator (POST) and market condition variables (M) are constructed in the 
same way as explained above. H is a vector of hospital attributes other than hospital 
ownership. I include teaching status (teaching=1), number of licensed beds (a dummy 
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variable for hospitals with more than 200 licensed beds=1), and urban/rural status 
(rural=1). For the BBA, I control for the magnitude of the financial shock, measured 
by the Medicaid FPI and Medicare FPI. The coefficients of the interaction terms, a3, 
are the estimates that capture the differences in policy impacts across hospital 
ownership types. 
In Model 2, I compare hospitals’ supply of indigent care between markets that 
have different levels of concentration of indigent care burden, in addition to the 
ownership types. The DDD type estimates (b7) capture the difference in policy impacts 
across markets and across ownership types. 
 
Construction of Dependent Variables 
The three sets of dependent variables are constructed in the following way. For 
uncompensated care, I use four variables as follows: log of UC costs, log of charity 
care costs, UC costs as a percent of total operating expenses, and charity care costs as 
a percent of total operating expenses. UC or charity care costs are calculated by 
multiplying UC or charity care charges with hospital-specific cost-to-charge ratio66. 
The first two are inflation-adjusted, dollar based measures. I separately examine 
charity care for the following two reasons. First, the Florida State Statute67 is very 
specific in defining charity care, which is universally applied to hospitals across the 
state (Jackson and Beatty, 2003): charity care is the portion of unpaid care which is 
exclusively offered to uninsured low-income patients, mostly those with incomes 
                                                 
66
 The American Hospital Association (AHA) defines cost-to-charge ratio as total expenses exclusive of 
bad debt to the sum of gross patient revenue and other operating revenue. I use the ratio of total 
operating expenses to the sum of gross patient charges and other operating revenues. 
67
 Title XXIX (2): “‘Charity care’ or ‘uncompensated charity care’ means that portion of hospital 
charges reported to the agency for which there is no compensation for care provided to a patient whose 
family income for the 12 months preceding the determination is less than or equal to 150 percent of the 
federal poverty level, unless the amount of hospital charges due from the patient exceeds 25 percent of 
the annual family income. However, in no case shall the hospital charges for a patient whose family 
income exceeds four times the federal poverty level for a family of four be considered charity.”  
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under 150% of the FPL, while a payer source for bad debt can vary. Therefore, I 
perceive charity care as a lower bound of hospitals’ true willingness to provide 
indigent care. Second, even if there is no change in the amount of UC, hospitals may 
change the composition of UC. 
For volume of the indigent, I use uninsured (selfpay) admissions as a proxy for 
indigent admissions. I first examine a proportion of uninsured admissions, a number of 
uninsured patients in log form, and uninsured inpatient days in log form. The 
proportion of uninsured admissions captures relative volume of indigent admissions, 
but can vary not only by changes in absolute number of uninsured admissions, but also 
by changes in insured admissions. Therefore, I also look at absolute number of 
uninsured admissions and their days of stay at hospital.  Then, I isolate non-emergency 
patients from total admissions and break them down by payer source. The non-
emergency uninsured admissions, the other set of dependent variables, are measured 
by number in log form as well as in proportion among non-emergency admissions of 
all payers. Lastly, following Nakamura (2007), I construct a ratio of non-emergency to 
emergency admissions for the uninsured. If hospitals decrease indigent care, the 
decrease should be larger for non-emergency patients than emergency patients, so this 
ratio should decrease. In order to control for other factors that could influence hospital 
admission patterns across all payer sources, such as service closure, a national trend of 
switching to outpatient care, or a type of illness, I difference out the same ratio 
associated with the privately insured from the ratio for the uninsured. This differenced 
ratio will decrease if hospitals reduce indigent care. In addition to these uninsured 
admissions, I examine admission patterns for Medicaid patients: number, proportion, 
and inpatient days of Medicaid patients.  
For the analysis of Medicaid expansions, I divide Medicaid admissions into the 
target group (pregnant women and infants under age 1) and the non-target group of the 
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policy, and classify uninsured admissions in the same manner. Then I look at how 
hospitals changed the composition of these four groups. If expansions of public 
coverage increase number of Medicaid patients in the target group, who are more 
profitable than uninsured patients, hospitals may increase Medicaid admissions at the 
expense of uninsured admissions within the target group or substitute Medicaid 
patients in the non-target group for those in the target group. However, if Medicaid 
expansions generate more revenues for hospitals, hospitals may increase admissions 
for uninsured patients who belong to the non-target group or for uninsured patients in 
the target group who still do not qualify for Medicaid. 
For the service provision, I separately examine amounts of 16 services (10 
profitable and 6 unprofitable services) in log forms. These are total amounts of 
services provided to patients in all payer sources, not restricted to the uninsured 
subgroup. Since these services are measured by five different units such as inpatient 
days, number of visits, minutes performed, number of procedures, and number of staff, 
my 16 dependent variables are as follows: log inpatient days for NICU, burn intensive 
care, coronary care, pediatric intensive care, psychiatric acute care, and substance 
abuse acute care; log visits of clinic services and emergency services; log minutes of 
open heart surgery; log number of staff for orthopedic surgery; log procedures of 
labor/delivery, cardiac catheterization, diagnostic radiology, CT, MRI, and ESW 
Lithotripsy. I also examine number of unprofitable services provided (from zero to 
six), as well as proportion of unprofitable services among those six (from zero to one). 
For profitable services, the total number (from zero to ten) and the proportion out of 
those ten are examined as well.  
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VI. Results 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.4 presents descriptive statistics, as well as the methods of constructing 
all the dependent and independent variables. My sample consists of a total of 1739 
hospital-year observations, coming from 168 short-term hospitals in Florida which did 
not change ownership status during 1990-2000. The state of Florida has 67 counties, 
among which six counties (Liberty, Jefferson, Wakulla, Dixie, Gilichrist, and 
Lafayette) in the west of Florida and the west part of the northeast Florida have no 
hospitals. In addition, Glades and Sumter counties in the central and south Florida do 
not have any short-term hospital. All of these counties without a hospital belong to 
non-Metropolitan areas. As the map in Figure 2.6 shows, most of the hospitals are 
located in south Florida and along the state’s east or west coast. Table 2.5 presents 
distribution of the hospitals in my sample across counties. Among the 67 counties, the 
number of counties with short-term hospitals that did not change ownership status 
over the years is between 48 and 51. The average number of hospitals within counties 
is about 3, and the majority of the counties consist of one or two short-term hospitals: 
37 percent of the counties include only one hospital, while 63 percent include multiple 
hospitals (31 percent contain two hospitals, and 32 percent consist of more than two 
hospitals). The maximum number of short-term hospitals within a county is 18 in 
Miami-Dade and Broward counties. 
The distribution of the uninsured, however, greatly varies across the state (see 
Figure 2.7). Three contiguous counties in the South East region—Miami-Dade, 
Broward, and Palm Beach Counties—are home to more than one half of the uninsured 
population in Florida—24.6%, 14.8%, and 15.1% of the state’s uninsured population, 
respectively (Census, 2000). Since they account for only 14.1%, 10.1%, and 7% of the 
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[Table 2.4] Construction of Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Construction Obs Mean s.d. 
Hospital Attributes (Independent Variables: Hospital Level) 
FP Private, for-profit hospital 1739 0.47 0.50 
Public Public hospital 1739 0.11 0.32 
Teaching Hospital that has at least 10 residents 1739 0.14 0.47 
Large Bed Hospital with number of licensed beds>200 1739 0.47 0.50 
Rural 
Acute care hospital that is licensed under Florida 
Statute 395.602(2)(e). The statute can be found at 
http://www/flsenate.gov/statutes/. 
1739 0.11 0.32 
Policy Indicator 
    
POST92  Years after Medicaid expansion (1993-1995) 1739 0.71 0.45 
POST97  Years after the BBA (1998-2000) 1739 0.25 0.43 
McareFPI Medicare FPI at the year of 1998 (p. 7) 147 -0.83 0.42 
McaidFPI Medicaid FPI at the year of 1998 (p. 7) 147 -0.06 0.12 
 
Market Attributes ( Independent Variables: County Level) 
HHI for the 
uninsured 
sum of the squared market shares of predicted 
hospital admissions for indigent patients in each 
disease group and zip code 
1739 0.29 0.29 
High HHI for the 
uninsured 
HHI for the uninsured is greater than its median 
value: high concentration of indigent care burden at 
the county level   
1739 0.21 0.40 
Sole hospital the only hospital within county 1739 0.10 0.30 
per capital 
emergency visit ln(number of emergency visits /total population) 1739 0.38 0.19 
ln(per capita 
income) ln(per capital income) 1739 9.99 0.27 
% of population 
aged 65 or over Population aged 65+/total population 1739 0.19 0.07 
% of population 
who are non-white Non-white population/total population 1739 0.28 0.18 
Unemployment 
rate (%) Unemployment rate 1739 5.85 2.26 
ln(active non-
federal MD’s) ln(number of active non-federal physicians, MDs) 1739 6.58 1.71 
Presence of public 
hospital in the 
market 
At least one public hospital present in the market 1739 0.42 0.49 
HHI with 
admissions of 
paying patients 
sum of the squared market shares of hospital 
admissions for privately insured, Medicare, 
Medicaid, and other payer sponsored patients 
1739 0.34 0.29 
% population 
under the poverty 
line  
Population under poverty line/total population 1739 0.14 0.04 
ln(birth) ln(number of birth) 1739 8.08 2.52 
ln(Medicaid 
caseload) ln(Medicaid caseload in total) 1739 10.48 1.34 
Commercial HMO 
penetration Commercial HMO penetration (only for 1996-2000) 759 0.21 0.11 
Medicaid HMO 
penetration Medicaid HMO penetration (only for 1996-2000) 759 0.02 0.01 
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[Table 2.4] continued 
 
Dependent Variables (Hospital Indigent Care) 
Variable Construction Obs Mean s.d. 
Uncompensated Care (UC) 
ln(UC cost) ln(UC charges*cost-to-charge ratio) 1739 14.61 1.92 
% UC cost UC costs/total expenses 1739 0.07 0.05 
ln(charity care) ln(charity care charges*cost-to-charge 
ratio) 1739 12.34 3.96 
% charity care Charity care costs/total expenses 1739 0.05 0.08 
Admission Patterns 
% Uninsured Adm Uninsured admissions/total admissions 1739 0.06 0.05 
ln(uninsured adm) ln(number of uninsured admissions) 1739 5.72 1.44 
ln(uninsured inpdays) ln(uninsured inpatient days) 1739 7.20 1.46 
ln(non-ER uninsured adm) ln(number of uninsured patients with 
non-ER conditions) 1739 4.88 1.39 
% Mcaid adm Medicaid admissions/total admissions 1739 0.11 0.09 
ln(Mcaid adm) ln(number of Medicaid admissions) 1739 6.08 1.65 
ln(Mcaid inpdays) ln(Medicaid inpatient days) 1739 7.69 1.71 
∆ ratio(non-ER/ER) 
(ratio of non-ER to ER for uninsured 
patients) – (ratio of non-ER to ER for 
the privately insured) 
1739 -0.46 0.80 
ln(uninsured adm: target group)* 
ln(number of uninsured maternity 
patients and uninsured infants under 
age 1) 
980 2.72 2.35 
ln(uninsured adm: non-target 
group)* 
ln(number of uninsured patients above 
age 1 who demand non-maternity care) 980 5.67 1.46 
ln(non-ER uninsured adm: non-
target)* 
ln(number of uninsured patients with 
non-ER conditions among non-
maternity patients aged above 1) 
980 4.81 1.52 
ln(Mcaid adm: target)* 
ln(number of Medicaid maternity 
patients or Medicaid infants under age 
1) 
980 3.70 2.86 
ln(Mcaid adm: non-target)* ln(number of Medicaid patients above 
age 1 who demand non-maternity care) 980 5.40 1.46 
Service Provision 
Profitable Services 
ln(coronary) ln(Coronary Care Inpatient Days) 1739 3.04 3.93 
ln(CC) ln(Cardiac Catheterization Procedures) 1739 4.52 3.67 
ln(CT) ln(Computed tomography Scanner Procedures) 1739 8.04 2.07 
ln(Radiology/diagnostic) ln(Diagnostic Radiology Procedures) 1739 10.53 1.10 
ln(ESW) ln(ESW Lithotripter Procedures) 1739 1.47 2.08 
ln(MRI) ln(Magnetic resonance imaging Procedures) 1739 4.05 3.43 
ln(NICU) ln(Neonatal Intensive Care Unit Inpatient Days) 1739 1.94 3.49 
ln(Open Heart) ln(Open Heart Surgery minutes) 1739 3.36 5.32 
ln(Orthopedic) Ln(Number of Staff for orthopedic 
surgery) 1739 1.91 1.18 
ln(Pediatric Intensive Care)  Ln(Pediatric Intensive Care Inpatient Days) 1739 0.79 2.30 
Num(Profitable service) Number of Profitable Services (0-10) 1739 5.56 2.21 
% Profitable service (number of profitable Services)/10  1739 0.56 0.22 
 124 
[Table 2.4] continued 
 
 
 
Source: Florida Hospital Service Guide (AHCA, 2003) 
Note: Numbers in each county mean the number of hospitals during 1990-2000. 
For example, the number of short-term hospitals in Miami-Dade County was between 22 and 26 during 
my sample period. 
 
[Figure 2.6] Distribution of Florida Hospitals by County 
Dependent Variables (Hospital Indigent Care): continued 
Unprofitable Services 
Variable Construction Obs Mean s.d. 
ln(Burn care) ln(Burn Intensive Care Unit Days) 1739 0.14 6.04 
ln(ER) ln(Emergency Room Visits) 1739 9.63 1.87 
ln(Free Clinic) ln(Clinic+ Free Standing Clinic Visits) 1739 2.94 4.43 
ln(Obstetric) ln(Labor and Delivery Procedures) 1739 4.35 3.74 
ln(Psych) ln(Psychiatric Acute Care Days) 1739 2.91 4.22 
ln(substance abuse) 
ln(Substance Abuse Acute Care 
Inpatient Days) 1739 0.75 2.25 
Num(unprofitable service) Number of unprofitable services (0-6) 1739 2.34 1.11 
% (unprofitable service) (number of unprofitable services)/6 1739 0.39 0.18 
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[Table 2.5] Distribution of Hospitals across Counties 
 
Year Average # of Hospitals # of County 
1990 3.29 51 
1991 3.29 49 
1992 3.33 49 
1993 3.33 48 
1994 3.24 50 
1995 3.32 50 
1996 3.22 50 
1997 3.18 49 
1998 3.02 49 
1999 3 49 
2000 2.94 50 
 
 
 
Source: Florida Health Insurance Study, 2004 
  
[Figure 2.7] Distribution of Uninsured Residents under Age 65 by District 
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state’s population, respectively, this means that hospitals located on the south coast 
face higher demand for indigent care. On the other hand, there are few uninsured 
persons in rural and sparsely populated counties: for example, the sum of uninsured 
residents in seven counties in Central Florida—DeSoto, Glades, Hardee, Hendry, 
Highlands, Monroe, and Okeechobee—makes up of only 2% of the uninsured 
population in the state. Within these counties, however, almost a quarter (24.4%) of 
the population lacks health insurance coverage, which implies that the role of safety-
net providers is also important in these rural counties.  
Now, I discuss distribution of the uninsured within counties for 1990-2000. 
Figure 2.8 shows the HHI for the uninsured (red line) and HHI for paying patients 
(blue line). The HHI for the uninsured (concentration of indigent care burden at the 
county level) increased in 1992 from 0.41 to 0.54, but has stayed almost the same 
since 1992. The HHI for paying patients has been constantly higher approximately at 
0.6, and changed little over the years. 
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[Figure 2.8] Distribution of the Uninsured (HHI for the uninsured: county level) 
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The Florida hospital market mainly consists of FP and NFP hospitals, 
accounting for 47 and 41 percent of the study sample, respectively, while public 
hospitals are 12 percent of the hospital sample. Teaching hospitals, defined as those 
that have at least 10 residents, consist of 14 percent of my sample. Florida hospitals 
have an average of 289 licensed beds, and 89 percent are located in urban areas. 21 
percent of the hospitals are located in counties where at least two hospitals operate and 
the indigent care burden is highly concentrated, whereas 10 percent are the only 
providers operating in their respective counties. 
Hospital UC consists of 29 percent charity care and 71 percent bad debts (see 
Figure 2.9), and takes up 7 percent of operating expenses. The payer mix is as follows: 
6 percent self-pay, 11 percent Medicaid, 26 percent private insurance, and 51 percent 
Medicare. While 60 percent of privately insured or Medicaid patients are admitted 
with non-emergency conditions, only 50 percent of self-pay patients come with non-
emergency conditions. 
On the demand side, the average per capita income is $21,222.7; the average 
unemployment rate at the county level is about 6 percent; the elderly (65 years or 
older) make up 19 percent of the population, whereas the non-white population makes 
up 28 percent. On the supply side, the average number of active non-federal 
physicians is 723 at the county level; the value of HHI with paying patients is 0.34; 
and 42 percent of hospitals were located in counties which had a public hospital. 
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Source: author’s calculation based on the Florida hospitals’ financial data set 
 
[Figure 2.9] Hospital Uncompensated Care in Florida (1990-2000) 
 
 
Results of Model 0 (county level) 
 
Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 report the estimates of the county level analysis (Model 0) for 
the Medicaid expansion and the BBA, respectively. Here, the dependent variable is the 
aggregate of hospitals’ indigent care at the county level. 
 
(a) Results for the Medicaid Expansions (Model 0) 
In Table 2.6, the results in the first panel show that the aggregate amounts of 
indigent care in terms of charity care costs and number of uninsured patients 
decreased, by 0.16 logs and 0.21 logs respectively, after the Medicaid expansion; 
however, neither change was statistically significant. Interestingly, the aggregate 
number of uninsured patients belonging to the non-target group increased after the 
expansion, by 0.29 logs, in a statistically significant manner.  
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[Table 2.6] Results of Model 0 (Medicaid Expansions) 
 
Panel I ln(UC cost) ln(charity 
cost) 
ln(uninsured 
adm) 
ln(uninsured 
target) 
ln(uninsured 
non-target) 
Post92 0.1 (0.08) 
0.08 
(0.09) 
-0.16 
(0.42) 
-0.44 
(0.59) 
-0.21 
(0.29) 
-0.32 
(0.46) 
0.33 
(0.75) 
1.02 
(0.83) 
0.29** 
(0.12) 
0.29** 
(0.14) 
Post92× 
HHIhigh 
  
  
-0.02 
(0.06) 
  
  
-0.04 
(0.16) 
  
  
0.16 
(0.19) 
  
  
-0.19 
(0.57) 
  
  
  0.06 
(0.10) 
Post92× 
solehosp 
  
  
0.05 
(0.06) 
  
  
0.64 
(0.56) 
  
  
0.11 
(0.29) 
  
  
-1.37 
(0.83) 
  
  
-0.04 
(0.13) 
County 
F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 
R-sqr 0.99 0.99 0.85 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.87 0.87 0.97 0.97 
F-stat 6.26 5.99 9.91 5.97 5.46 5.46 44.35 21.01 38.21 47.48 
Prob>F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Panel II ln(Medicaid Admission) 
ln(Medicaid Adm: 
Target group) 
ln(Medicaid Adm: 
Non-target group) 
-0.08 0.14 0.48 1.02 -0.18** -0.05 Post92 (0.09) (0.13) (0.53) (0.64) (0.08) (0.10) 
  -0.08   -0.46   -0.06 Post92× 
HHIhigh 
  (0.09)   (0.55)   (0.08) 
  -0.42***   -0.85*   -0.25** Post92× 
solehosp 
  (0.15)   (0.49)   (0.11) 
County 
F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 297 297 297 297 297 297 
R-sqr 0.98 0.98 0.89 0.89 0.98 0.98 
F-stat 3.97 4.05 3.04 7 70.7 10.89 
Prob>F 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Panel III Ln(ER visits) Ln(clinic 
visits) 
Ln(labor/delivery 
procedures) Ln(NICU) 
Ln(pediatric 
intensive care) 
0.04 0.09** 1.54 0.02 0.19 0.87 -0.21 0.13 -0.06 0.2 Post92 (0.03) (0.03) (1.26) (1.92) (0.36) (0.76) (0.54) (0.84) (0.06) (0.19) 
  -0.05   0.83   -1.04   -0.05   -0.3 Post92× 
HHIhigh 
  (0.04)   (1.80)   (0.71)   (0.53)   (0.24) 
  -0.05*   2.71   -0.71   -0.7   -0.34 Post92× 
solehosp 
  (0.03)   (2.02)   (0.69)   (0.71)   (0.27) 
County 
F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 
R-sqr 1 1 0.78 0.78 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.99 0.99 
F-stat 27.11 27.9 31.71 26.23 3.14 3.58 72 127 340 1872 
Prob>F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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This implies hospital indigent care beneficiaries shifting from maternity to non-
maternity patients after the Medicaid program covered more maternity patients. The 
aggregate of Medicaid patients in the target group, mostly involving births, increased, 
while the aggregate of Medicaid patients in the non-target group decreased by 0.18 
logs; however, neither change was statistically significant. In markets with only one 
hospital, the admissions for Medicaid patients (in total, in the target group, and in the 
non-target group) actually decreased after the expansions: this may imply that patients 
residing in a county where a single hospital was operating may have moved to 
hospitals in a different county after the coverage gain. 
 In the third panel, I present results for the service provision at the county level. 
Here, I only report the estimates for services that were possibly affected by the 
expansion policy such as maternity and pediatric care. In a given county, the sum of 
labor/delivery procedures performed at hospitals increased, while the aggregate NICU 
days and the sum of pediatric intensive care days decreased. However, none of these 
changes was statistically significantly different from zero at the 10% level. Although I 
expect emergency room or clinic visits to decrease after the coverage expansion 
(because these are the entry points for uninsured patients), both increased, albeit by 
amounts that are not statistically significant. In particular, the total number of ER 
visits increased by 0.09 logs for counties with multiple hospitals, but decreased by 
0.05 logs for those with only one hospital. Considering that these counties also 
increased the aggregate amount of care offered to uninsured patients in the non-target 
group, these increased ER visits were likely to originate from non-maternity patients.    
 
(b) Results for the BBA (Model 0) 
Panel I in Table 2.7 presents the estimates for the BBA regarding changes in 
UC and volume of the uninsured at the county level. As in Table 2.6, most of the  
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[Table 2.7] Results of Model 0 (the BBA) 
 
Panel I ln(UC cost) Ln(Charity Cost) 
Ln(Uninsured 
Admission) 
Ln(Medicaid 
Admission) 
0.01 -0.04 0.14 0.07 0.37 0.34 -0.17 -0.16 POST97 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.17) (0.19) (0.59) (0.65) (0.12) (0.12) 
  0.1   0.12   0.08   -0.03 POST97 
×HHIhigh 
  (0.06)   (0.16)   (0.23)   (0.07) 
  0.07   0.17   0.03   0 POST97 
×solehosp 
 (0.08)  (0.21)  (0.27)  (0.09) 
Obs. 247 247 247 247 247 247 247 247 
county F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-square 0.99 0.99 0.93 0.93 0.87 0.87 0.98 0.98 
Prob>F 0 0 0.41 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Panel II ln burncare 
ln 
(ER) 
ln 
(clinic) 
ln 
(labor) 
ln 
(psych) 
ln 
(subst) 
ln(# of 
unprofit) 
0.14 0.96 -0.67 -0.07 0.29 -0.45 0.34 POST97 
(0.14) (0.85) (2.27) (0.12) (0.39) (1.02) (0.40) 
-0.08 -0.12 4.33** -0.12 0.01 0.22 0.03 POST97 
×HHIhigh (0.09) (0.19) (1.95) (0.15) (0.27) (0.87) (0.09) 
-0.03 -0.05 0.35 -0.08 -1.05 -0.08 0.01 POST97 
×solehosp (0.06) (0.19) (2.62) (0.15) (0.85) (1.02) (0.14) 
Obs. 247 247 247 247 247 247 247 
county F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-square 0.96 0.85 0.8 1 0.98 0.9 0.91 
Prob>F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
  Panel III 
 ln(CC)  ln (MRI) 
ln 
(NICU)  
ln 
openheart 
ln 
(orthoped) 
ln 
(pedinc)  
ln(num 
of profit) 
0.73** -0.95* 0.21 -0.84 0.06 -0.4 0.43 POST97 
(0.29) (0.53) (0.21) (1.52) (0.17) (0.82) (0.39) 
0.87 1.42** 0.18 0.69 0.04 0.12 -0.01 POST97 
×HHIhigh (0.65) (0.68) (0.29) (2.04) (0.11) (0.67) (0.10) 
0.4 -1.55* 0.52 0.03 0.37 -0.07 -0.02 POST97 
×solehosp (0.62) (0.92) (0.59) (1.61) (0.26) (0.35) (0.10) 
Obs. 247 247 247 247 247 247 247 
county F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-square 0.97 0.92 0.98 0.9 0.99 0.97 0.94 
Prob>F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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policy effects on the aggregate level of indigent care did not change in a statistically 
significant manner. Moreover, contrary to my hypothesis, the BBA did not reduce the 
indigent care provision at the county level: UC, charity care, and uninsured admissions 
at the county level all increased after the BBA, while the aggregate of Medicaid 
admissions decreased. For the unprofitable service provision, the BBA reduced county 
level clinic visits, substance inpatient days, and labor procedures. In contrast, many of 
the profitable services provided at the county level increased after the BBA: aggregate 
amounts of services related to cardiac care, CT, diagnostic radiology, ESW, NICU, 
and orthopedic care all increased after the supply shock. 
 
Results of Model 1 (Hospital Level) 
 
Now, I discuss the policy effects on individual hospitals’ supply of indigent care. 
Model I is the difference-in-difference type regression that enables me to compare 
policy impacts across ownership types. The coefficient of POST captures policy 
impacts on indigent care for NFP hospitals, while the estimates for two interaction 
terms (POST×FP and POST×Public) capture the differences in policy impacts 
between NFP and the respective ownership type (NFP vs. FP and NFP vs. Public). 
 
(a) Results for the Medicaid Expansions (Model 1) 
Table 2.8 through Table 2.10 present the results of Model I for the Medicaid 
expansion—UC measures, admission patterns, and types of services provided. In 
Table 2.8, I report the estimates for the four UC measures: UC costs in log form, UC 
as a percent of total operating expenses, charity care costs in log form, and charity care 
as a percent of total operating expenses. Prior to the Medicaid expansion, regardless of 
the choice of measures, I can confirm conventional wisdom concerning the  
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[Table 2.8] Results of Model I for Medicaid Expansion: Uncompensated Care 
 
  
ln 
(UC cost) 
% 
(UC cost)  
ln 
(charity 
care) 
% 
(charity 
care)  
POST92 -0.09 0 -1.16** -0.01* 
  (0.16) (0.00) (0.44) (0.00) 
POST92×FP 0.24 0.01* 1.58*** 0 
  (0.22) (0.00) (0.44) (0.00) 
POST92×Public 0.13 0 0.24 0.02* 
  (0.16) (0.01) (0.24) (0.01) 
FP -0.78*** -0.02*** -5.01*** -0.02*** 
  (0.22) (0.01) (0.59) (0.01) 
Public 1.43*** 0.12*** 2.60*** 0.16*** 
  (0.32) (0.02) (0.85) (0.02) 
Teaching 0.57** 0.02* -0.27 0.04** 
  (0.23) (0.01) (0.71) (0.02) 
Large_bed 1.16*** 0 2.71*** 0.01* 
  (0.16) (0.01) (0.55) (0.01) 
Rural 5.05** 0.12*** 4.96 0.11*** 
  (2.29) (0.03) (3.16) (0.03) 
ln(mcaidcase) -0.18 -0.01 1.23 0.01 
  (0.40) (0.01) (1.04) (0.01) 
% pop65 0.6 0.16 9.51 0.24 
  (8.51) (0.14) (22.22) (0.21) 
% nonwhite -1.02 -0.32** 13.5 0.1 
  (3.40) (0.13) (12.43) (0.12) 
capita_ERvisit 0.23 0 0.13 0 
  (0.26) (0.00) (0.24) (0.00) 
unemployment -0.05 -0.00* 0.11 0 
  (0.05) (0.00) (0.09) (0.00) 
ln(birth) -0.13 0 -0.17 0 
  (0.17) (0.00) (0.32) (0.00) 
ln(capita_income) 1.06* 0.02 0.74 0.03 
  (0.63) (0.02) (1.88) (0.02) 
ln(active MD) 0.72 0 3.37** 0.01 
  (0.57) (0.03) (1.65) (0.02) 
% poverty pop -2.45 0.17 15.24 0.22* 
  (4.42) (0.19) (11.81) (0.11) 
Pres_public hosp 1.00* 0.03 2.51** 0.03 
  (0.56) (0.02) (1.01) (0.03) 
HHI_pay 0.85 0.02 2.17 0.04 
  (0.59) (0.02) (1.66) (0.03) 
Constant 2.32 -0.02 -37.09** -0.51*** 
  (6.79) (0.17) (18.53) (0.16) 
Observations 980 980 980 980 
County F.E. YES YES YES YES 
R-square 0.54 0.58 0.51 0.54 
Prob>F 0 0 0 0 
  
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the hospital level.  
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relationship between hospital ownership type and provision of indigent care: 
compared to NFP hospitals, FP hospitals provide less indigent care, while public 
hospitals offer more. The first two columns show that after the Medicaid expansion, 
there was very little statistical evidence that hospitals changed UC, except for FP 
hospitals which increased UC costs as a percent of operating costs. The last two 
columns show that FP hospitals increased both charity care and bad debts, but the 
increase in bad debts was larger than that in charity care. The Medicaid expansion 
reduced the charity care burden for NFP hospitals both in log terms (by 1.16) and as a 
percent of operating expenses (1 percentage point). Public hospitals also reduced 
charity care costs by 1.16 logs, but relative to operating costs, charity care costs 
increased by 1 percentage point. My findings suggest that public and NFP hospitals 
benefited from the Medicaid expansion, by carrying a smaller charity care burden. 
However, no change in UC implies an increase in bad debt, so that the overall indigent 
care burden might not have been reduced for these hospitals. 
Table 2.9 presents the results for the admission patterns after the expansion. 
The first three columns include the estimates for uninsured (selfpay) admission rates, 
number of uninsured admissions in log form, and uninsured inpatient days in log form. 
I expect uninsured admissions to decrease after the Medicaid expansion. Although 
hospitals of all ownership types admitted fewer uninsured patients, these decreases are 
not statistically significantly different from zero. However, uninsured inpatient days 
decreased by 0.27 logs across all ownership types (at the 10% level). Now, I separate 
uninsured patients into maternity and infant patients (the Medicaid target group) and 
the rest (the non-target group), and examine whether the Medicaid expansion 
decreased uninsured patients who belonged to the target group. The fourth column 
shows that the number of uninsured patients who were in the target group did decrease 
at NFP and public hospitals by 0.42 logs after the expansion, but FP hospitals 
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[Table 2.9] Results of Model I for Medicaid Expansion: Admission Patterns 
 
Panel I (N=980) 
  
%unins 
adm 
ln(unins 
adm)  
ln(unins 
Inpday)  
ln 
(unins: 
target) 
ln(unins: 
non-
Target) 
ln(unins: 
non-ER 
& non-
target 
∆ Ratio 
(nonER/ 
ER) 
POST92 0 -0.09 -0.27* -0.42** 0.27* 0.31** 0.19* 
  (0.01) (0.13) (0.15) (0.18) (0.15) (0.15) (0.11) 
POST92×FP 0.01 -0.13 0.01 0.44*** -0.35*** -0.42*** -0.07 
  (0.00) (0.12) (0.12) (0.16) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11) 
POST92×Public -0.01 0.08 0.06 0.26 0.22* 0.24* 0.12 
  (0.01) (0.11) (0.14) (0.23) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13) 
FP -0.02*** -0.62*** -0.54*** -1.99*** -0.26 -0.33** 0.04 
  (0.01) (0.17) (0.16) (0.39) (0.16) (0.16) (0.12) 
Public 0.10*** 1.35*** 1.66*** 1.33 1.14*** 1.13*** -0.09 
  (0.02) (0.28) (0.30) (0.81) (0.26) (0.28) (0.22) 
Teaching 0 0.32 0.39* 0.49 0.34 0.45** -0.02 
  (0.01) (0.20) (0.22) (0.38) (0.22) (0.22) (0.13) 
Large Bed 0 1.24*** 1.24*** 1.28*** 1.25*** 1.24*** -0.27** 
  (0.01) (0.17) (0.15) (0.35) (0.17) (0.15) (0.12) 
Rural 0.08*** 1.22 1.88* -0.43 1.38 0.83 -0.01 
  (0.03) (0.98) (0.95) (1.26) (0.95) (0.96) (0.18) 
Other County  
Variables & 
County F.E. 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-square 0.51 0.54 0.6 0.47 0.52 0.59 0.15 
Panel II (N=980) 
  
% 
Mcaid 
adm  
ln 
(Mcaid 
Adm) 
ln 
(Mcaid 
inpday) 
ln 
(Mcaid: 
target) 
ln (Mcaid: 
non-
target) 
  
POST92 0 -0.18 -0.12 -0.36* -0.14   
  (0.01) (0.12) (0.12) (0.20) (0.10)   
POST92×FP 0.02** 0.24* 0.24 0.47** 0   
  (0.01) (0.14) (0.18) (0.20) (0.12)   
POST92×Public 0.01 -0.12 -0.11 0.06 -0.09   
  (0.01) (0.12) (0.13) (0.22) (0.10)   
FP -0.03* -0.80*** -0.59*** -2.28*** -0.49***   
  (0.02) (0.22) (0.21) (0.42) (0.18)   
Public 0.10*** 1.58*** 1.68*** 1.64* 1.37***   
  (0.03) (0.33) (0.33) (0.86) (0.26)   
Teaching 0.09*** 0.91*** 0.98*** 1.07** 0.66***   
  (0.02) (0.25) (0.25) (0.48) (0.22)   
Large Bed 0.01 1.47*** 1.63*** 1.59*** 1.45***   
  (0.01) (0.20) (0.19) (0.42) (0.17)   
Rural 0.08 0.99 1.18 -0.04 1.15   
  (0.07) (1.26) (1.33) (1.62) (1.07)   
Other County 
Controls & 
county F.E. 
YES YES YES YES YES 
  
R-square 0.41 0.56 0.57 0.5 0.56   
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increased it by 0.02 logs. However, the reason why the overall uninsured admissions 
did not change was because NFP and public hospitals admitted more uninsured 
patients in the non-target group, i.e., non-maternity patients above age 1, while FP 
hospitals decreased these admissions. In the last two columns, I find that the increase 
in indigent care at NFP and public occurred with those who had non-emergency 
conditions and seek non-maternity care, i.e., indigent care which hospitals could have 
chosen not to offer. 
In order to check whether the decreased number of uninsured patients in the 
target group was matched with an increased number of Medicaid admissions, I also 
examine Medicaid admission patterns in Panel II. At first, I examine Medicaid 
admissions in total, not restricted to the target group of the expansion, and find that 
only FP hospitals increased the total number of Medicaid patients (by 0.24 logs) and 
their admission rates (by 2 percentage points). When I divide Medicaid patients into 
the target and non-target group, the fourth and fifth columns show that the increase in 
Medicaid admissions at FP hospitals was due to the increase in the number of 
maternity and pediatric patients, those in the target group.  
My findings imply that the Medicaid expansion did not reduce the total 
number of uninsured patients, but did change distribution of uninsured patients across 
hospitals. NFP and public hospitals, which had taken care of a large number of low-
income patients before the expansion, were able to reduce uninsured admissions 
among maternity patients and infants under age one, the target group of the policy 
change. However, they balanced out this decrease in uninsured admissions with the 
increase in admissions for uninsured patients who were in the non-target group. FP 
hospitals, which originally took care of few uninsured patients, became more 
interested in caring the patient group who were potentially eligible for Medicaid after 
the expansion: they increased admissions for low-income patients who were uninsured 
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or on Medicaid, but only those in the target group, by sacrificing care to uninsured 
patients who were in the non-target group. 
Table 2.10 reports the results of the expansion policy regarding service 
provision. For the Medicaid expansion, I do not expect hospitals to make large 
changes in types of services provided, and this is confirmed by Table 2.10. Neither 
profitable nor unprofitable services changed by statistically significant amounts, 
except for CT procedures, which decreased at FP hospitals. However, there may have 
been reallocation of maternity patients and infants under age 1 across hospitals, 
because the increased public insurance coverage provided payments to hospitals for 
treating those who became eligible for Medicaid. Therefore, I focus on three services 
particularly related to maternity and pediatric care: two profitable intensive care 
services (NICU days and pediatric intensive care) and one unprofitable service (labor 
procedures). Prior to the Medicaid expansion, FP hospitals provided smaller amounts 
of all of these three services than NFP and public hospitals. After the Medicaid 
expansion, FP hospitals provided relatively more labor and pediatric intensive care 
services than NFP hospitals, but the differences were not statistically significantly 
different from zero. Lastly, I examine whether the income effect motivated hospitals 
to increase provision of unprofitable services. Based on the number and proportion of 
unprofitable services, I do not find such effects. 
 
(b) Results for the BBA (Model 1) 
Next, I present the results of Model I for the BBA. First, I estimate Model I 
with the hospital sample for 1995-2000 with Medicare FPI and Medicaid FPI included 
(controlling for the size of the financial shock at the hospital level). However, the 
policy impacts may differ by the size of the financial shock, so I add interaction terms  
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[Table 2.10] Results of Model I for Medicaid Expansion: Service Provision 
 
POST92 POST92×FP POST92×Public 
Profitable 
Services Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Other 
Hosp. 
Var. 
Other 
County 
Variables 
& F.E 
R-
square 
ln(coronary) 
-0.07 (0.36) -0.15 (0.34) -0.01 0.51 YES YES 0.51 
ln(CC)  0.18 (0.25) -0.3 (0.28) -0.44 0.55 YES YES 0.55 
ln(CT)  0.19 (0.25) -0.37** (0.15) 0.26 0.5 YES YES 0.5 
ln(radio/diag) 0.2 (0.19) -0.12 (0.13) 0.02 0.38 YES YES 0.38 
ln(ESW) 0.14 (0.21) -0.16 (0.21) -0.02 0.4 YES YES 0.4 
ln(MRI) 0.42 (0.43) 0.18 (0.35) 0.58 0.43 YES YES 0.43 
ln(NICU) 0.14 (0.19) -0.19 (0.16) 0.34 0.45 YES YES 0.45 
ln(openheart) 
-0.07 (0.28) 0 (0.25) -0.14 0.39 YES YES 0.39 
ln(orthopedic) 0.07 (0.09) -0.12 (0.08) 0.13 0.58 YES YES 0.58 
ln(ped.int) 
-0.15 (0.15) 0.01 (0.14) 0.3 0.32 YES YES 0.32 
# of profitable 0.16 (0.17) -0.14 (0.15) 0.1 0.61 YES YES 0.61 
% of profit. 0.02 (0.02) -0.01 (0.01) 0.01 0.61 YES YES 0.61 
 
POST92 POST92×FP POST92×Public 
Unprofitable 
Services Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Other 
Hosp. 
Var. 
Other 
County 
Variables 
& F.E 
 
R-
square 
 ln(burncare) -0.02 (0.04) -0.01 (0.04) 0.02 (0.04) YES YES 0.29 
 ln(ER) -0.01 (0.23) -0.19 (0.22) -0.03 (0.12) YES YES 0.29 
 ln(freeclinic) 0.61 (0.56) -0.65 (0.44) 0.01 (0.82) YES YES 0.37 
 ln(obstetric) -0.49 (0.30) 0.39 (0.29) 0.14 (0.40) YES YES 0.45 
 ln (psychiatr) -0.31 (0.27) -0.09 (0.27) -0.02 (0.31) YES YES 0.41 
 ln(substance) -0.1 (0.29) 0.22 (0.27) 0.06 (0.37) YES YES 0.2 
# of unprofit. 
-0.01 (0.10) -0.01 (0.09) 0.03 (0.12) YES YES 0.51 
% of unprof. 0 (0.02) 0 (0.02) 0 (0.02) YES YES 0.51 
 
between Medicaid FPI and each of the ownership types to Model I68. I construct a 
dummy variable for hospitals with high Medicaid FPI: HIGH_MCAIDFPI=1 if 
Medicaid FPI of a hospital is greater than the median value of all hospitals’ Medicaid 
FPI. Table 2.11 through Table 2.13 present the three sets of results. The estimates in 
row (1)-(3) capture how hospitals with small financial shock responded to the BBA, 
                                                 
68
 I do not include interaction terms between Medicare FPI and ownership types because when I 
estimate Model I with Medicare FPI and Medicaid FPI included, the Medicare FPI did not have 
statistically significant impacts on hospital indigent care for most of my indigent care measures. 
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while the estimates in row (4)-(6) capture responses of hospitals with large financial 
shock (high Medicaid FPI) to the BBA. If those with larger shock reduced indigent 
care to a greater extent, these estimates would have negative values. 
Table 2.11 reports the estimates for the four UC measures. Surprisingly, the 
BBA seemed to have had little effect on the amount of UC or charity care. Only FP 
hospitals made an adjustment to the log amount of charity care costs, but the 
adjustment was the increase in charity care costs by 0.56 logs. My results confirm that 
the decrease in indigent care was indeed larger at hospitals with greater financial 
shocks: For those with high Medicaid FPI, UC as a percent of operating expenses 
decreased by 1 percentage point, regardless of ownership type. For public hospitals 
with high Medicaid FPI, charity care as a percent of operating expenses also decreased 
by 8 percentage points. 
 
[Table 2.11] Results of Model I for the BBA: Uncompensated Care 
 
No. Variables ln 
(UC cost) 
% 
(UC cost) 
ln 
(charity 
care) 
% 
(charity 
care) 
0.16 0 0.22 0.01 (1) POST97 (0.10) (0.00) (0.30) (0.01) 
-0.26 0 0.56* -0.01 (2) POST97×FP (0.17) (0.01) (0.32) (0.01) 
-0.04 0 -0.13 0.02 (3) POST97×Public (0.17) (0.01) (0.30) (0.02) 
-0.22 -0.01** -0.15 -0.01 (4) POST97×HighFPI (0.16) (0.01) (0.33) (0.01) 
0.36* 0.01 0.41 0.02 (5) POST97×FP×HighFPI (0.19) (0.01) (0.37) (0.02) 
-0.11 -0.01 -0.31 -0.08* (6) POST97×Public×HighFPI (0.30) (0.01) (0.53) (0.04) 
 Other Hosp. Variables YES YES YES YES 
 Other County Variables YES YES YES YES 
 County F.E. YES YES YES YES 
 Observations 729 729 729 729 
 R-square 0.67 0.74 0.55 0.71 
 Prob>F 0 0 0 0 
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Table 2.12 reports the estimates for admission patterns. My results show that 
NFP and public hospitals were more responsive to the BBA, and that hospitals with 
high Medicaid FPI reduced indigent care to a greater extent. Hospitals of all 
ownership types with high Medicaid FPI reduced uninsured admissions by 0.31 logs 
and Medicaid admissions by 0.47 logs. These account for a 1 percent decrease in 
uninsured admission rates for private hospitals, and 6 percent for public hospitals. 
There was no statistically significant change in uninsured inpatient days at hospitals in 
any ownership type. Now I isolate uninsured patients who did not have emergency 
conditions from total uninsured patients. I expect hospitals, with more financial 
pressure after the BBA, to reduce uninsured admissions, but only those who arrived 
with non-emergency conditions. The fourth and fifth column show that the size of the 
reductions in non-emergency uninsured admissions differs by ownership type and by 
the level of Medicaid FPI. Among those with low FPI, NFP hospitals decreased the 
log of uninsured admissions with non-ER conditions by 0.16, which accounted for 2 
percentage points reductions in uninsured admission rates, but FP and public hospitals 
increased non-ER uninsured admissions by 0.26 and 0.31 logs, respectively (4 and 3 
percentage-point higher than the rate for NFP hospitals). Among those with high 
Medicaid FPI, public hospitals seemed to have made the largest adjustments to 
indigent care: public hospitals lowered the rate of non-emergency uninsured admission 
by 5 percentage points (the largest), while FP hospitals lowered it by 1 percentage 
point (the smallest) and NFP hospitals by 2 percentage points. However, after taking 
into account the trend that might have occurred with privately insured patients 
(ΔRATIO), the changes in uninsured admissions with non-ER conditions became 
statistically insignificant.  
In the last three columns, I examine Medicaid admission patterns: since the 
BBA specifically reduced Medicaid and Medicare hospital payments, it could directly 
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[Table 2.12] Results of Model I for the BBA: Admission Patterns  
 
 N=729 % unins adm 
ln(unins 
adm) 
ln(unins 
Inpday) 
ln(nonER  
unins 
adm) 
% (nonER  
unins 
adm) 
∆ Ratio: 
nonER/ 
ER 
-0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.16 -0.02* -0.1 POST97 (0.01) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.01) (0.13) 
0.01 0 0.02 0.26* 0.04*** -0.07 POST97×FP (0.01) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) (0.01) (0.14) 
0.02** 0.1 0.16 0.31* 0.03** 0.31 POST97×Public (0.01) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.01) (0.22) 
-0.01 -0.31** -0.23 -0.26 0.02 0.14 POST97×HighFPI (0.01) (0.15) (0.15) (0.23) (0.01) (0.18) 
0 0.17 0.13 0.04 -0.03* 0.1 POST97×HighFPI 
×FP (0.01) (0.22) (0.21) (0.30) (0.02) (0.24) 
-0.05*** -0.38 -0.06 -0.63 -0.06** -0.48 POST97×HighFPI 
×Public (0.02) (0.33) (0.28) (0.43) (0.03) (0.46) 
0 0.02 -0.19 0.18 0 -0.15 Mcare FPI (0.01) (0.35) (0.24) (0.32) (0.01) (0.19) 
-0.07 -1.49*** -1.47*** -1.44** -0.12* 0.42 Mcaid FPI (0.05) (0.52) (0.53) (0.65) (0.07) (1.02) 
-0.02*** -0.62*** -0.81*** -0.82*** -0.03** 0.03 FP (0.01) (0.18) (0.17) (0.16) (0.01) (0.16) 
0.06*** 1.02*** 0.94*** 0.86*** 0.06*** 0 Public (0.02) (0.29) (0.27) (0.27) (0.02) (0.35) 
0 -0.02 0.01 0.21 0.02 0.21 Teaching (0.01) (0.17) (0.16) (0.20) (0.02) (0.18) 
0 0.93*** 0.96*** 0.75*** -0.02** -0.47*** Large bed (0.00) (0.19) (0.16) (0.17) (0.01) (0.14) 
0.03*** -0.51 -0.38 -0.63** 0.09** 0.4 Rural  (0.01) (0.38) (0.29) (0.31) (0.04) (0.28) 
Other County 
Variables & F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-square 0.61 0.67 0.74 0.7 0.39 0.32 
Prob>F 0 0 0 0 0 0.06 
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[Table 2.12] continued 
 
 N=729 % Mcaid Adm 
ln (Mcaid 
Adm) 
ln(Mcaid 
Inpday) 
0.02** 0.27* 0.26* POST97 (0.01) (0.14) (0.13) 
0.01 0.09 -0.01 POST97×FP (0.01) (0.18) (0.16) 
-0.03** -0.38* -0.19 POST97×Public (0.01) (0.21) (0.24) 
-0.05*** -0.74*** -0.67*** POST97×HighFPI (0.01) (0.19) (0.18) 
0 0.08 0.15 POST97×HighFPI 
×FP (0.01) (0.28) (0.27) 
0.02 0.26 0.19 POST97×HighFPI 
×Public (0.02) (0.47) (0.49) 
0.01 0.1 -0.04 Mcare FPI (0.01) (0.29) (0.24) 
-0.37*** -3.24*** -3.34*** Mcaid FPI (0.06) (0.66) (0.62) 
-0.01 -0.49*** -0.40** FP (0.01) (0.18) (0.17) 
0.02 0.59* 0.64** Public (0.01) (0.32) (0.32) 
0.01 0.12 0.21 Teaching (0.01) (0.16) (0.17) 
0 0.94*** 1.07*** Large bed (0.01) (0.19) (0.18) 
-0.02 -1.05*** -1.11*** Rural  (0.02) (0.32) (0.20) 
Other County Variables 
& F.E. YES YES YES 
R-square 0.74 0.73 0.77 
Prob>F 0 0 0 
 
harm low-income patients even though they had Medicaid coverage. I find that NFP 
and FP hospitals with low Medicaid FPI increased the log of Medicaid admissions by 
0.27 and the rate of Medicaid admissions by 2 percentage points. However, public 
hospitals with low FPI reduced the log and rate of Medicaid admissions by 0.11 logs 
and 1 percentage point, respectively. Compared to hospitals with low Medicaid FPI, 
those with high FPI significantly decreased the log and rate of Medicaid admissions, 
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by 0.75 logs and 5 percentage points respectively. These findings imply that public 
hospitals, i.e., safety-net providers which were expected to experience a greater 
financial shock after the BBA, lowered indigent care to a greater extent, and hospitals 
which were hit hard by the BBA made larger adjustments to indigent care. 
Table 2.13 shows the results for BBA impact on the type of services provided. 
I expect hospitals to provide more profitable services but less unprofitable services 
after the BBA, and hospitals with high FPI to make greater adjustments to their service 
provision. I find mixed results. The provision of profitable services increased at most 
hospitals, especially FP hospitals with high FPI and NFP hospitals with low FPI. 
However, only a few estimates have statistically significantly positive values: NICU 
days and orthopedic staffs increased by 0.93 and 0.31 logs, respectively, at NFP and 
FP hospitals with low FPI. Interestingly, FP hospitals with high FPI increased the 
number and proportion of profitable services by 0.92 logs and 0.09, respectively, 
which were due to the increases in orthopedic care and pediatric intensive care. The 
provision of unprofitable services decreased at FP hospitals with low FPI, as well as 
NFP and public hospitals with high FPI. However, many of the changes were not 
statistically significantly different from zero at the 10% significance level. Hospitals 
with a greater BBA shock, regardless of ownership types, decreased provision of 
obstetric services, the entry point for the indigent. In contrast, FP or public hospitals 
with high FPI increased provision of some of unprofitable services: public hospitals 
increased free clinic services by 5.36 logs; FP hospitals increased burn care, free 
clinic, and substance inpatient days. However, there is no clear pattern of hospitals 
cutting back the aggregate number of unprofitable services.  
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[Table 2.13] Results of Model I for the BBA: Service Provision 
 
Panel I: Profitable Services 
 N=729 ln (coronary) ln(CC) ln(CT) 
ln 
(radio/diag) ln(ESW) ln(MRI) 
0.46 0.18 -0.08 0.06 -0.17 0.33 POST97 (0.58) (0.41) (0.32) (0.11) (0.33) (0.46) 
-1.40* -0.43 0.09 -0.21* 0.3 -0.03 POST97×FP (0.75) (0.63) (0.32) (0.12) (0.40) (0.53) 
-0.23 -0.41 0.51 -0.04 0.58 0.05 POST97×Public (0.77) (0.65) (0.41) (0.13) (0.43) (0.65) 
-1.12 0.09 0.59 -0.13 0.18 0.06 POST97 
×HighFPI (0.85) (0.59) (0.54) (0.11) (0.47) (0.70) 
1.84 1.29 -0.33 0.21 -0.07 0.07 POST97×FP 
× HighFPI (1.16) (1.02) (0.56) (0.17) (0.61) (0.88) 
1.2 -0.16 -1.11 -0.06 -0.9 -0.64 POST97×Public 
× HighFPI (1.73) (1.34) (0.78) (0.30) (0.83) (1.21) 
Other Hosp. 
Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Other County 
Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
County F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-square 0.47 0.63 0.58 0.72 0.45 0.46 
Prob>F 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 
 
 N=729 ln(NICU) 
ln 
(open 
heart) 
ln 
(ortho 
pedic) 
ln 
(pediac 
intens) 
# of 
Profitable 
Service 
% 
Profitable 
Service 
0.93** -0.83 0.31** 0.48 0.08 0.01 POST97 (0.44) (0.79) (0.14) (0.31) (0.23) (0.02) 
-1.11* -1.17 -0.26 -0.91** -0.24 -0.02 POST97×FP (0.67) (0.94) (0.17) (0.41) (0.32) (0.03) 
-1.57* 0.84 -0.25 0.14 0.25 0.03 POST97×Public (0.82) (1.36) (0.19) (0.69) (0.40) (0.04) 
-1.51** 0.43 -0.09 -1.06** -0.28 -0.03 POST97 
×HighFPI (0.72) (1.18) (0.17) (0.46) (0.35) (0.03) 
2.20* 2.32 0.51** 1.77** 0.92* 0.09* POST97×FP 
× HighFPI (1.12) (1.55) (0.23) (0.74) (0.49) (0.05) 
3.40* -1.52 0.43 0.49 -0.32 -0.03 POST97×Public 
× HighFPI (1.81) (2.29) (0.38) (0.99) (0.75) (0.08) 
Other Hosp. 
Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Other County 
Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
County F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-square 0.56 0.47 0.7 0.54 0.67 0.67 
Prob>F 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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[Table 2.13] continued 
 
Panel II: Unprofitable Services 
 
ln(burn 
care) ln(ER) 
ln(free 
clinic)  
ln(obst 
etric)  
ln(psy 
chiat) 
ln(sub 
abuse)  
# of 
Unprof 
service  
% 
Unprof 
service  
0.06 0.2 0.48 0.36 0.52 -0.55* 0.09 0.01 POST97 (0.14) (0.13) (0.81) (0.40) (0.52) (0.30) (0.13) (0.02) 
-0.30* 0.02 -1.28 0.5 -0.63 -0.2 -0.12 -0.02 POST97 
×FP (0.16) (0.18) (0.84) (0.53) (0.67) (0.32) (0.15) (0.03) 
-0.18 -0.15 -0.07 -0.46 0.26 1.18** 0.09 0.02 POST97 
×Public (0.21) (0.23) (0.86) (0.83) (0.72) (0.55) (0.19) (0.03) 
-0.07 -0.33 -0.79 -1.03* -1.32 1.07** -0.22 -0.04 POST97 
×HighFPI (0.24) (0.22) (1.03) (0.61) (0.90) (0.44) (0.18) (0.03) 
0.51* 0.04 2.10* -0.83 1.61 0.01 0.23 0.04 POST97×FP 
× HighFPI (0.29) (0.26) (1.16) (0.97) (1.16) (0.45) (0.22) (0.04) 
0.33 -0.08 5.36*** 0.72 -0.51 -1.74** 0.46 0.08 POST97×Public 
× HighFPI (0.48) (0.48) (1.50) (1.98) (1.54) (0.73) (0.43) (0.08) 
Other Hosp. 
Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Other County 
Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
County F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 729 729 729 729 729 729 729 729 
R-square 0.46 0.38 0.51 0.51 0.43 0.24 0.59 0.59 
Prob>F 1 0 0 0 0 0.86 0 0 
 
 
Results of Model 2 (Hospital Level) 
 
In Model 2, I compare hospitals’ provision of indigent care across three types 
of markets: markets with a single hospital, markets with multiple hospitals where the 
indigent care burden is equally spread out (low HHI, the reference group), and markets 
with multiple hospitals where the indigent care burden is highly concentrated at a few 
hospitals (high HHI). I expect hospitals operating in markets with high HHI or acting 
as sole providers to make smaller changes in indigent care, since alternative providers 
may be unavailable or unwilling to compensate for the decrease in indigent care.  
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(a) Results for the Medicaid Expansions (Model 2) 
Table 2.14 through Table 2.16 present results for the Medicaid expansion. 
Table 2.14 reports the estimates for hospital UC regarding the Medicaid expansion 
policy. Panel (a), (b), and (c) indicate the three market types: markets with low HHI 
(reference group), with high HHI, and with a single hospital. Each panel consists of 
three blocks each of which represents a different ownership type: NFP (reference 
group), FP, and public hospitals. I make comparisons between panels, i.e., across 
markets in a given ownership type, as well as within panels, i.e., across ownership 
types in a given market type. In terms of UC and charity care costs, I find that UC 
costs declined by 1 percentage point after the expansion at hospitals of all ownership 
types and across all markets: among NFP hospitals, the decrease in UC costs was the 
largest in counties where multiple hospitals were operating; if hospitals were operating 
as sole providers, they decreased UC costs, but not in a statistically significant 
manner. However, FP hospitals actually increased charity care by 1.27 logs. No 
change or increase in charity care with the decrease in UC costs indicates that bad 
debts incurred by uninsured low-income patients decreased after the expansion. In 
other words, low-income maternity patients may have incurred bad debts before they 
were uninsured, instead of qualifying for charity care. 
Table 2.15 presents results for admission patterns. The first three columns 
report the estimates regarding total uninsured admissions, and in the next four 
columns, uninsured patients are broken down into the target and non-target groups. I 
find that total uninsured admissions did not change much after the coverage 
expansions, while the composition of the uninsured admissions between the target and 
non-target group changed. The first three columns show that none of the changes in 
log amounts of uninsured admissions and uninsured inpatient days was statistically 
significant. However, the uninsured admission rates decreased at public hospitals 
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[Table 2.14] Results of Model 2 for Medicaid Expansion: Uncompensated Care 
 
Panel Explanatory Variables ln 
(UC cost) 
% 
(UC cost)  
ln 
(charity 
care) 
% 
(charity 
care)  
-0.35 -0.01* 0.02 0.01 POST92 (0.31) (0.01) (0.46) (0.01) 
0.01 0 1.27** 0 POST92×FP (0.23) (0.00) (0.53) (0.00) 
0.09 -0.01 0.02 0.04 
(a) 
POST92×Public (0.27) (0.01) (0.32) (0.02) 
-0.01 0 -0.05 0.01 POST92×HighHHI (0.24) (0.00) (0.30) (0.01) 
0.66 0 1.16 0.01 POST92×FP×HighHHI (0.69) (0.01) (1.01) (0.01) 
0.29 0.01 0.92 -0.04 
(b) 
POST92×Public×HighHHI (0.52) (0.01) (0.79) (0.03) 
0.42 0 0.03 0 POST92×solehosp (0.27) (0.01) (0.27) (0.01) 
-0.29 0 0.52 0.01 POST92×FP×solehosp (0.37) (0.01) (1.53) (0.01) 
-0.65 0.02 0.24 -0.03 
(c) 
POST92×Public×solehosp (0.64) (0.02) (0.69) (0.03) 
 Other Hosp. Variables YES YES YES YES 
 Other County Variables YES YES YES YES 
 Observations 980 980 980 980 
 R-square 0.46 0.53 0.44 0.5 
 Prob>F 0 0 0 0 
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[Table 2.15] Results of Model 2 for Medicaid Expansion: Admission Patterns 
 
Panel I 
 N=980 %unins adm 
ln(unins 
adm)  
ln(unins 
Inpday)  
ln (unins: 
target) 
ln(unins: 
non-
target) 
ln(unins: 
non-ER 
& non-
target 
∆ Ratio 
(nonER/ 
ER) 
0 -0.11 -0.28 0.12 -0.03 -0.06 0.04 POST92 (0.01) (0.18) (0.23) (0.34) (0.14) (0.15) (0.07) 
0.01* -0.17 -0.02 0.55* -0.41** -0.51*** -0.11 POST92×FP (0.00) (0.15) (0.14) (0.30) (0.18) (0.16) (0.12) 
-0.02* -0.07 -0.1 -0.31 0.12 0.1 0.19 POST92×Public (0.01) (0.13) (0.16) (0.41) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) 
0.01 0.09 0.1 -0.85* 0.14 0.1 0.18** POST92 
×HighHHI (0.01) (0.26) (0.29) (0.49) (0.23) (0.23) (0.09) 
-0.02 -0.09 -0.2 0.25 0.05 0.12 -0.14 POST92×FP 
×highHHI (0.01) (0.33) (0.36) (0.63) (0.30) (0.29) (0.15) 
0.03* 0.35 0.41 1.55* 0.16 0.46 -0.63*** POST92×Public 
×highHHI (0.02) (0.32) (0.36) (0.90) (0.38) (0.53) (0.20) 
0.01 -0.05 0.01 -0.74** -0.15 -0.14 0.16 POST92 
×solehosp (0.02) (0.37) (0.44) (0.29) (0.17) (0.18) (0.10) 
-0.01 0.07 0.01 -0.4 0.41* 0.48** -0.01 POST92×FP 
×solehosp (0.02) (0.39) (0.45) (0.43) (0.23) (0.24) (0.17) 
0.02 0.24 0.08 0.22 0.42* 0.38 -0.36* POST92×Public 
×solehosp (0.03) (0.37) (0.45) (0.69) (0.22) (0.28) (0.20) 
Other Hosp. and 
County Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-square 0.41 0.48 0.51 0.44 0.46 0.54 0.12 
Prob>F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Panel II 
  
% Mcaid 
adm  
ln(Mcaid 
Adm) 
ln(Mcaid 
Inpday) 
ln(Mcaid: 
Target) 
ln(Mcaid: 
non-
target)   
0 0.15 -0.09 0.86** 0.25   POST92 (0.02) (0.23) (0.24) (0.42) (0.16)   
0.01 0.07 0.1 0.63* -0.05   POST92×FP (0.01) (0.18) (0.23) (0.33) (0.14)   
0 -0.34* -0.27 -0.76* -0.21   POST92×Public (0.02) (0.18) (0.19) (0.42) (0.14)   
-0.01 -0.49** -0.3 -1.48*** -0.36**   POST92 
×HighHHI (0.02) (0.24) (0.24) (0.55) (0.17)   
0.02 0.57 0.43 0.8 0.41*   POST92×FP 
×HighHHI (0.02) (0.36) (0.38) (0.77) (0.23)   
0.03 0.93** 0.86* 2.17** 0.68***   POST92×Public 
×HighHHI (0.03) (0.43) (0.46) (0.85) (0.25)   
-0.05** -0.73*** -0.60** -1.20*** -0.68***   POST92 
×solehosp (0.02) (0.27) (0.29) (0.41) (0.23)   
0.05* 0.51 0.46 -0.29 0.57*   POST92×FP 
×solehosp (0.03) (0.37) (0.37) (0.61) (0.30)   
0.04 0.90* 0.68 0.81 1.17*   POST92×Public 
×solehosp (0.03) (0.46) (0.49) (0.93) (0.67)   
Other Hosp. and 
County Variables YES YES YES YES YES   
R-square 0.32 0.5 0.5 0.45 0.53   
Prob>F 0 0 0 0 0   
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which were operating in markets with low HHI or acting as sole providers by 2 
percentage points, but increased by 1 percentage point if public hospitals were in 
markets with high HHI. On the other hand, the rate increased by 1 percentage point at 
FP hospitals across all three market types; this is mostly because they admitted more 
uninsured patients among maternity and infant patients, those who were potentially 
eligible for Medicaid. 
Despite their lack of statistical significance, the changes in uninsured 
admissions and inpatient days support my hypothesis: hospitals operating in markets 
with low HHI reduced their numbers of uninsured admissions, by 0.11-0.28 logs, with 
the highest decrease at FP hospitals, while hospitals operating in markets with high 
HHI or as sole providers decreased uninsured admissions by smaller amounts or even 
increased them. Also, public hospitals clearly behaved differently across markets: in 
markets with low HHI, they reduced uninsured admission rates by 2 percentage points, 
while those in markets with high HHI or acting as sole providers increased them by 1 
percentage point or did not change after the expansion.  
In the next two columns, I divide uninsured patients into the target group 
(pregnant women and infants under age 1) and the non-target group (all other 
uninsured patients). After the expansion, hospitals acting as sole providers admitted 
fewer uninsured patients in the target group (by 0.74 logs for all ownership types), but 
more of those in the non-target group (by 0.41 logs at FP hospitals, and 0.42 logs at 
public hospitals). This finding implies that Medicaid revenues generated by the 
increased coverage enabled hospitals to extend indigent care to those who were not 
targets of the expansion policy. In contrast, FP hospitals in markets with low HHI 
began to admit more uninsured patients in the target group at the expense of those in 
the non-target group. In markets with high HHI, both FP and NFP hospitals 
experienced a reduction in uninsured patients in the target group, while public 
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hospitals still provided more indigent care to maternity patients. The last two columns 
confirm that any change in uninsured admissions was made with those without 
emergency conditions.  
Panel II continues to present the results for Medicaid admissions. Overall, FP 
and NFP hospitals increased total Medicaid admissions if they were in markets with 
low HHI, but decreased them in markets with high HHI or if they were only providers 
within markets. Public hospitals, however, appeared to act as lenders of last resort, 
compensating for the decreased indigent care by private hospitals, except for those 
operating in markets with low HHI. Not surprisingly, Medicaid admissions for those 
in the target group increased overall, by 0.01-1.49 logs, with the increase larger at FP 
and NFP hospitals that were operating in markets with multiple hospitals. In markets 
with high HHI, public hospitals were still the major providers for maternity and infant 
patients with Medicaid. In markets with a single hospital, Medicaid admissions for the 
target group increased if the single hospital had FP or NFP ownership, but decreased if 
the hospital was a public entity. This may indicate that maternity patients in counties 
with only one public hospital chose hospitals out of their county after obtaining 
Medicaid coverage. The expansion seemed to redistribute other Medicaid patients—
non-maternity and non-infant patients with Medicaid—as well. For example, in 
markets with high HHI, FP and public hospitals provided more care for non-maternity 
Medicaid patients, while NFP hospitals saw fewer of them. My results suggest that 
Medicaid patients were reallocated across hospitals after the expansion: in markets 
with low HHI, Medicaid patients in the target group were more likely to use FP and 
NFP hospitals, but in markets with high HHI, they were more likely to use public or 
NFP hospitals. In markets that contained only one hospital, NFP and FP hospitals 
replaced non-maternity Medicaid patients with maternity Medicaid patients after the 
expansion policy. 
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In Table 2.16, I explore the impact of the Medicaid expansion on types of 
services provided. Since I was not able to isolate the quantity of services provided 
specifically to the uninsured, any changes that I would find here mean changes in total 
amounts of services provided at the hospital level. As a result, I find relatively small 
policy effects on the service provision. Since there is no reason that the coverage 
expansion would change service provision other than maternity and infant care, I focus 
on the three services related to pregnant women and infants—labor procedures, NICU 
days, and pediatric intensive care. Among these three, only labor procedures and 
NICU days changed in a statistically significant manner, and the policy changes 
differed by ownership status and across the three market types. My results suggest that 
the Medicaid expansion may have resulted in some patient reallocation across 
hospitals. In markets with low HHI, public hospitals lost their maternity patients to FP 
and NFP hospitals: public hospitals performed 0.24 logs fewer labor procedures, but 
FP and NFP hospitals performed 0.41 and 0.31 logs more. However, in markets with 
high HHI, FP and public hospitals increased their numbers of labor/delivery 
procedures, while NFP hospitals reduced them. For NICU care, public hospitals in all 
three types of markets increased NICU days (0.07-1.13 logs), but FP hospitals reduced 
them; NFP hospitals increased NICU days unless they were sole providers. 
Among the remaining services, I will discuss changes in emergency room and clinic 
services, which are entry points for a majority of indigent patients. As expected, the 
coverage expansion significantly lowered the use of ER and clinic services for most 
hospitals. Except for NFP hospitals in markets with low HHI and FP hospitals in 
markets with high HHI, the number of ER visits decreased across all hospitals 
regardless of ownership or market types. Similarly, the number of free clinic visits 
decreased to some extent: the exceptions are NFP hospitals in markets with low HHI, 
public hospitals in markets with high HHI, and all hospitals that were sole providers. 
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[Table 2.16] Results of Model 2 for Medicaid Expansion: Service Provision 
 
Panel I: Profitable Services 
 N=980 ln (coronary) ln(CC) ln(CT) 
ln 
(radio/diag) ln(ESW) ln(MRI) 
-1.17** 0.28 0.54** 0.26 0.64** 0.91 POST92 (0.57) (0.36) (0.25) (0.17) (0.30) (0.57) 
-0.36 -0.47 -0.59*** -0.23 -0.31 0.04 POST92×FP (0.39) (0.34) (0.20) (0.16) (0.22) (0.45) 
-0.87 -0.53 -0.33 -0.05 -0.07 0.33 POST92×Public (0.62) (0.46) (0.34) (0.13) (0.33) (0.69) 
-0.53 0.64 -0.44** -0.43** -0.17 0.71 POST92 
×HighHHI (0.70) (0.64) (0.21) (0.19) (0.53) (0.66) 
0.83 -0.17 0.69** 0.43 0.52 -0.33 POST92×FP 
×HighHHI (0.99) (0.83) (0.34) (0.30) (0.69) (0.91) 
3.45*** 0.17 2.41* 0.4 0.41 0.68 POST92×Public 
×HighHHI (1.25) (0.84) (1.34) (0.26) (1.47) (1.62) 
0.15 -0.46* -0.50* -0.27 0.09 -0.73* POST92 
×solehosp (0.39) (0.25) (0.27) (0.17) (0.42) (0.43) 
-0.76 2.11** 1.16*** 0.46* 0.75 1 POST92×FP 
×solehosp (0.92) (1.03) (0.36) (0.24) (0.74) (0.75) 
1.48* 0.96 0.89* 0.41* -0.24 0.55 POST92×Public 
×solehosp (0.78) (0.67) (0.54) (0.23) (0.66) (1.13) 
Other Hosp. & 
County Var. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
 N=980 ln(NICU) 
ln 
(open 
heart) 
ln 
(ortho 
pedics) 
ln 
(pediac 
intens) 
# of 
Profitable 
Service 
% 
Profitable 
Service 
0.38 -1.06 0.02 -0.07 0.22 0.02 POST92 (0.37) (0.71) (0.13) (0.34) (0.23) (0.02) 
-0.47** -0.26 -0.16 0.02 -0.30* -0.03* POST92×FP (0.19) (0.29) (0.11) (0.20) (0.16) (0.02) 
0.01 -0.79* 0.27** 0.55 -0.13 -0.01 POST92×Public (0.81) (0.43) (0.13) (0.66) (0.24) (0.02) 
-0.29 -0.7 0 0.01 0 0 POST92 
×HighHHI (0.30) (0.65) (0.14) (0.22) (0.26) (0.03) 
0.44 1.59 0.05 -0.04 0.22 0.02 POST92×FP 
×HighHHI (0.36) (0.98) (0.19) (0.26) (0.44) (0.04) 
1.03 3.96*** -0.26 -0.45 1.02 0.1 POST92×Public 
×HighHHI (1.36) (1.43) (0.23) (0.69) (0.78) (0.08) 
-1.05 0.19 0.02 -0.02 -0.25 -0.02 POST92 
×solehosp (0.68) (0.42) (0.10) (0.18) (0.17) (0.02) 
0.95 0.22 0.07 -0.12 0.96** 0.10** POST92×FP 
×solehosp (0.75) (0.75) (0.18) (0.26) (0.40) (0.04) 
0.73 0.9 -0.25 -0.52 0.38 0.04 POST92×Public 
×solehosp (1.07) (0.61) (0.21) (0.69) (0.49) (0.05) 
Other Hosp. & 
County 
Variables 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
 153 
[Table 2.16] continued 
 
Panel II: Unprofitable Services 
 N=980 ln(burn 
care) ln(ER) 
ln(free 
clinic)  
ln(obs 
tetric)  
ln(psy 
chiat) 
ln(sub 
abuse)  
# of 
unpro 
fitable 
% 
unpro 
fitable  
0.18 0.02 0.62 0.41 0.13 -0.68 0.11 0.02 POST92 (0.23) (0.20) (0.69) (0.54) (0.57) (0.44) (0.15) (0.02) 
-0.02 -0.38 -0.6 -0.1 -0.3 0.11 -0.14 -0.02 POST92 
×FP (0.05) (0.24) (0.53) (0.40) (0.30) (0.33) (0.11) (0.02) 
0.06 -0.07 -0.7 -0.65 -0.71 -0.47 -0.30** -0.05** POST92 
×Public (0.12) (0.19) (0.93) (0.53) (0.49) (0.60) (0.13) (0.02) 
0.02 -0.35** -1.26 -1.51* 1 0.19 -0.28 -0.05 POST92 
×HighHHI (0.06) (0.16) (0.97) (0.77) (0.75) (0.40) (0.18) (0.03) 
0.07 0.74 1.25 1.95** 0.12 0.52 0.60** 0.10** POST92×FP 
×HighHHI (0.07) (0.55) (1.12) (0.99) (0.92) (0.53) (0.24) (0.04) 
-0.04 0.34 3.07 2.47** 1.37 2.07* 1.14*** 0.19*** POST92×Public 
×HighHHI (0.15) (0.28) (2.18) (1.09) (1.36) (1.23) (0.43) (0.07) 
0.07 -0.16 1.55 -0.59* -1.04 -0.03 -0.1 -0.02 POST92 
×solehosp (0.07) (0.12) (1.15) (0.34) (0.78) (0.73) (0.31) (0.05) 
0 0.34 -1 0.52 1.14 0.46 0.14 0.02 POST92×FP 
×solehosp (0.11) (0.30) (1.64) (0.58) (1.00) (0.75) (0.39) (0.06) 
-0.22 0.19 -0.3 1.28 2.64* 1.22 0.6 0.1 POST92×Public 
×solehosp (0.20) (0.24) (1.67) (0.92) (1.53) (0.96) (0.42) (0.07) 
Other Hosp. & 
County Var. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Regarding the provision of unprofitable services, public hospitals in markets 
with low HHI or operating as sole providers offered fewer unprofitable services after 
the expansion (by 0.30 logs), but those in markets with high HHI provided more 
unprofitable services due to increases in maternity and substance abuse care. In the 
same markets, FP hospitals also increased provision of unprofitable services, entirely 
attributed to increased maternity care. 
 
(b) Results for the BBA (Model 2) 
Table 2.17 through Table 2.19 present results of Model 2 for the BBA. Table 
2.17 reports the estimates for UC and charity care. Consistent with the results of 
Model I, I do not find any statistically significant reductions in UC or charity care 
after the BBA. In fact, I find that charity care increased at FP hospitals in all markets  
 154 
[Table 2.17] Results of Model 2 for the BBA: Uncompensated Care 
 
N=729 ln 
(UC cost) 
% 
(UC cost)  
ln 
(charity 
care) 
% 
(charity 
care)  
POST97 0.07 0 -0.07 0 
  (0.07) (0.00) (0.12) (0.01) 
POST97×FP -0.05 0 1.13*** 0 
  (0.13) (0.00) (0.38) (0.00) 
POST97×Public -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
  (0.08) (0.00) (0.11) (0.01) 
POST97×highHHI 0.09 0.01 0.41*** 0.02* 
  (0.09) (0.01) (0.15) (0.01) 
POST97×FP×highHHI -0.04 0 -1.33*** -0.01 
  (0.17) (0.01) (0.43) (0.01) 
POST97×Public×highHHI 0.1 0.02 -0.41 -0.01 
  (0.15) (0.02) (0.49) (0.02) 
POST97×solehosp 0.23* 0.01 0.43 0.02 
  (0.12) (0.01) (0.26) (0.01) 
POST97×FP×solehosp -0.26 -0.02 -0.61 -0.03 
  (0.21) (0.01) (1.03) (0.02) 
POST97×Public×solehosp -0.13 -0.01 -0.46 -0.02 
  (0.16) (0.01) (0.41) (0.03) 
Other hosp & county 
variables YES YES YES YES 
R-square 0.58 0.54 0.47 0.46 
Prob>F 0 0 0 0 
 
(0.21-1.13 logs), and at hospitals of all ownership types in highly concentrated 
markets (0,21-0.41 logs). Also, hospitals operating as sole providers increased UC 
costs by 0.23 logs. It is surprising to see that the BBA had such minimal effects on UC 
and charity care or even increased them. 
In Table 2.18, I present the estimates for admission patterns. Again, I do not 
find large or significant reductions in uninsured admissions. Hospitals acting as sole 
providers actually increased uninsured inpatient days by 0.36 logs, and uninsured 
admissions by 0.18-0.64 logs, with the smallest increase at FP hospitals. After the 
BBA, public hospitals admitted more uninsured patients across all market types. The 
next three columns show that non-emergency patients among uninsured admissions 
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decreased at NFP hospitals in markets where there were at least two hospitals. 
However, public hospitals and those that are single providers within markets did not 
reduce admissions for non-emergency uninsured patients. 
In addition to uninsured admissions, hospitals may have also made adjustments 
to Medicaid admissions. The last three columns show that FP hospitals increased care 
for Medicaid patients: Medicaid admission rates, numbers of Medicaid admissions and 
Medicaid inpatient days increased, except at hospitals operating as sole providers. My 
findings imply that, contrary to my hypothesis, the hospital market conditions did not 
generate differential policy effects. Moreover, neither UC nor uninsured admissions 
seemed to decrease after the BBA. 
 
[Table 2.18] Results of Model 2 for the BBA: Admission Patterns 
 
 N=729 % unins adm 
ln(unins 
adm) 
ln(unins 
Inpday) 
ln(nonER  
unins 
adm) 
% 
(nonER  
unins 
adm) 
∆ Ratio: 
nonER/ 
ER 
0 0.01 -0.05 -0.05 0 0.23 POST97 (0.00) (0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.01) (0.18) 
0 0.08 0.06 0.27* 0.01 -0.18 POST97×FP (0.00) (0.11) (0.12) (0.14) (0.01) (0.16) 
0.01 0.15* 0.15 0.19 -0.01 -0.1 POST97×Public (0.01) (0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.01) (0.14) 
-0.01 -0.02 0 -0.06 -0.02 -0.24 POST97 
×HighHHI (0.01) (0.13) (0.13) (0.17) (0.02) (0.17) 
0.02** 0.15 0.1 0.12 0.03* 0.32* POST97×FP 
×HighHHI (0.01) (0.20) (0.19) (0.23) (0.02) (0.18) 
0 -0.29 0.14 -0.54 0.02 0.32 POST97×Public 
×HighHHI (0.01) (0.22) (0.39) (0.39) (0.02) (0.20) 
0.01 0.49*** 0.36** 0.49** -0.02 -0.11 POST97 
×solehosp (0.01) (0.15) (0.14) (0.21) (0.02) (0.15) 
0 -0.46** -0.22 -0.66** 0.01 0.12 POST97×FP 
×solehosp (0.01) (0.20) (0.19) (0.27) (0.02) (0.18) 
0 -0.14 0.26 -0.02 0.04* 0.14 POST97×Public 
×solehosp (0.02) (0.20) (0.35) (0.22) (0.02) (0.14) 
Other Hosp. & 
County Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-square 0.44 0.57 0.65 0.6 0.27 0.18 
Prob>F 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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[Table 2.18] continued 
 
 N=729 % Mcaid Adm 
ln (Mcaid 
Adm) 
ln(Mcaid 
Inpday) 
0 0.14 0.11 POST97 (0.01) (0.10) (0.10) 
0.02*** 0.22** 0.17** POST97×FP (0.01) (0.09) (0.08) 
-0.01 -0.08 -0.1 POST97×Public (0.01) (0.11) (0.11) 
0.02* 0.12 0.08 POST97 
×HighHHI (0.01) (0.12) (0.11) 
-0.02 -0.26 -0.29 POST97×FP 
×HighHHI (0.01) (0.20) (0.19) 
-0.03 -0.36 -0.04 POST97×Public 
×HighHHI (0.02) (0.22) (0.23) 
0.03* 0.56*** 0.66*** POST97 
×solehosp (0.02) (0.20) (0.19) 
-0.04** -0.83*** -0.83*** POST97×FP 
×solehosp (0.02) (0.19) (0.19) 
0.03 0.14 0.9 POST97×Public 
×solehosp (0.02) (0.33) (0.73) 
Other Hosp. & 
County Variables YES YES YES 
R-square 0.35 0.55 0.59 
Prob>F 0 0 0 
 
Next, Table 2.19 presents the BBA effects for the service provision. With the 
BBA aggravating hospitals’ financial distress, I expect hospitals in markets with low 
HHI to make the largest adjustments to the service provision. NFP hospitals did 
reduce many of their unprofitable services after the BBA, with the decrease largest in 
markets with low HHI. Notably, NFP hospitals cut down free clinic visits by 1.67 logs 
if they were operating in markets with low HHI or acting as sole providers, but 
increased them in markets with high HHI. Interestingly, public hospitals increased 
provision of unprofitable services when NFP hospitals decreased it, but decreased it 
when NFP hospitals increased unprofitable services. For example, ER visits increased 
at NFP hospitals in markets with high HHI, but decreased at public hospitals in the 
same types of markets. This finding implies that NFP and public hospitals took the  
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[Table 2.19] Results of Model 2 for the BBA: Service Provision 
 
Panel I: Profitable Services 
 N=729 ln coronary ln CC ln CT 
ln 
rad/diag 
ln 
ESW ln MRI 
-0.16 0.47* 0.50** 0.05 0.06 0.78* POST97 (0.36) (0.27) (0.25) (0.05) (0.25) (0.40) 
-0.36 0.2 -0.15 -0.12** 0.34 0.03 POST97×FP (0.40) (0.31) (0.22) (0.05) (0.31) (0.33) 
0.51 -0.71*** 0.04 0.03 0.14 0.19 POST97×Public (0.33) (0.25) (0.17) (0.06) (0.28) (0.49) 
0.26 0.02 -0.01 0.06 -0.2 0.12 POST97 
×HighHHI (0.38) (0.39) (0.23) (0.07) (0.43) (0.67) 
-0.04 0.17 -0.22 -0.11 -0.34 -0.59 POST97×FP 
×HighHHI (0.78) (0.65) (0.29) (0.09) (0.56) (0.76) 
-0.32 0.02 0.11 -0.41* -0.34 -0.5 POST97×Public 
×HighHHI (0.55) (0.49) (0.40) (0.23) (0.52) (0.87) 
0.45 -0.24 -0.5 -0.2 0.01 -0.34 POST97 
×solehosp (0.39) (0.32) (0.37) (0.28) (0.33) (0.47) 
-0.81 0.25 0.9 0.16 -0.18 -0.11 POST97×FP 
×solehosp (1.82) (0.58) (0.99) (0.30) (0.46) (0.68) 
-0.92 0.63 0.51 0.25 -0.08 -0.53 POST97×Public 
×solehosp (0.63) (0.41) (0.66) (0.33) (0.40) (1.31) 
Other Hosp. & 
County Var. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
 N=729 ln NICU 
ln 
open 
heart 
ln 
ortho 
pedic 
ln 
pediac 
intens 
# of 
profit. 
service 
% 
profit. 
service 
0.13 0.33 0.04 -0.22 0.11 0.01 POST97 (0.31) (0.44) (0.09) (0.21) (0.16) (0.02) 
-0.09 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.27 0.03 POST97×FP (0.21) (0.40) (0.12) (0.17) (0.17) (0.02) 
-0.05 0.3 -0.01 0.6 0.23 0.02 POST97×Public (0.28) (1.07) (0.14) (0.68) (0.22) (0.02) 
0.01 -0.26 -0.08 0.01 -0.01 0 POST97 
×HighHHI (0.45) (0.41) (0.16) (0.37) (0.24) (0.02) 
0.3 -0.56 -0.07 -0.2 -0.21 -0.02 POST97×FP 
×HighHHI (0.58) (0.84) (0.21) (0.42) (0.36) (0.04) 
-0.26 -0.55 -0.2 -0.58 -0.34 -0.03 POST97×Public 
×HighHHI (0.66) (1.17) (0.20) (0.79) (0.35) (0.03) 
0.21 -0.27 -0.08 -0.31 0.12 0.01 POST97 
×solehosp (0.35) (0.92) (0.11) (0.20) (0.21) (0.02) 
0.16 1.61 0.13 -0.05 0.07 0.01 POST97×FP 
×solehosp (0.78) (1.38) (0.30) (0.32) (0.40) (0.04) 
-0.51 -1.41 -0.19 -1.16 -0.56* -0.06* POST97×Public 
×solehosp (0.58) (1.36) (0.18) (0.86) (0.32) (0.03) 
Other Hosp. & 
County 
Variables 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
 158 
[Table 2.19] continued 
 
Panel II: Unprofitable Services 
 N=729 ln(burn 
care) ln(ER) 
ln(free 
clinic)  
ln(obs 
tetric)  
ln(psy 
chiatr) 
ln(sub 
abuse)  
# of 
unprof 
serv  
% 
unprof 
serv  
-0.03 0.04 -1.67*** 0.31 -0.15 -0.06 -0.14 -0.02 POST97 (0.11) (0.07) (0.58) (0.33) (0.40) (0.16) (0.10) (0.02) 
0.09 0.11 0.46 0.1 0.52* -0.01 0.14 0.02 POST97×FP (0.08) (0.14) (0.65) (0.30) (0.27) (0.27) (0.10) (0.02) 
-0.02 0 2.49*** -0.05 0.2 0.58 0.35*** 0.06*** POST97×Public (0.15) (0.07) (0.69) (0.28) (0.31) (0.42) (0.11) (0.02) 
0.37 0.13* 3.15*** -0.14 0.51 0.62* 0.49** 0.08** POST97 
×HighHHI (0.29) (0.08) (1.15) (0.42) (0.57) (0.33) (0.19) (0.03) 
-0.43 -0.36** -2 -0.33 -0.83 -0.75 -0.49** -0.08** POST97×FP 
×HighHHI (0.33) (0.17) (1.22) (0.54) (0.65) (0.50) (0.22) (0.04) 
-0.15 -0.26** -2.83 -0.32 -0.25 -0.73 -0.47* -0.08* POST97×Public 
×HighHHI (0.25) (0.12) (1.90) (0.50) (0.75) (0.52) (0.25) (0.04) 
0.05 -0.04 0.97 0.49 0.34 0.15 0.23 0.04 POST97 
×solehosp (0.11) (0.09) (1.52) (0.47) (0.44) (0.17) (0.20) (0.03) 
-0.14 -0.07 -2.43 -0.64 -1.97* 0.04 -0.56* -0.09* POST97×FP 
×solehosp (0.18) (0.15) (2.21) (0.70) (1.03) (0.31) (0.30) (0.05) 
-0.05 0.15 -0.72 0.75 -0.07 -0.88* 0.07 0.01 POST97×Public 
×solehosp (0.26) (0.20) (2.52) (0.67) (0.67) (0.51) (0.26) (0.04) 
Other Hosp. & 
County Var. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
role of substitute providers in the provision of unprofitable services. The number of 
unprofitable services, which take a value between zero to six, increased at public 
hospitals across all three market types, but decreased at FP hospitals acting as sole 
providers. In the case of NFP hospitals, the number of unprofitable services increased 
in markets with high HHI.  
The BBA seemed to increase provision of profitable services at all hospitals, 
regardless of ownership type or market structure. However, most of the changes were 
not statistically significantly different from zero. Among the profitable services, 
cardiac catheterization, CT, and MRI procedures increased statistically significantly at 
hospitals of all ownership types across all three markets. Interestingly, numbers and 
proportions of profitable services increased at NFP and FP hospitals regardless of 
market type, albeit these changes were not statistically significant. However, public 
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hospitals which were operating as single providers actually reduced provision of 
profitable services. My results suggest that FP and NFP hospitals, regardless of market 
structure, reduced indigent care if their financial situations worsened, while the 
financial shock did not force public hospitals to make large reductions in indigent 
care. 
 
VII. Robustness Check 
 
In this section, I conduct several tests to check the robustness of my main results. My 
first robustness check uses hospital fixed-effect models. The hospital fixed-effect 
models control for all unobserved, time-invariant heterogeneity across hospitals: for 
example, inconsistency in UC measurement, hospitals’ treatment styles (preference for 
outpatient care for the uninsured), or a degree of commitment to indigent care, will be 
controlled for in this fixed-effect model. The results of the hospital fixed-effect models 
are consistent with those in the main analysis. This implies that my main results are 
not confounded by those unobserved, time-invariant, hospital-specific factors. Here, I 
will discuss differences in the results between the hospital fixed-effect models and the 
main analysis.  
For Model I, the hospital fixed-effect models produced identical results for the 
Medicaid expansion, but a few of the BBA effects become weak: the decreases in the 
number of selfpay admissions at hospitals of all ownership type and the increases in 
the number of profitable services at FP hospitals are no longer statistically significant 
at the 10% level in the hospital fixed-effect estimation. 
 For Model 2, the hospital fixed-effect models produced the following 
differences. For the Medicaid expansion, I find more evidence that the policy change 
decreased hospitals’ indigent care burdens by reducing charity care and selfpay 
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inpatient days. Hospitals of private ownership were more actively involved with 
reducing indigent care: hospitals of FP and NFP ownership across all markets, as well 
as public hospitals in markets with high HHI, decreased charity care by 1 percentage 
point, while public hospitals in other two types of markets (markets with low HHI or 
markets with a single hospital) increased them by 3 percentage points. Particularly, FP 
hospitals reduced the number of non-emergency, selfpay admissions across all three 
types of market. Several estimates regarding the service provision become statistically 
insignificant at the 10% level or changed the signs. Among the three services related 
to maternity and infant care, only labor procedures are correctly estimated. The policy 
impacts remain statistically significant at public hospitals, and the sizes of the impacts 
differ across markets: public hospitals in markets with low HHI decreased labor 
procedures after the expansion, while public hospitals in markets with high HHI or 
those operating as sole providers increased the procedures. My findings imply that 
maternity patients might have been more easily reallocated across hospitals if they 
resided in markets where every hospital fairly shared the indigent care burden. In the 
hospital fixed-effect models, I find no statistical evidence for the decreased amounts of 
unprofitable services, while the increased provision of profitable services remained 
statistically significant (at the 5% level) at FP hospitals operating as sole providers.  
 For the BBA, the hospital fixed-effect analysis produces qualitatively similar 
results to those in the main analysis, but some of the differences are as follows: first, 
the decreases in selfpay admissions become statistically insignificant; second, selfpay 
admissions with non-emergency conditions increased at hospitals of all ownership 
types if they were sole providers within markets, while NFP hospitals decreased them 
if there were another hospitals within markets; third, FP hospitals, if not sole 
providers, reduced Medicaid admissions, while FP hospitals operating in markets 
which consisted of at least two hospitals increased Medicaid admissions with no 
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change in non-emergency, selfpay admissions. Most results regarding service 
provision are the same, except for the following three: first, there was no change in the 
number or proportion of profitable services at the 10% significance level in the 
hospital fixed-effect models; second, the number and the proportion of unprofitable 
services increased at public hospitals after the BBA across all three types of market; 
third, FP and NFP hospitals also increased their provision of unprofitable services if 
they were in markets with high HHI.  
The second robustness check uses different policy measures for the Medicaid 
expansion. Instead of using the POST92 dummy variable, I use the fraction of the 
Medicaid eligible population (ELIG), which changes over time due to the generosity 
of the Medicaid program. My results remain qualitatively similar to those in the main 
analysis. Since the policy impact could be larger in counties where the eligible 
population actually took up coverage, I use another specification in which I replace 
POST92 with Medicaid caseload, and include interaction terms between the caseload 
and hospital ownership types. The results from this estimation were also qualitatively 
the same as the main results. Finally, I re-estimate the baseline models with year fixed 
effects, instead of POST92 or POST97. The results with the year fixed-effects are 
identical to those in the main analysis. 
 
VIII. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Hospital indigent care represents the safety-net of last resort for the majority of 
indigent and uninsured patients (Weissman, 2005). This paper examines how hospitals 
adjusted their provision of indigent care in response to a demand shift (Medicaid 
expansion) and a supply shock (the BBA). It is difficult to measure indigent care 
because it refers to care offered to uninsured patients who are poor. In this paper, I 
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measure indigent care based on amounts of uncompensated care, admissions for the 
uninsured, and quantities of unprofitable services provided. Although none of them 
perfectly measures the care provided specifically to the uninsured who are poor, these 
are good proxies available for hospital indigent care. Uncompensated care is the sum 
of charity care (for low-income uninsured patients) and bad debts (for patients of all 
payer sources). Uninsured admissions are defined based on payer source (self-pay) 
and include all admissions for the uninsured who could be low- or high- income.  
Considering that a majority of the uninsured are poor, particularly those with 
hospitalizations according to the analysis of the MEPS in 2003, using admissions for 
total uninsured patients as a proxy for admissions for uninsured patients who are poor 
is reasonable. Unprofitable services are defined based on Horwitz (2005) and 
measured by total amounts of care provided to patients, regardless of payer source.  
I hypothesize that the policy impacts on indigent care will differ by hospitals’ 
ownership type and by markets’ level of concentration of indigent care burden among 
hospitals. By estimating OLS regressions with the Florida hospital sample for 1990-
2000, I find that the policy effects were heterogeneous according to ownership types: 
public and NFP hospitals were more responsive to the demand shift, but FP hospitals 
were more responsive to the supply shock. Regarding the market level of 
concentration of indigent care burden at hospitals, I do not find statistical evidence 
that hospitals operating in markets with low concentrations of indigent care burden 
made larger adjustments to indigent care than those operating in markets with high 
concentrations of indigent burden or acting as sole providers.   
After the Medicaid expansion (the demand shift), hospitals reduced their 
amount of charity care, but total uninsured admissions did not necessarily fall. 
Provision of charity care decreased at hospitals of all ownership types across all three 
types of markets, with this decrease larger at NFP and public hospitals. Although 
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hospitals’ financial burdens for maternity and infant patients lowered after the 
expansion, revenues generated from these patients appeared to extend care for non-
maternity and non-infant patients who were uninsured and had non-emergency 
conditions, particularly at NFP and public hospitals in all three types of markets and at 
FP hospitals which were sole providers. The increased coverage also influenced the 
service provision related to maternity and pediatric care, which varied by ownership 
status and market structure, but these changes did not support my hypothesis.  
For the BBA, the adjustments to indigent care were made mostly by 
manipulating uninsured admissions and service provision, rather than uncompensated 
care. In fact, it is surprising to see that FP hospitals across all markets increased their 
charity care provision after the BBA, as did all hospitals in markets with high 
concentrations of indigent care burden. However, NFP hospitals, if operating in 
markets in which alternative providers existed, reduced non-emergency uninsured 
admissions after the BBA. Public hospitals and those acting as sole providers within 
markets seemed to have more constraints on reducing indigent care (uninsured 
admissions). NFP hospitals in all markets also cut back unprofitable services 
(primarily clinic services), more so if they were operating in markets in which the 
indigent care burden is spread out. In contrast, public hospitals in all three types of 
markets seemed to compensate the decreased indigent care by other hospitals by 
providing more unprofitable services. Interestingly, FP hospitals decreased provision 
of unprofitable services only when they were sole providers, but increased provision 
of profitable services in all three market types. 
The contribution of this paper is as follows: unlike previous studies (Davidoff 
et al, 2000; Lo Sasso and Seamster, 2007) that have examined only hospitals’ 
uncompensated care, I examine several aspects of hospital indigent care such as 
admission patterns and service provision, in addition to uncompensated care. 
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Moreover, I control for effects of other hospitals’ supply of indigent care and 
separately examine the BBA effects. 
Finally, I will discuss several issues that merit further consideration, some of 
which will be left for a future research agenda. First, there may be concerns about 
crowding-out effects of private insurance coverage due to the presence of charity care. 
If the availability of hospital charity care gives incentives to marginally low-income 
individuals to drop out of private health insurance and seek hospital charity care, 
demand for charity care could increase in markets where hospitals generously provide 
charity care. According to Rask and Rask (2000), Herring (2005), and Lo Sasso and 
Mayer (2006), however, hospital uncompensated care does not crowd out private 
insurance, although health center uncompensated care may do so. Second, I was not 
able to control for hospital payments that might have significant effects on the supply 
of indigent care. However, Florida hospitals are generally believed to have had no 
changes in Medicaid payments (Lipson et al, 1997); their Medicaid reimbursements 
relative to costs stayed relatively constant at 82-83 percent in the 1990s.  
Third, I did not consider hospital system membership status in the construction 
of the concentration measure, due to unavailability of data. The potential bias from 
ignoring this system status is to decrease the value of the HHI. According to 
Alexander et al (2009), who studied all hospitals in Florida, California, and Texas for 
1989-2003, system-affiliated hospitals provide less community benefits. Although 
proportion of Florida hospitals affiliated with health care systems increased from 52% 
in 1989 to 62% in 2003, this increase occurred in the mid 1990s, and they noted that 
the system membership status has been relatively continuously maintained among 
hospitals which were already affiliated with systems (p.77). Therefore, I do not expect 
that the policy impacts that I find are caused by a change in system status among 
Florida hospitals.  
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Fourth, this paper does not examine long-term consequences of the policy 
changes such as conversions, closures, or mergers, which could possibly affect 
provision of indigent care. While Needleman et al (1999) and Thorpe et al (2000) 
found that hospitals converting from public to FP significantly decreased provision of 
uncompensated care, Sloan (2002) found no such evidence in uninsured or Medicaid 
admissions. Since I restricted my hospital sample to those which did not convert 
during the study period, I can rule out any conversion effects. However, we need more 
research in the areas of hospital mergers and closures related to indigent care. Finally, 
my analysis is based on Florida, a single state. As is usually the case, I cannot 
generalize my findings to the national level. Since both the BBA and the Medicaid 
expansions were nationwide health policies that should have influenced all American 
hospitals and low-income patients, the extension of this study to the national setting 
will provide better understanding of hospitals’ behavior regarding provision of 
indigent care. Using the AHA Annual Survey data linked to the State Inpatient 
Database (SID), future research can extend this analysis to the national setting. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
The Impacts of SCHIP on Hospital Care for Low-income Children 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Since the mid 1980s, the U.S. government has made tremendous efforts to provide 
public insurance coverage for more low-income children. As a result of the 
implementation of Medicaid and SCHIP (henceforth “Medicaid”) from 1965 to the 
late 1990s, the fraction of the nation’s children that are eligible for free or drastically 
reduced-cost health care has gone from less than 15 percent to about 50 percent; 
Medicaid is the single largest source of public health insurance for low-income 
children. Expansions in Medicaid have taken place in two waves since 1965. The first 
took place in the late 80s and early 90s. The second was in the late 1990s, through the 
CHIP legislation. Figure 3.1 shows the magnitude of these expansions.  
 
 
[Figure 3.1] Trend in Children’s Eligibility 
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The goal of this paper is to examine impacts of the CHIP expansion on hospital 
care for low-income children. Previously, two papers have examined the effects of the 
earlier Medicaid expansions on children’s hospitalizations, but there has been no 
evaluation of the effect of the most recent expansions on children’s hospitalization, 
other than a few studies focusing on California (Azer, 2007; Bermudez and Baker, 
2005). Exploiting variations in public insurance eligibility rules for children by age, 
state, and year, we investigate net impacts of the coverage expansions on 
hospitalization rates, and intensity of care provided during hospital visits for a data set 
representing over 30 states. If the expansion of public insurance coverage increases 
access to primary and preventive care for low-income children (Newacheck et al, 
1998; Dubay and Kenny, 2001; Stevens et al, 2006; Perry and Kenny, 2007), then 
these early medical interventions may reduce hospitalizations for ambulatory care 
sensitive (ACS) conditions, as well as intensity of care conditional on admission to a 
hospital (efficiency effect). On the other hand, the gain of public insurance lowers the 
marginal cost of hospitalization for families, which may increase hospital visits as well 
as intensity of care demanded (price effect) for all types of hospitalizations, depending 
on the elasticity of demand. A third possibility is that coverage expansions could shift 
some hospitalizations that were previously uninsured or privately insured to public 
insurance, and this could decrease or increase the intensity of services, depending on 
financial incentives that result for the hospital. 
We study children’s hospitalizations from 1996 to 2002 in the Nationwide 
Inpatient Sample (NIS). We restrict our sample to children aged 0-15 and divide them 
into four age categories—children under 1 year (excluding newborns), 1-5 years, 6-10 
years, and 11-15 years—at the state and year levels69. For each age group/state/year 
cell, we create a simulated eligibility measure of Medicaid/CHIP that is the fraction of 
                                                 
69
 We also repeat this by single age of child, state, and year. 
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a nationally representative sample of children (from the CPS) in each age group who 
would be eligible for public health insurance in a given state and year. Using age of 
patient, year, and state identifiers of hospitals, we merge this state-year-age group 
level policy data with the NIS to study CHIP expansions. 
Our main econometric model is based on a reduced form approach with the 
simulated measure as a policy variable. We also use the instrumental variables method 
of Dafny and Gruber (2005), which instrumented the eligibility measure for the CPS 
group with the simulated measure. First, we study the impact of policy expansions on 
hospitalization rates for children, which we then break down into ACS and non-ACS 
hospitalizations. We expect that the expansion of public insurance coverage will have 
an ambiguous effect on hospitalizations for ACS conditions (since there are two 
opposing forces at work), but increase hospital care for non-ACS conditions (which 
should only experience the price effect). In addition to these hospitalization rates, we 
study intensity of care during hospital visits, using number of days spent in the 
hospital and number of procedures performed per admission. Depending on a child’s 
counterfactual insurance status had the expansion not happened, we expect different 
impacts from the expansion. If the child would have been uninsured but is publicly 
covered due to the expansions, i.e., the target group of the CHIP, we expect intensity 
of care to decrease for ACS hospitalizations, but increase for non-ACS 
hospitalizations. This is because of the efficiency and price effects explained above. 
However, if the child’s counterfactual insurance status would have been privately 
insured, but is now public coverage (crowding-out effect), we expect intensity of care 
to decrease. This is because private insurance would have provided higher 
reimbursements and thus greater access. We also estimate effects of policy separately 
by insurance status, using the fraction of all hospitalizations for children that are 
public, private, or uninsured. We find that prior work did not look at insurance status 
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(Kaestner et al, 2001; Dafny and Gruber, 2005), presumably due to the uncertainty 
regarding the time that the payer source was recorded, upon admission or at discharge; 
we too proceed cautiously with this analysis as insurance coding might be not entirely 
reliable. 
We find that children’s hospitalization rates increased by 3.9 percent in 
response to a 10 percentage-point increase in eligibility for public health insurance. 
The entire increase comes from hospitalizations categorized as non-ACS. We also find 
that intensity of care increases both overall and among hospitalizations in the non-
ACS category: if the fraction of the eligible population increases by 10 percentage 
points, length of stay increases by 0.12 days, while number of procedures increases by 
0.06. For ACS hospitalizations, neither length of stay nor number of procedures is 
affected in a statistically significant manner (the coefficients are small and negative). 
Our results also suggest that the increases in hospitalizations are due to an increase in 
publicly insured cases. The fraction of Medicaid hospitalizations increases by 0.10 as 
the fraction of children in a state/year/age group made eligible increases from 0 to 1, 
while the fraction of uninsured hospitalizations declines by 0.06. The fraction with 
private coverage does not display a statistically significant impact; the coefficient sign 
and magnitude are -0.04. 
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows: in Section II, we explain 
background information about public health insurance programs for children and 
pediatric hospitalizations. Section III reviews previous literature, and Section IV 
describes our data and empirical strategy. We discuss empirical results in Section V, 
and conclude the paper in Section VI.  
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II. Background  
 
(a) Public Health Insurance Programs for Children 
The Medicaid program was implemented in 1965 with the aim of providing health 
insurance coverage for low-income individuals. Low-income children are its major 
beneficiary group, representing about a half of Medicaid beneficiaries (as of 2006). 
From the early days to the mid 1980s, Medicaid coverage was available for children of 
welfare mothers, which means that the income threshold for Medicaid eligibility was 
extremely low (below 100% of the FPL). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, 
eligibility income thresholds increased to 133-185 percent of the FPL, depending on a 
child’s age and state of residence. These Medicaid expansions resulted in coverage for 
a greater number of low-income children. 
Despite this increased generosity of Medicaid, concerns remain about a 
significant number of children who are still uninsured, i.e., those who are too poor to 
afford private insurance, but too rich to qualify for Medicaid. In 1997, the U.S. 
Congress created the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) in an 
attempt to extend the public insurance safety net for those remaining uninsured, near-
poor children. States were required to further increase their eligibility income 
thresholds, with their own choice of administrative model among the following three 
types: expansion of the Medicaid program, a separate SCHIP program, or a 
combination of these two70. By 2002, most states had increased their income 
thresholds up to the minimum of 200 percent of the FPL. As a result, Figure 3.2 shows 
that SCHIP enrollment has more than quadrupled during 1998-2008: it had increased 
rapidly for the first five years, from 900,000 in 1998 to 4 millions in 2003, but has  
                                                 
70
 As of June 2007, 14 states expanded the Medicaid program, 19 states created a separate SCHIP 
program, and 18 states run a combination program (the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the 
Uninsured, available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/7642.cfm). 
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Data Source: SCHIP Statistical Enrollment Data System (SEDS) 01/20/2009. Downloaded at 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalCHIPPolicy/downloads/CHIPEverEnrolledYearGraph.pdf 
 
[Figure 3.2] SCHIP Enrollment 
 
stabilized since 2003; the annual percentage change in the SCHIP enrollment was 
101.2% in 1999, 48.6% in 2000, 28.1% in 2001, 9.7% in 2002, and 4.1% in 2003. 
The children’s public insurance programs reimburse both physicians and 
hospitals, although their reimbursement rates are lower than those of private payers. If 
Medicaid/SCHIP reimbursed hospital care alone, hospital care would increase 
regardless of type of diseases. However, since Medicaid/SCHIP cover physician care 
as well, better access to primary physician care for low-income children will prevent 
some hospitalizations for ambulatory care sensitive conditions. Moreover, having 
adequate amounts of physician care before hospitalization is likely to prevent diseases’ 
development into advanced stage, so that intensity of care during hospital visits may 
decline. Another factor that could affect hospital care is a hospital payment system. 
The public insurance programs reimburse hospitals at a lower level than private payers 
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(AAP report71, 2001; Zuckerman et al, 2009), while a majority of uninsured, low-
income children create hospital uncompensated care (Hadley and Holahan72, 2004). 
Therefore, children who were previously uninsured but obtain public insurance 
coverage are likely to have more hospital care, while those who were previously 
privately insured but switch to public insurance coverage are likely to have less 
hospital care: even though Medicaid DSH payments, extra payments to hospitals that 
treat a disproportionately large number of low-income patients, as well as dominance 
of managed care in private insurance market, are taken into account, private payer 
reimbursements are significantly higher than Medicaid payments (See if there is any 
reference: this info is based on a conversation with a hospital administrator, John 
Rudd).           
  Like the Medicaid expansions, the SCHIP expansions raised two important 
issues: low take-up rates and large crowd-out effects (Shore-Shepard, 2000; 
Cunningham et al, 2002; Lo Sasso and Buchmueller, 2004; Hudson et al, 2005). States 
have made great efforts to address these issues: to encourage take-up and improve 
retention, states have developed innovative outreach programs, through which they 
have disseminated information about their programs, simplified application and 
enrollment processes, and assisted with those procedures (Aizer, 2007; Buchmueller et 
al, 2008). To reduce crowding-out effects, several states have chosen a waiting period 
strategy such that a child is required to be uninsured for a certain period of time (2-12 
months) prior to enrolling in SCHIP (Kronebusch and Elbel, 2004; Kenny, 2007). 
 
 
 
                                                 
71
 The ratio of Medicaid to Medicare payments for hospital care (initial hospitalization with low 
complexity, CPT code=99221) is $47.91/$71.54=0.67 in 2001. 
72
 Based on Hadley and Holahan’s analysis of 1998-2000 MEPS, 29.3% of total pediatric care ended up 
with uncompensated care. 
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(b) Pediatric Hospitalization: ACS vs. non-ACS Hospitalization  
Children’s hospitalizations account for about 8 percent of total inpatient episodes. 
Primary causes of pediatric hospitalizations are diseases of the respiratory system 
(asthma, pneumonia, and bronchitis), various infections, appendicitis, general 
symptoms, as well as digestive and kidney diseases. Hospitalizations can be divided 
into two broad categories—ambulatory care sensitive (ACS) and non-ACS cases—
based on whether or not they might have been prevented by better primary care and 
greater early medical interventions: ACS conditions are potentially preventable with 
timely and effective primary care, while non-ACS conditions are not. The ACS 
conditions are often called “avoidable,” “discretionary,” or “preventable” ones, while 
non-ACS conditions are called “unavoidable,” “non-discretionary”, or “non-
preventable” ones; however, we believe that both ACS and non-ACS conditions have 
some room for discretion, although the scope of discretion for ACS conditions are 
relatively larger. These ACS hospitalizations are used as an indicator of quality and 
quantity of primary care or as an objective measure for children’s health (Kaestner et 
al, 2001; Dafny and Gruber, 2005; Aizer, 2007; Cousineau et al, 2008). Examples of 
ACS conditions are asthma, pneumonia, gastroenteritis, diabetes, nutritional 
deficiencies, dehydration, severe ENT infections, immunization preventable 
conditions, and so on. According to McConnochie et al (1997), 18 to 28 percent of 
pediatric hospitalizations are believed to be ambulatory care sensitive.  
We define ACS conditions based on International Classification of Diseases-9-
Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) codes listed in Dafny and Gruber (2005), Weisman 
et al (1992), as well as Billings et al (1993). Panel (a) in Table 3.1 includes the ICD-9 
codes used to define ACS conditions, while the rest are considered non-ACS 
conditions. Obviously, these non-ACS conditions can be further broken down 
according to the scope of discretion. In this paper, we first examine non-ACS  
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[Table 3.1] ICD-9 Codes for Children’s Hospitalization 
 
Panel (a): Ambulatory Care Sensitive Conditions 
Condition ICD-9 Codes 
Immunization preventable 
conditions 
032, 033, 037, 045, 055, 056, 072, 390,  391, 
070.3, 041.5, 320.0 
Grand Mal status and other 
epileptic convulsions 
345, 780.3, 642.6 
Severe ENT infections 382, 462, 463, 465, 472.1, 461, 475, 383.0 
Bacterial pneumonia 481-487 
 
Asthma 493 
Tuberculosis 011-018 
 
Cellulitis 681, 682, 683, 686 
Diabetes 250.0, 250.1, 250.2, 250.3, 250.4, 250.5, 250.6, 
250.7, 250.8, 250.9 
Hypoglycemia 251.0, 251.2 
Gastroenteritis 276.5, 558.9 
Kidney/urinary infection 590, 598.0, 599.0, 599.9 
Dehydration-volume depletion 276.5 
Iron deficiency anemia 280.1, 280.8, 280.9 
Nutritional deficiencies 260, 261, 262, 265, 266, 280, 281, 268.0, 268.1 
Failure to thrive 783.4 
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary 
Disease (Acute bronchitis and 
bronchiolitis) 
491, 492, 494, 496, 490, 466.0, 466.1 
Other acute and subacute forms 
of ischemic heart disease 
411.1, 411.8, 413 
 
Hypertensive Disease 401.0, 401.9, 402.00, 402.10, 402.90, 402.0, 
403.0, 404.0 
Ulcer 531-534 
Pelvic Inflammatory Disease 614 
Dental 521, 522, 523, 525, 528 
Other abnormal heart sounds 785.3 
Congenital syphilis 090 
Panel (b): Extremely Unavoidable Cases 
Condition ICD-9 Codes 
Broken bones 800-829 
Injuries 861-897 
Crushing injuries 925-929 
Foreign Body Entering Through Orifice 930-939 
Burns 940-949 
Appendicitis 540-542 
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hospitalizations as a whole. Then, among the non-ACS conditions, we specify 
conditions that would unequivocally require hospitalization, such as broken bones, 
burns, and serious injuries (from car accidents, gun shots, etc). Panel (b) in Table 3.1 
shows the ICD-9 codes for these extreme cases, which have absolutely no room for 
discretion. Although we expect “ACS” hospitalizations to decrease, and “non-ACS” 
hospitalizations to increase after the coverage expansions, these extremely mandatory 
hospitalizations are not expected to change. 
 
III. Literature Review 
 
Many studies have examined policy impacts on take-up of Medicaid, its effect on 
uninsurance among children as well as substitution of Medicaid for private coverage 
(Dubay et al, 2000; Baughman, 2004; LoSasso and Buchmueller, 2004; Hudson and 
Selden, 2007; LoSasso and Buchmueller, 2008; Shore-Sheppard, 2008), changes in 
medical care utilization (Lave et al, 1998; Joyce and Racine, 2005; Davidoff et al, 
2005; Duderstadt et al, 2006; Seden and Hudson, 2006; Wang et al, 2007; Currie et al, 
2008), and health outcomes (Currie and Gruber 1996; Kenny et al, 2000; Szilagyi et 
al, 2000; Lykens and Jargowsky, 2002; Currie et al, 2008). Studies about take-up rates 
and crowding-out effects examined a linear relationship between a fraction of the 
public insurance eligible population and a probability for each coverage type among 
persons in the CPS March sample: the probability of having public insurance indicates 
take-up, and the probability of having private insurance suggests crowding-out. They 
presented different levels of take-up rates and crowding-out effects. Based on various 
data sources73 and subgroup of children74, past studies unanimously found a positive 
                                                 
73
 Most studies used the National Health Insurance Survey (NHIS), while a few used the Medical 
Expenditure Panel Survey, National Survey of Children’ Health, and National Immunization Survey.   
74
 Most studies examined all children under 19, but several studies restricted their sample to infants 
under age 2, immigrant children, or those with chronic illness. 
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association between public insurance expansions and health care utilization, although 
it is debatable whether the expansions improved health outcomes. 
There have been two national studies of the effect of expansions on children’s 
hospitalizations, and both studied the early expansions before 1996. Kaestner et al 
(2001) examined the impact of the first wave of Medicaid expansions on children’s 
hospitalizations and health outcomes. Using NIS data in 1988 and 1992, they found 
that Medicaid expansions decreased the incidence of ACS hospitalizations among 
children aged 2-6 from very low-income zip code areas. Dafny and Gruber (2005) 
studied the impact of Medicaid expansions in the 1980s and early 1990s on children’s 
hospital care. Using the National Hospital Discharge Survey (NHDS) for 1983-1996, 
they found both efficiency and price effects: Medicaid expansions for low-income 
children increased total hospitalization rates and number of procedures performed at 
hospital, while length of hospital stay decreased, and avoidable hospitalizations did 
not display a statistically significant change.  
We find only three recent papers that specifically study the impact of the 
SCHIP expansions on hospitalization rates; all three studied the state of California 
alone: Aizer (2007), Bermudez and Baker (2005), and Cousineau et al (2008). 
Cousineau et al (2008) studied Children’s Health Initiatives (CHIs), a supplement 
program to Medicaid and SCHIP in California, which have been developed in 26 
counties since 2001. Their findings are also consistent with those in the previous 
literature: showing a negative relationship between increases in public insurance 
coverage and ACS hospitalization rates. Bermudez and Baker (2005) and Aizer (2007) 
are two studies that examined SCHIP enrollment, and its relation to ACS 
hospitalization rates in California. Both studies found that higher SCHIP enrollments 
reduced avoidable hospitalization rates. In particular, Aizer (2007) identified 
administrative hassle and insufficient knowledge as major reasons for low take-up 
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rates and used number and presence of bilingual administrative staff who could help 
parents to enroll their children in SCHIP, as well as bilingual advertisements, as 
instruments for enrollment rates. Given the unique nature of California, it is hard to 
learn how children’s hospitalization has been affected in the nation as a whole.  
 
IV. Data and Empirical Strategy 
 
Data 
Our primary source of data is the Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS), part of the 
Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP), sponsored by the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). The NIS is a nationally representative 
sample with all patients’ discharge records for 20% of U.S. community hospitals in 
each of several states. The greatest advantages of this data set are its large sample size 
and provision of detailed information about patients—age, DRG codes, diagnosis and 
procedure codes, payer source, and length of stay. 
We use the discharge records from 1996 to 2002, which encompasses both the 
pre- and post- expansion period, and includes 19-35 states: for 2002, the NIS contains 
about 8 million hospital discharges (1.4 million for children’s hospitalizations) from 
35 states (the 35 states represented here contain 83% of the U.S. population)75; for 
1996, it contains 6.5 million discharges (1.2 million for children’s hospitalizations) 
from 19 states (59% of the U.S. population). This sample size is 20 times greater than 
that of the NHDS, the other national discharge data source, used by Dafny and Gruber 
(2005) (8 million in NIS vs. 375,000 in NHDS in 2005). Although the NIS does not 
include all discharge records, using discharge weights provided by the NIS, we are 
                                                 
75
 Kaestner et al (2001) studied 8 states in 1988, which represent 40% of the U.S. population, and 11 
states in 1992, which represent 53% of the U.S. population. 
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able to produce estimates for the universe of hospitalizations at the national level. We 
obtain population estimates from the Census Bureau, which we use as a denominator 
in calculation of hospitalization rates. 
We select children aged 0-18 who were hospitalized during 1996-2002. After 
we drop newborns76, who have a different hospitalization pattern, our sample size is 
3.6 million. For the main analysis, we further restrict our sample to those aged 0-15 
(2.7 million) and divide them into four age subgroups: children less than 1 year of age 
(no newborns), 1-5 years, 6-10 years, and 11-15 years. Children within each age 
category are under the same eligibility rules, and their causes of hospitalizations are 
similar. Here, we do not include those aged 16-18, in order to make our sample 
consistent with Dafny and Gruber (2005), but we later include this older age group for 
a robustness check. We also examine the further breakdown of our sample into single 
year of age (16 age groups for 0-15 years) in the robustness section. 
  
Empirical Strategy 
Our objective is to examine the impact of the SCHIP expansions on hospitalization 
rates for children and intensity of care during hospital visits. Model I is our baseline 
econometric model, following the specification in Dafny and Gruber (2005). 
 
Model I:  YAST = α + β1 ELIGAST + β2 AGE_GROUPA + β3 STATES + β4 YEART + β5 
STATE × YEAR + eAST 
 
YAST is the rate of hospitalizations for age group A, state S, and year T, or another 
dependent variable of our interest: hospitalization rates of each type (ACS or non-
ACS), length of stay, and number of procedures. The hospitalization rate is the 
number of hospitalizations in the age group/state/year cell divided by the population 
                                                 
76
  DRG code 385-391. 5.7 million among 9.3 million pediatric discharges (61%) are dropped. 
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estimate for that age group, state, and year. All dependent variables are used in log 
forms: log hospitalization rates, log length of stay, and log number of procedures. 
The explanatory variable of our primary interest is ELIG, generosity of public 
insurance programs. Our aim is to have a measure that reflects the magnitude by 
which public health insurance eligibility expanded for each group. Following the 
algorithm of Currie and Gruber (1995) and many other researchers, we simulate 
eligibility for public health insurance (Medicaid and SCHIP) among children under 
19, using a constant national sample from the CPS March supplements of 1997-2003. 
ELIGAST is the fraction of children in age group A who would be eligible for 
Medicaid/SCHIP had they lived in state S in year T. This year/state/age group 
instrument captures the generosity of the states’ public health insurance programs, 
which is attributed only to eligibility rules, independent of other factors such as 
differences in income, race, or age distribution of children in each state.  
We include a full set of dummy variables for states, years, and age groups in 
order to control for any underlying correlation between SCHIP eligibility and 
hospitalizations within these groups. As in Dafny and Gruber (2005), we also include 
a full set of State×Year interaction terms in order to control for other time-varying, 
state-specific trends that might be correlated with SCHIP eligibility policy. 
Here, we assume that marginal effects on hospitalizations result from 
beneficiaries of public insurance coverage, so that we examine patterns of hospital 
care for all children. In order to check whether changes in hospitalizations did 
originate from those who obtain public insurance coverage, we break down total 
hospitalizations by coverage type—public, private, and uninsured—and estimate 
Model I separately by insurance status. We use the fraction of hospitalizations for each 
coverage type, as well as the log number of admissions by insurance type, as 
alternative dependent variables. 
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V. Results 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.2 presents descriptive statistics. The average hospitalization rate is 7.61%, and 
the ACS hospitalization rate is 3.38%. On average, children under 16 who were 
hospitalized during 1996-2002 stayed for 3.85 days and received 0.79 procedures 
during their hospital stays. 
 
[Table 3.2] Descriptive Statistics 
 
(N=732) Mean Standard Deviation 
Hospitalization Rates 7.61% 0.10 
 ACS 3.38% 0.05 
 non-ACS 4.23% 0.06 
ELIG (Simulated) 0.47 0.14 
ELIG for CPS 0.40 0.14 
   
Length of Stay (days) 3.85 1.46 
Number of Procedures 0.79 0.36 
 
Hospitalizations 
Table 3.3 reports the estimates of ELIG for the numbers of hospitalized 
children and hospitalization rates for total, ACS, and non-ACS cases. Panel I shows 
that the total number of hospitalizations increased by 4.6 percent if ELIG increased by 
10 percentage points. However, this increase is entirely attributed to the increase in the 
number of non-ACS hospitalizations: the number of ACS hospitalizations increased 
by 0.1 percent, but the estimate is small and statistically insignificant; the number of 
non-ACS hospitalizations increased by 8.5 percent, which is statistically significantly 
different from zero.  
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[Table 3.3] Results for Hospitalization 
 
Panel II (Rates: # of hospitalizations/population) 
 1996-2002 ln(total hosp’n rate) ln(ACS_rate) ln(non-ACS_rate) 
ELIG (Simulated) 0.39** 0.04 0.79*** 
  (0.18) (0.16) (0.22) 
Main effect (Age 
group, state, and 
year fixed-effects) Y Y Y 
STATE×YEAR Y Y Y 
Average (unlogged) 0.076 0.034 0.042 
Observations 732 732 732 
Adjusted R-square 0.98 0.99 0.96 
F test 367.16 587.99 417.08 
p value 0 0 0 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
*** significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
 
In Panel II, our dependent variable is hospitalization rates, number of 
hospitalized children divided by population estimates for each age group/state/year 
cell. The first column shows that an increase in public insurance coverage of 10 
percentage points increased the total hospitalization rates by 3.9 percent. Our estimate 
is about half the size of the estimate obtained by Dafny and Gruber (2005), who 
studied earlier Medicaid expansions with the NHDS. Considering that SCHIP 
beneficiaries have lower take-up rates than their Medicaid counterparts, the size of our 
Panel I (Counts=# of hospitalizations) 
 1996-2002 
ln(# of total 
hospitalizations) 
ln(# of ACS  
hospitalizations ) 
ln(# of non-ACS  
hospitalizations) 
ELIG (Simulated) 0.46** 0.1 0.85*** 
  (0.19) (0.15) (0.23) 
Main effect (Age 
group, state, and 
year fixed-effects) Y Y Y 
STATE×YEAR Y Y Y 
Average (unlogged) 18237.45 7417.58 10819.87 
Observations 732 732 732 
Adjusted R-square 0.98 0.99 0.97 
F test 555.81 618.39 409 
p value 0 0 0 
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estimate seems reasonable. Since the fraction of children who are eligible for public 
insurance coverage increased by 0.20, from 0.31 in 1996 to 0.51 in 2002, this estimate 
implies that total hospitalizations increased by 7.8 percent, or 5.9 additional 
hospitalizations per 1000 children (based on average hospitalization rates for all 
children aged 0-15 during 1996-2002). Our findings imply that the price effect 
outweights any efficiency gain from better access to primary care.  
In the next two columns, we decompose total hospitalizations into ACS and 
non-ACS cases. As with the number of hospitalizations above, we find that the 
increase in total hospitalization rates was due to the increase in non-ACS 
hospitalization rates, but not ACS cases: a 10 percentage-point increase in ELIG 
increased non-ACS hospitalization rates by 7.9 percent (6.6 additional hospitalizations 
per 1000 children77), while ACS hospitalization rates increased by 0.4 percent, which 
is small and not statistically significant.  
 
Intensity of Care 
So far, we have studied the policy impact on a chance of being hospitalized, 
i.e., hospitalization decision before admissions. Expansions of public insurance 
coverage can also influence intensity of care when a child is hospitalized, i.e., amount 
of care after admissions. Table 3.4 presents estimates for ELIG for length of stay and 
number of procedures, two measures for intensity of care. Intensity of care increased 
overall after the SCHIP expansion, but this impact originated from non-ACS 
hospitalizations. A 10 percentage-point increase in ELIG increased hospital stays by 
3.2 percent and number of procedures by 8.2 percent: with average values of each 
measure used as a baseline, our estimates indicate 0.12 days longer hospital stays and 
 
                                                 
77
 0.20 (increases in ELIG) * 0.042 (average unavoidable hospitalization rates) * 1000 * 0.079 (the 
estimate) 
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[Table 3.4] Results for Intensity of Care 
 
 ln(length of stay) ln(# of procedures) 
 1996-2002 Total ACS 
Non-
ACS Total ACS 
Non-
ACS 
ELIG (Simulated) 0.32 -0.02 0.33 0.82*** -0.09 0.73*** 
  (0.24) (0.19) (0.28) (0.26) (0.33) (0.27) 
Main effect (Age 
group, state, and 
year fixed-effects) Y Y Y Y Y Y 
STATE×YEAR Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Average 
(unlogged) 3.85 2.71 4.55 0.79 0.28 1.11 
Observations 732 732 732 732 732 732 
Adjusted R-square 0.77 0.67 0.66 0.84 0.74 0.68 
F test 30.45 38.16 26.01 28.72 72.21 29.56 
p value 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0.06 more procedures. Compared to Dafny and Gruber (2005), who found mixed 
results regarding intensity of care—decreased length of stay (0.13 days) and increased 
number of procedures (0.04 procedures)—after Medicaid expansions, we consistently 
find that overall intensity of care increased after the SCHIP expansions, although the 
increase in length of stay is not statistically significantly different from zero.  
When we break down these two measures by ACS and non-ACS conditions, 
however, we find evidence that seems to support the efficiency theory because 
intensity of care increased only for non-ACS hospitalizations, while there was no 
statistically significant change for ACS hospitalizations. In fact, those who were 
hospitalized with ACS conditions were released more quickly (by 0.005 days) and had 
fewer procedures (by 0.003) during hospital visits, although these estimates are very 
small and statistically insignificant at the 10% level. For those who were hospitalized 
with non-ACS conditions, however, intensity of care increased in both measures: 
length of stay increased by 0.15 days (which is not statistically significant), and 
number of procedures increased by 0.08 in a statistically significant manner. Our 
findings give stronger evidence for both the price and efficiency effects: the coverage 
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expansions increased access to care in overall (the price effect); patients whose 
hospitalization decisions were marginal had better primary care and thus enhanced 
health outcomes before being hospitalized, so that their hospital stays became shorter, 
and they needed fewer procedures (the efficiency effect). 
 
Hospitalizations by Coverage Types 
In this section, we examine hospitalizations separately by coverage type. We 
expect that marginal increases in hospitalizations originate from low-income children 
who have public insurance coverage. That means, among pediatric hospitalizations, 
the number of children who come with public health insurance should increase after 
the SCHIP expansions. Here, we divide total hospitalizations into three subgroups—
Medicaid, privately insurance, and uninsured—and count admissions for each 
coverage type. 
Table 3.5 shows that the number of Medicaid admissions increased after the 
SCHIP expansion, as did the number of privately insured admissions. However, the 
increase in hospitalizations was larger for Medicaid admissions: in response to a 10 
percentage-point increase in ELIG, the number of Medicaid admissions increased by 
418, while the number of privately insured admissions increased by 357. The number 
of uninsured admissions decreased by 9.3 percent, but the estimate is not statistically 
significantly different from zero. In Panel II, we use a fraction of hospitalizations for 
each coverage type as our dependent variables: for example, the fraction of Medicaid 
hospitalizations is the number of Medicaid hospitalizations divided by total 
hospitalizations for each age group/state/year cell. Again, we find that the fraction of 
Medicaid hospitalizations increased, by 0.10 if ELIG increased from 0 to 1, while the 
fraction of uninsured hospitalizations decreased by 0.06. Both are statistically 
significant at the 5% level. The fraction of privately insured hospitalizations decreased 
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[Table 3.5] Results for Hospitalizations by Coverage Type 
 
Panel II (proportions) 
 Proportion of Medicaid Private insurance Uninsured 
ELIG (Simulated) 0.10** -0.04 -0.06** 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) 
Main effect (Age 
group, state, and 
year fixed-effects) Y Y Y 
STATE×YEAR Y Y Y 
Observations 732 732 732 
Adjusted R-square 0.87 0.86 0.72 
F test 80.67 115.43 48.07 
p value 0 0 0 
 
by 0.04, based on which we can infer crowding-out effects, but this change is not 
statistically significantly different from zero. 
 
VI. Robustness Check 
 
We conduct several robustness checks and find that our results are highly robust to 
alternative measures and specifications. First, we use the instrumental variables 
method, following Dafny and Gruber (2005). Here, we create ELIG_CPS, a fraction of 
children for each age group in a given year and state who are actually eligible for 
Panel I (counts) 
 ln (# of Medicaid) ln (# of the privately insured) 
ln (# of 
the uninsured) 
ELIG (Simulated) 0.64*** 0.39** -0.93 
  (0.24) (0.19) (0.61) 
Main effect (Age 
group, state, and year 
fixed-effects) Y Y Y 
STATE×YEAR Y Y Y 
Average (unlogged) 7508 9157 882 
Observations 732 732 732 
Adjusted R-square 0.97 0.98 0.82 
F test 347.86 474.45 280.68 
p value 0 0 0 
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public insurance coverage in the CPS March sample. This fraction is different from 
the simulated policy measure (ELIG) because we do not use the same set of national 
sample across states. Since ELIG_CPS is endogenous by nature, we use ELIG as an 
instrument variable for the CPS group level measure of eligibility. This IV method 
produces results almost identical to those from the reduced form.  
Second, we include interaction terms between year and age group, and then 
state-age group interaction terms as in Dafny and Gruber (2005). These Year×Age 
group interaction terms control for confounding effects that could be attributed to 
different time trends across age groups, while the State×Age group interaction terms 
control for time-invariant heterogeneity across state and age group cells. Our results in 
Table 3.6 report the estimates for ELIG. When we add the Year×Age group 
interaction terms, the magnitude of the estimates and their standard errors both 
increase. In the case of ACS hospitalizations, the estimate increases by a substantial 
amount and becomes statistically significant. Finally, when we add the State×Age 
group interaction terms, the estimates for total and non-ACS hospitalizations become 
negative and statistically insignificant, while the estimate for ACS hospitalizations 
remains positive and statistically significant. These findings imply that the changes in 
ACS hospitalizations are sensitive to the specifications. 
Third, we adjust our standard errors for correlation within states, clustering 
standard errors at the state level. Most of the results, except for those concerning the 
fractions of hospitalizations by coverage type, remain statistically significant. Fourth, 
among unavoidable hospitalizations, we separately examine admissions for extreme 
conditions that would unequivocally require hospitalization, such as broken bones. At 
the margin, we do not expect any changes in these extreme cases. Table 3.7 does show 
that there is no statistically significant change in this type of hospitalization; the result 
is robust to the inclusion of Year×Age group and State×Age group interaction terms. 
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[Table 3.6] Robustness Check for Hospitalization Rates 
 
Hospitalization 
Rates 
ln(Total 
hosp’n 
rate) 
ln(Total 
hosp’n 
rate) 
ln(ACS 
hopt’n 
rate) 
ln(ACS 
hopt’n 
rate) 
ln(non-
ACS 
hopt’n 
rate) 
ln(non-
ACS 
hopt’n 
rate) 
ELIG (Simulated) 0.64** -0.05 0.64*** 0.61** 0.74** -0.47 
  (0.27) (0.37) (0.22) (0.30) (0.32) (0.46) 
Main effect (Age 
group, state, and 
year fixed-
effects) 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
STATE×YEAR Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Age 
Group×YEAR Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Age 
Group×STATE N Y N Y N Y 
Observations 732 732 732 732 732 732 
R-square 0.98 0.99 0.99 1 0.98 0.99 
F test 357.22 3113.69 695.65 3833.92 370.25 4737.29 
p value 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
[Table 3.7] Robustness Check for Hospitalization Rates of Extreme Cases 
 
Hospitalization Rates for 
Extreme Cases (broken bones, 
burns, injuries, etc) 
ln(extreme 
cases) 
ln(extreme 
cases) 
ln(extreme 
cases) 
ELIG (Simulated) 0.6 0.97 -0.37 
  (0.62) (0.68) (1.01) 
Main effect (Age group, state, 
and year fixed-effects) Y Y Y 
STATE×YEAR Y Y Y 
AGE Group×YEAR N Y Y 
Age Group×STATE N N Y 
Observations 732 732 732 
R-square 0.53 0.52 0.6 
F test 74.01 52.79 233.69 
p value 0 0 0 
 
This result strengthens our earlier findings about the policy impact on the increase in 
non-ACS hospitalizations. In other words, the coverage expansions help children who 
may not seek heath care without coverage to receive necessary hospital care when they 
get sick. 
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Fifth, we include the upper age group of 16-18 year olds, and redo all of the 
estimations in the main analysis. We mentioned that we did not include this upper age 
group in the main analysis in order to construct a consistent sample with that of Dafny 
and Gruber (2005). Moreover, the primary cause of hospitalizations for female teens 
aged above 15 is pregnancy-related or maternity care, so that the pattern of their 
hospital use may be different from that of children in other age groups. For the SCHIP 
expansions, however, the increases in income thresholds were larger for older 
children, those aged above 11. Therefore, the magnitude of policy impacts may 
increase when we add this older age group to our original sample. Table 3.8 presents 
estimates for the five age groups including 16-18 year olds. These results are 
consistent with our main results. For hospitalization rates, the magnitude of our 
estimates is slightly smaller: when ELIG increases by 20 percentage points, there are 
5.5 additional hospitalizations per 1000 children. For intensity of care, however, the 
estimates are larger and statistically significantly positive for both measures: in 
response to a 10 percentage-point increase in ELIG, length of hospital stay increased 
by 0.17 days, and number of procedures performed per admissions increased by 0.10.  
 
[Table 3.8] Results for the Five Age Groups (16-18 year-olds included) 
 
Panel I (Hospitalization Rates=# of hospitalizations/population) 
 ln(total hosp’n rate) ln(ACS hopt’n rate) ln(non-ACS hopt’n rate) 
ELIG (Simulated) 0.35* 0.07 0.73*** 
  
(0.18) (0.15) -0.21 
Main effect (Age 
group, state, and 
year fixed-effects) 
Y Y Y 
STATE×YEAR Y Y Y 
Average (unlogged) 0.078 0.029 0.049 
Observations 915 915 915 
Adjusted R-square 0.96 0.98 0.94 
F test 208.07 417.72 173.52 
p value 0 0 0 
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[Table 3.8] continued 
 
Panel II (Intensity of Care) 
 ln(length of stay) ln(# of procedures) 
  
Total ACS Non-ACS Total ACS 
Non-
ACS 
ELIG (Simulated) 0.44** 0.30 0.51** 1.15** 0.42 1.05** 
  
(0.19) (0.15) (0.22) (0.23) (0.26) (0.22) 
Main effect (Age 
group, state, and year 
fixed-effects) 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
STATE×YEAR Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Average (unlogged) 3.76 2.75 4.33 0.91 0.31 1.19 
Observations 915 915 915 915 915 915 
Adjusted R-square 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.75 0.71 0.62 
F test 24.07 38.03 19.72 19.83 50.02 14.25 
p value 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
For non-ACS hospital visits, the magnitude of the estimates is even larger: 
0.22 days longer hospital stays and 0.12 more procedures. 
Finally, we estimate our model with individual age fixed-effects (single year of age 
between 0 and 15 constructs each age dummy), instead of the 4 age group dummies. In 
Table 3.9, we find the same patterns as our main results: total and non-ACS 
hospitalizations increased in a statistically significant manner, while intensity of care 
overall and for non-ACS cases also increased after the expansions. The estimates for 
hospitalizations are smaller than those in the main results, but the estimates for 
intensity of care are larger and become statistically significant. For ACS conditions, 
both hospitalizations and intensity of care decreased, albeit not statistically significant. 
These findings clearly suggest that the SCHIP expansions provide greater access to 
hospital care and better access to primary care. 
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[Table 3.9] Results for Each of 0-15 Age group (16 Age Groups) 
  
Panel I (Hospitalization Rates=# of hospitalizations/population) 
 
ln(total hosp’n rate) ln(ACS hopt’n 
rate) 
ln(non-ACS hopt’n 
rate) 
ELIG (Simulated) 0.27*** -0.14 0.70*** 
  
(0.10) (0.10) (0.12) 
Main effect (Age 
group, state, and 
year fixed-effects) 
Y Y Y 
STATE×YEAR Y Y Y 
Average (unlogged) 0.045 0.018 0.027 
Observations 2895 2895 2895 
Adjusted R-square 0.96 0.96 0.94 
F test 636.93 668.09 414.83 
p value 0 0 0 
 
Panel II (Intensity of Care) 
 ln(length of stay) ln(# of procedures) 
  Total ACS 
Non-
ACS Total ACS 
Non-
ACS 
ELIG (Simulated) 0.43*** -0.09 0.54*** 0.89*** -0.59* 1.09*** 
  (0.11) (0.09) (0.14) (0.15) (0.34) (0.20) 
Main effect (Age 
group, state, and year 
fixed-effects) Y Y Y Y Y Y 
STATE×YEAR Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Average (unlogged) 3.64 2.63 4.16 0.80 0.28 1.09 
Observations 2895 2892 2894 2889 2892 2894 
Adjusted R-square 0.67 0.51 0.63 0.78 0.56 0.51 
F test 55.87 42.87 40.98 65.52 55.26 40.74 
p value 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
VII. Conclusion and Discussion 
 
This paper examines how expansions of public insurance coverage for low-income 
children influence incidence of hospitalization as well as intensity of care during 
hospital visits. Since its inception in 1997, the SCHIP has increased numbers of 
children with public insurance coverage. We hypothesize that this coverage expansion 
could increase or decrease hospital care for low-income children because of two 
counterbalancing effects. First, low-income children who were previously uninsured 
 198 
but gained coverage, the major coverage gain group, are likely to have better access to 
primary and preventive care. This earlier medical intervention will enhance their 
health outcomes, so that some hospitalizations may be avoidable (the efficiency 
effect). On the other hand, families who now face lower out-of-pocket costs with the 
gain of public insurance coverage may be more willing to seek hospital care when 
they get sick (the price effect). Based on the same logic, children who are hospitalized 
may need less care if earlier medical interventions effectively improve their health 
status, while they may demand more care if intensity of care received at hospitals 
before gaining coverage was lower than the optimal level. 
Our findings show that the coverage expansions for low-income children result 
in greater access to and higher intensity of hospital care. When the fraction of the 
eligible population among children aged 0-15 increased by 0.20 percentage points 
from 1996 to 2002, we find that 5.9 per 1000 additional children were hospitalized, 
and that they stayed 0.24 days longer at hospitals and had 0.12 more procedures 
performed. These findings indicate that the CHIP expansions provided better access to 
hospital care as well as increased intensity of care during hospital visits. However, we 
also find that these increases in hospitalization rates and intensity of care were entirely 
attributable to those with non-ACS conditions, but not those with ACS conditions. 
This finding implies that the price effects balanced out the efficiency effects: all of the 
increase in hospital care came from children whose conditions were not preventable 
with primary care (those with only the price effects), but children at the margin (those 
with both the price and efficiency effects) did not increase hospital care after gaining 
coverage. This also suggests that increased public insurance coverage may reduce 
inefficiency in the provision of care: those without coverage are more likely to delay 
seeking care, which jeopardizes their health and incurs needlessly higher costs when 
they show up in advanced stages of illness, or arrive at emergency rooms with non-
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emergency conditions. However, the coverage gain encourages patients to have more 
access to primary and preventive care and seek needed care in a timely manner, which 
prevents development of disease into advanced stages or unnecessary use of 
emergency rooms. As a result, increased public insurance coverage may reduce 
potentially high medical costs in the future. Reassuringly, we find no statistically 
significant effect of the policy on hospitalization rates for extreme conditions (such as 
broken bones) which should not have been affected at the margin. Also, our results are 
robust to various specifications and different sets of samples. 
The impact we estimate for the CHIP expansions is smaller than that found by 
Dafny and Gruber (2005) for earlier Medicaid expansions. Taking into account lower 
take-up rates and larger crowding-out effects for the CHIP expansions, however, the 
size of our estimate seems reasonable. Our next step is to examine policy impact by 
race and age of children as well as further breakdowns of types of hospitalization by 
their scope of discretion. Since non-whites are overrepresented among beneficiaries of 
public insurance coverage, we expect a larger policy impact on non-white, low-income 
children. 
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